The Hindu : Front Page : More to it than meets the eye

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Wednesday, May 17, 2006

Front Page

Front Page

More to it than meets the eye

What determined this election? An unwise alliance and a subtle shift in the minority vote, says Yogendra Yadav

A routine change of Government? A mere five-year itch? Or has the Left Democratic Front's victory in Kerala have to do with issues such as governance, policies, and ideology? Will this verdict have a long-term effect on the politics of the State? These questions are bound to confront any serious analyst, even if the media find them much too boring to ask.

The sense of boredom may have to do with the fact that, of the results in the four States that went to the polls, the Kerala verdict ran along the most expected lines. Beginning with The Hindu-CNN-IBN pre-poll survey, which projected 93 to 103 seats for the LDF, all the surveys forecast a big victory for the LDF. The final projection by The Hindu-CNN-IBN, between 107 and 117 seats, may have over-estimated the magnitude of the LDF's victory, but no one really doubted the final outcome.

A close look at the final figures suggests that there is something more than "routine" at work here. The final gap between the vote shares of the LDF and the United Democratic Front is exactly six percentage points, the same the LDF had in its previous best performance in the 1980 Assembly elections. Six percentage points are a huge lead in Kerala. The regular change in governments between 1980 and 2001 took place with the winning alliance having a lead of less than three percentage points. The regime changes can be attributed to the voters' desire to change the government every five years. The pattern was broken in 2001, when the UDF secured a lead of 5.4 percentage points. Then, the UDF was helped by the very poor record of the LDF Government and factionalism within the CPI(M).

What additional factor gave the LDF more than a "routine" margin of victory this time? The Hindu-CNN-IBN Polls, which tracked the mood of the voters before and after the elections, provide the answer. We know that it was not the performance of the Oommen Chandy-led UDF Government. His Government enjoyed a moderately positive rating, better than that of the previous LDF Government. Only the LDF's traditional supporters rated the Government very negatively. Among the floating voters, who shifted to the LDF this time, the dominant opinion went like this: the Government was not bad, yet it needed to be changed.

Not personality driven

We also know that this election was not personality driven. No doubt, V.S. Achuthanandan emerged the clear frontrunner, leaving Mr. Chandy behind. But his popularity was driven by the tide in the favour of the LDF and not the other way round. "VS" has not yet acquired the capacity of "Buddha" [Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, West Bengal Chief Minister], who has carried the party along with him. The leadership issue did not influence the election either; the supporters of both parties supported the existing leadership, and there was hardly any challenge to Mr. Achuthanandan from Pinarayi Vijayan or to Mr. Chandy from Democratic Indira Congress (K) leader K. Karunakaran.

There is also no evidence of a significant ideological shift in the Left's favour. The Hindu-CNN-IBN Polls asked respondents in West Bengal and Kerala a common set of questions to gauge their social and economic views. The findings reveal a marked difference in the political culture of the two States. The electorate of Kerala, Left inclined or otherwise, is generally more "progressive" than that in West Bengal. The Left voters of Kerala are firmer on the party's economic ideology and closer to the positions attributed to VS than to the new economic policies of Mr. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee. The only exception is privatisation, which finds a high degree of acceptance in Kerala. In short, there is little to suggest that ideology determined the election result.

Two factors were at work in making this verdict what it was. A close look at the vote share of the major alliances provides the clue to a small but crucial factor. Mr. Karunakaran's DIC(K) contested 17 seats and managed to win only one. In the constituencies it contested, it secured only 35.9 per cent of the vote. The corresponding figure for the Congress is 43.8 per cent. The post-poll survey showed that had the DIC(K) contested alone, it would have won less than half a per cent of the total vote. Had the Congress not entered into this unwise alliance and contested the seats it allotted to the DIC(K), the UDF's vote share would have increased by one percentage point. The new alliances built by the Left worked much better in comparison. The Indian National League brought it a decent share of votes and paved its entry into the Muslim-dominated areas.

The Left's disadvantage

The second factor has to do with a subtle shift in the social basis of voting. The Left always started from a position of disadvantage, because of its inability to win over the 40 per cent-plus minority vote. The UDF used to start with well above two-thirds of the Christian and Muslim votes in any electoral race. After considerable effort, including an alliance with Muslim sectarian parties, the LDF made a breakthrough in this election. It is not yet clear what the extent of the LDF's gain is and how enduring it will be.

In the 2001 elections, the LDF won only four seats in the 21 "Muslim-dominated" segments and 34 seats in those with a substantial Christian presence. This time the LDF won 13 and 20 seats respectively. Its vote share increased by seven percentage points in Muslim-dominated seats, well above its average. This resulted in big gains for the LDF in Malappuram district and a sweep in Kozhikode. Yet it is not clear how many Muslims finally voted for the LDF. The Hindu-CNN-IBN post-poll survey estimates it at 39 per cent, a modest increase of three percentage points over the last election. The survey under-sampled the Muslim voters and may have underestimated the shift of Muslim votes to the LDF. The LDF also gained in areas with a Christian presence, but not very significantly.

Overall, the picture of the social pattern of voting behaviour remained substantially the same.

The bulk of the LDF vote came from Dalits and OBCs, including the single largest community in the State: Ezhavas. The upper castes, the only section to vote in significant measure for the BJP, appear to have leaned towards the LDF this time. But this shift may not matter much, given their small numbers. In class terms too, the Left represents a classic pyramid: broad at the bottom and narrow at the top. A massive lead of 16 percentage points among the poor enables the LDF to maintain its overall lead. As in the past, the UDF takes a lead over the LDF among the well-to-do. In this respect, the Left in Kerala is different from the Left in West Bengal, which increased its vote share among the middle class and the rich. It is not clear if the gains made by the LDF will endure. If it does, the LDF may succeed in overcoming its traditional weakness among minorities and in levelling the playing field of electoral politics.

(The figures given here are based on The Hindu-CNN-IBN post-poll survey carried out in the State. They may be different from the figures reported in the earlier post-poll surveys, for those did not include constituencies that went to the polls in the last phase of the elections. The discrepancies between the post-poll data and the actual outcome have been corrected by weighting the data by the actual vote share for different parties. Comparison with the voting patterns in 2001 is based on a similar post-poll survey undertaken by the CSDS after the Assembly elections in 2001.)

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