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Teheran poses a difficult choice for Washington

M.K. Bhadrakumar

The prospects of putting together a"like-minded coalition" for bringing about a regime change in Iran appear uncertain.

EIGHTEEN YEARS ago, in a surprise initiative, Iran's spiritual leader Imam Khomeini wrote an "open letter" to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Mikhail Gorbachev. The Imam was ostensibly taking note of the Soviet leader's perestroika and glasnost, and did some plain-speaking as to where the Soviet state went astray through the preceding godless 70 years.

On one plane, the letter was harshly worded. Iran, as the fountainhead of revolutionary Shiaism, and the Soviet Union, situated on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, were ideologically poles apart. Moscow viewed next-door revolutionary Shias with great uneasiness bordering on suspicion. It avoided eye contact.

The significance of the letter lay not in its specific content but in the very fact of such an initiative. The Imam calculated — and Mr. Gorbachev understood — that Teheran and Moscow would stand to gain by cooperating. By 1988, Mr. Gorbachev had long admitted that Afghanistan was a "bleeding wound"; and, Iran was without doubt a moderating influence on the Afghan Mujahideen. The Imam on his part was acutely conscious of the value of Soviet support as the United States was revving up its policy of "containment" of Iran.

Indeed, Iran-Russia relations have never looked back. That is to say, there is a curious precedent for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad's May 7 letter to U.S. President George W. Bush. The initiative, therefore, is worthy of deep contemplation.

Talking to the media in Ankara, Iran's chief negotiator on the nuclear issue, Ali Larijani, suggested in early comments that the letter could "lead to a new diplomatic opening." The American reaction as such has been to randomly pick holes, but, significantly, there has been so far no outright rejection of the Iranian offer of talks. (The Israeli lobby in the U.S. and the neocons would be infuriated by some of Mr. Ahmedinejad's observations.)

Mr. Larijani acknowledged that the tone of the letter did not show any "softening" of the Iranian position as such, but "we need to think about the future of the world, go over problems encountered in the past and understand why people in the region are concerned."

The development once again shows the innate pragmatism that is the hallmark of the Iranian (Persian) temper. Also, Mr. Ahmedinejad's initiative calls attention to the overblown hypothesis among self-opinionated Iran-watchers that the regime in Teheran is torn between "radicals" and "moderates." There should be no doubt that Mr. Ahmedinejad's move carries the imprimatur of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Nor is it conceivable that the Iranian Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guards) would dare sabotage the decision taken by the country's religious leadership.

Teheran's decision nonetheless must be placed contextually. It came on the eve of a crucial meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the five veto-holding member-countries of the U.N. Security Council and of Germany in New York on May 8 for further discussions aimed at evolving a consensus over the next move on the Iran nuclear issue.

Consensus lacking

Clearly, a consensus is lacking on the Iran nuclear issue. There is difficulty in even agreeing on where it is that Iran has faulted in fulfilling its "obligations" under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The discussion today concerns the fulfilment of the so-called Additional Protocol, which in the first instance was meant to be a temporary measure undertaken by Iran voluntarily, and not enforceable.

The gaps in the positions of the "Iran Six" (which met in New York) have become pronounced in recent days.

Russia and China find the rhetoric of the draft resolution (drafted by Britain and France at the U.S.' behest) invoking Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter allowing mandatory measures including military actions against Iran, to be completely unacceptable. Arguably, Moscow and Beijing too recognise the need to send a unified clear signal to Iran urging it to be more cooperative and, specifically, calling on Iran to freeze all nuclear enrichment and related activities, and to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

Such a signal, however, cannot be in the nature of an ultimatum or by way of putting deadlines. China, in particular, insists that the issue must be resolved through negotiations; that the door for a negotiated settlement still remains open; and, that in the meanwhile, utmost restraint and patience is called for from all sides so that tensions do not get exacerbated. A high degree of coordination is evident between the Russian and the Chinese positions.

The European Union position has drawn close to the U.S. demand for taking a tougher attitude toward Iran. But there are nuances here too. Britain, France, and Germany are yet to give up the principle of resolving the issue through negotiations — their hardening stance notwithstanding.

The widespread view among the international community (and even within the U.N. Security Council) shows a preference for diplomatic mediation. This body of international opinion has reservations about both economic sanctions and military action against Iran. The efficacy of economic sanctions is in serious doubt in any case, while military action may only serve the purpose of hardening the Iranian position. Almost everyone agrees that a conflagration in the Middle East, which is already a highly volatile region, could have far-reaching consequences globally.

Washington too must weigh carefully the downstream implications of militarily attacking Iran. The prospects of putting together a "like-minded coalition" for bringing about a regime change in Iran appear uncertain. The million dollar question, therefore, is: if, despite the heavy rhetoric on all sides in recent weeks, offered an appropriate and fair resolution, would Teheran be still prepared to make a substantial compromise?

At the New York conference, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov strongly pitched for the international community offering some clear benefits to Iran for cooperating. The conference apparently agreed that the EU-3 (Britain, France, and Germany) would put together a fresh package of benefits to offer to Iran if it chose to comply with demands to cease nuclear enrichment activities. Mr. Lavrov later described the New York discussions as dwelling on "the general action strategy of the international community" — and not on sanctions against Iran "in any form."

Mr. Ahmedinejad's initiative has been timed carefully. Iran always sought to talk things over directly with the U.S. The nuclear issue was only part of the agenda. As far as Teheran is concerned, Iran's integration in the international community is at stake. There is a point beyond which the EU-3 or Russia cannot deliver on the range of Iran's concerns. The U.S. hostility toward Iran is the core issue. No intermediary can pretend to hold Washington's brief in this regard.

At the same time, Teheran is putting the ball squarely in Washington's court. Pushed against the wall, Iran has threatened to quit the Non-Proliferation Treaty — and might well do so. Thus, if Washington were to persist with its tough line, it is going to be left with two alternatives. One, to accept a nuclear Iran; and, two, to attempt to set back Iran's nuclear programme by a few years through a military strike.

Mr. Ahmedinejad's initiative now opens a third option. The fact cannot be overlooked that it took 27 long years for the leadership in Teheran to address a communication to Washington. It implies that the Iranian offer needs probing. In the Middle East, Iran wields a lot of influence, which can be useful. That is self-evident.

But Iran is an ambitious country. A huge factor concerning the energy question, which has a bearing on global security, is also hanging in the air. On April 29, The Financial Times drew attention to it: "Analysts are concerned that an overall hardening of U.S. policy towards Moscow could drive Russia and Iran, which together hold nearly half the world's gas reserves, into an energy-based alliance.

"A senior financier told The Financial Times that Iran, which is competing with Gazprom to provide gas to the Caucasus, was considering a switch in policy by selling its gas to Russia through Central Asia because the U.S. was blocking its access to Europe and India."

The Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister who visited Moscow last month spoke of Iran and Russia forming an "arc" of energy-producing countries.

What is shaping up is the likelihood of Iran meeting China's energy needs for decades to come via a Central Asian pipeline system (bypassing the transit zone of the Straits of Malacca, which the U.S. Navy controls). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation too may admit Iran as a full member.

Analysts have viewed these trends as a strategic defeat for the U.S. Washington realises it may be getting outmanoeuvred. The sharp acceleration of the Caspian "great game" in recent weeks and the growing stridency reminiscent of Cold War rhetoric in the U.S. criticism of Russia testifies to a sense of frustration in Washington. The point is that all the protagonists — the U.S., EU, Russia, and China — should keep constantly in view Iran's standing as a major energy producing country.

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