Opinion - Leader Page Articles   

Whither Sri Lanka's peace process?

V.S. Sambandan

Will the situation spiral out of control or will it ultimately veer back to the path of negotiations? The international community could help determine what happens.

SRI LANKA's faltering peace process suffered another blow on April 25 when a woman suicide bomber of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) blew herself up inside the Army headquarters in Colombo. She failed in her mission to kill the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army, Sarath Fonseka, but what she did was to alter the nature of the engagement between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE.

The modus operandi adopted by the LTTE in its latest assassination bid — deploying a woman suicide bomber on a day marked for maternity care in the Army Hospital — shows the repulsive extent its war against the state has descended to. Two events of Tuesday mark a complete difference from the past four-odd years of a tenuous peace in Sri Lanka: the afternoon assassination attempt on Lt. Gen. Fonseka and the evening "deterrent strikes" by the Air Force and other wings of the armed forces.

Both carry clear signals from the Tigers and the Government. These need careful interpretation to even hazard a guess as to what is in store for South Asia's bloodiest internal conflict — whether the situation will spiral out of control or ultimately veer back to the path of negotiations. The "deterrent strikes" by the Sri Lanka Air Force, in the face of what the Government termed fresh LTTE attacks on the Sri Lanka Navy in the sensitive eastern Trincomalee district, mark a departure from the state's rules of engagement with the LTTE. So far the state was seen as "weak" in its responses to the LTTE's killings and "provocative attacks."

At stake in this new phase of engagement between the state and the rebels are issues that are both conceptual — the equation between the Government and a group that claims to be the "sole representative" of the Tamils and is bent on carving out a separate state — and humanitarian — where civilians and foot soldiers are often the first casualties in what is essentially a conflict that requires a political solution.

The LTTE's selection of the target for the latest suicide-bombing mission — the Army Commander — is central to its game plan. Not only is Lt. Gen. Fonseka the Army chief, he has battlefield experience in the northern theatre, has opposed the LTTE's demand for dismantling the northern High Security Zones even before he assumed office, and has worked on strengthening the Army since he took over in December 2005. To that extent, the assassination attempt is seen as both a `first strike' and a `pre-emptive one.'

The LTTE has been spoiling for a fight for long, trying to provoke the Government into a retaliation of sorts, which it could then play up at international fora to its advantage. This, while unilaterally suspending the Geneva negotiations to discuss the ceasefire agreement, points to a scenario in which the LTTE pushes the state over the brink, resorts to ground offensives, alters the demarcation lines between Government and rebel-held Sri Lanka, and then offers to negotiate. In short, the LTTE's game plan is to stay away from negotiations till it sees itself as being able to talk from a position of military strength. Its actions are largely unidirectional — towards fulfilling the agenda of separation through military means.

In the near term, the string of recent events — the LTTE's provocative strikes over the past couple of weeks, the attempted assassination of the Army chief, and the Sri Lankan Government's military response — is also to be seen against the backdrop of the Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu. By timing its pullout from the Geneva talks and then launching military offensives to synchronise with the democratic process in Tamil Nadu, the LTTE's unspoken agenda is to also propel the Sri Lankan Tamils issue into the Indian political discourse.

What requires more understanding is the Sri Lankan Government's military action after the assassination attempt on April 25. According to the Government, the Navy came under LTTE fire in the eastern Trincomalee district hours after the assassination attempt, and its air strikes, supported by the army and the navy, were to "deter" further rebel attacks. Herein is the containment agenda of any engagement between a state and a militarised opponent. The Sri Lankan Government spokesman has gone on record to state: "We have the right of self-defence to guard our security forces and our military camps."

There is also a key political outcome from these actions by the state. For long, hardliners in the south had been pushing for a military offensive against the LTTE. The air strikes have the potential impact of satisfying hardliners and sections of the security forces that feel enfeebled by continued LTTE attacks. Clearly, containment — of both the LTTE attacks and hardline southern rhetoric — is a key state objective directing the present phase of the unfolding military action.

One lesson from the engagements between successive governments in Colombo and the LTTE is that there is no military solution to the conflict. Hence, there is bound to be more pressure on both parties to resume talks and move towards a negotiated settlement.

The political deadlocks over the past decades can be divided into two phases. The pre-Chandrika Kumaratunga-Ranil Wickremesinghe period, in which Sri Lankan governments of the day saw the Tamil power-sharing demands as something that could not be met, and the Kumaratunga-decade when the LTTE, which had by then projected itself as the "sole representative," rejected the federalist packages.

It is on this issue that the Mahinda Rajapakse presidency will have to face its ultimate political test. Elected on a unitarist manifesto, President Rajapakse has now made it clear that he is for "maximum devolution."

A further elaboration of his political model for conflict resolution could significantly alter the internal dynamics that have been set off by the new terms of engagement between the state and the LTTE, and the international view of Sri Lankan affairs.

An unanswered question remains: How long will the current militarised mode continue? Much will depend on how effectively the state manages the military containment exercise and how fast it pushes forward a political solution — even if it is to be a unilateral offer.

For, the LTTE is most likely to strike at the state again. The assassination attempt on Lt. Gen. Fonseka is the clearest indication that rebels' theatre of operations has expanded from the North-East. It also foretells the possibility of a string of offensives aimed at stretching the state's military apparatus.

So far, decisive battles between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE have been in the northern theatre — Mullaittivu, Kilinochchi, and Elephant Pass. All of these are now under LTTE control. This time round, the LTTE has the disadvantage of being weakened in the East. Hence, the possibility of the LTTE changing the nature of its military operations, with more emphasis on non-conventional strikes, is not to be ruled out.

The global mood of zero-tolerance of terrorism and the international bans on the LTTE should make it evident that its project of beating the state into submission will have no takers. The present phase also offers the international community the opportunity to press for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The role of the international community to ensure that matters do not go out of hand gains more relevance now.

Now that the terms of military engagement between the Government and the Tigers have changed, the way out will largely be determined by the manner in which the political engagement is taken forward. For the international community, the key to this will be the manner in which the Government puts forward its solution for restructuring the Sri Lankan state from its present unitarist mould.

The major legacy of Ms. Kumaratunga's 11 years in office is that she had made unhesitant moves towards a federal Sri Lanka. By its successive acts, the LTTE pushed federalism out of the political parameters for a solution, making it more distant a political objective than it was a few years ago.

The past decades of bloodletting stem from two divergent positions — the state's entrenched unitarist position and the rebels' violent intransigence on separatism. The way out, hence, would be to halt the violence and return to the negotiating table to work out a solution that meets the aspirations of the minorities and allays the apprehensions of the majority.

Printer friendly page  
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Stories in this Section

Outrageous attack
The undiplomatic service
Whither Sri Lanka's peace process?
Nepal Army chief helped convince Gyanendra
Cleaning up after Chernobyl
Corrections and clarifications
Historical links, civilisational affinities
Gazing into a cloudy crystal ball
Barbed wire and bridges
Democracy in Nepal
Unrealistic
Laudable verdict
Plagiarism
Clarification

Copyright © 2006, The Hindu. Republication or redissemination of the contents of this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of The Hindu