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Monday, Jun 05, 2006

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Grand bargains and distress sales

Hamid Ansari

Three years ago, Iran had come up with a proposal for rapprochement with the United States. The details have only now been made public. As for the U.S., despite the grandstanding, the willingness to explore a new course is evident.

A FORMER National Security Council official revealed recently details of an Iranian proposal of May 2003 for rapprochement with the United States. This necessitates a reassessment of the moves and counter-moves of the two sides in the past three years.

Iran is a state "with the longest history of self-rule between Egypt and China." So wrote Henry Kissinger while explaining why every President from Roosevelt to Carter "affirmed the parallelism of interest between the United States and a friendly Iran." The break of 1979 was therefore traumatic and left psychological scars.

A first effort to kiss-and-make up was made in 1985. The resultant cake-and-Bible exercise, however, ended disastrously.

In the 1990s American policy makers, anxious not to be "seduced by the siren songs from Teheran," opted for a policy that fluctuated between containment and confrontation.

Mohammad Khatami's Dialogue of Civilisations approach was well received in Washington. Towards the end of 1997 the Swiss carried to Teheran an American message of willingness to talk. This was repeated through the Saudis in early 1998. In April, Bill Clinton personally talked about injustices of the past, dialogue, and "ultimate accommodation." In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright apologised for the 1953 Mosaddeq episode but undid the gesture by talking of the control exercised over Iranian policy by "un-elected hands."

The Bush administration's initial rhetoric on Iran was soon replaced by practical cooperation over Afghanistan. At Bonn the two working together made the conference a success. At the time of the invasion of Iraq, Iran was "not unhelpful" and was of considerable assistance to the post-war reconstruction effort.

It is at this stage that the new revelation, by Flynt Leverett, a former National Security Council staffer under President George W. Bush, comes in to complete the picture. He first referred to it in a New York Times op-ed on January 24, 2006. The text of the paper, sent through the Swiss, has only now been revealed.

The document is carefully structured, mentions in some detail Iranian and U.S. aims and suggests a methodology for conducting talks. In the section on "aims," it suggested that the two sides separately but simultaneously "accept a dialogue in mutual respect" and list out as agenda items six specific issues of primary concern to each side.

The Iranian aims are mentioned first: change in U.S. behaviour towards Iran, end of all sanctions and restrictions on frozen assets; support for democratic and representative government in Iraq; respect for Iranian national interests in Iraq and for religious links to Najaf and Karbala; full access to peaceful nuclear technology, biotechnology and chemical technology; recognition of Iran's legitimate security interests in the region concomitant to defence capacity; action against anti-Iranian terrorist groups.

The U.S. interests are stated with candour: full transparency including cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the implementation of all relevant instruments to ensure there is no Iranian effort to develop nuclear weapons or other WMDs; decisive action against all terrorist groups on Iranian territory, especially Al-Qaeda; coordination of positions on Iraq to achieve "stabilisation and establishment of democratic institutions and non-religious government"; suspension of all material support to Palestinian groups (Hamas, Jihad, etc.) and pressure on them to stop violent acts against civilians within the borders of 1967; action on Hizbollah to become a mere political organisation in Lebanon; acceptance of the Arab League's two-state solution for Palestine.

In regard to modalities, the Iranian paper suggested mutual simultaneous statements along an agreed text: "We have always been ready for direct and authoritative talks with the U.S./with Iran in good faith and with the aim of discussing — in mutual respect — our common interests and our mutual concerns based on merits and objective realities, but we have always made it clear that such talks can only be held if genuine progress for a solution of our concerns can be achieved."

The wording is interesting and has safeguards against mishaps. This was proposed to be followed by a first direct meeting, perhaps in Paris, where a decision could be taken on specific, mutual, steps relating to Iraq, terrorism, the Middle East question, and bilateral problems.

On Iraq, the Iranians proposed the establishment of a joint group, active Iranian support for stabilisation of Iraq in return for an American commitment to support Iranian war reparation claims when Iraq's foreign debts are discussed. On terrorism, Iran sought a U.S. commitment to disarm and remove the Mujahideen-e-Khalq (MKO) from Iraq in terms of Security Council resolution 1373 and offered in return "enhanced action against Al-Qaeda" in Iraq. On the Middle East, Iran offered to accept the Arab League's Beirut Declaration, support a peaceful solution involving all the parties and, by implication, recognise Israel. The U.S. in return would make a general statement that Iran did not belong to the "axis of evil."

As a final item, the Iranian paper suggested the establishment of three working groups on disarmament, regional security, and economic cooperation, aimed at developing three parallel road maps. For discussions in these working groups, it proposed, "each side accepts that the other side's aims are put on the agenda."

Analysis of the paper indicates that (a) points of immediate convergence of interests were correctly identified; (b) commitments were sought to be balanced; (c) Iran offered to cooperate on Iraq, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hizbollah, and a two-state solution for Palestine; (d) offered transparency and full acceptance of IAEA protocols; (e) sought in return normalisation of relations, action against MKO, de-freezing of assets, access to technology and a role in regional security. In the heady aftermath of the `Mission Accomplished' syndrome, however, the Iranian offer was considered but rejected and not responded to.

The EU3's subsequent negotiations with Iran in the 2003-2005 period resulting in the rupture of September 2005 at Vienna, and the subsequent American moves leading to the discussion of the matter in the Security Council, have to be viewed in the context of this background in which the United States (a) refused in principle to engage with Iran; (b) tried to impose conditions through EU3 and in the process "moved the goalpost"; (c) sought to "re-write" the NPT and move its own red-line: from a denial to Iran of nuclear weaponry to a denial, first, of enrichment and then, of research and knowledge itself.

In the process, specific Iranian offers on the nuclear question have been deliberately ignored. These include Ambassador Javed Zarif's op-ed in the New York Times (April 6), former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki's comment in the Financial Times (May 9), and the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rouhani's article in Time magazine (May 9). Together they amplify earlier positions, are specific and far reaching: (a) implement the Optional Protocol before ratification; (b) allow continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at conversion and enrichment facilities; (c) introduce domestic legislation to forego development of nuclear weapons; (d) refrain from reprocessing or producing plutonium; (e) limit enrichment programme to the fuel requirements of power reactors; (f) develop modalities to prevent Iran leaving the NPT; (g) accept foreign partners, both public and private, in uranium enrichment programme; (h) establishment of jointly owned regional consortiums on fuel-cycle development; and (i) mandate the IAEA to "establish a negotiating process for a fixed period to formulate a credible programme" for implementing these.

While the Bush administration remains adamant, the changing mood in the United States was reflected in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on May 16-18. Senator Joseph R. Biden was highly critical of the administration not sending a senior official to participate. He posed the critical question: "Is the administration committed to a regime change? Would it be prepared to abandon it as part of a package of security guarantees in a negotiated settlement of the nuclear issue?"

By coincidence, the question of negotiations with America was discussed in a seminar in Teheran on May 18. Former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, who remains relevant as foreign policy adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei, was candid in his comments: "We have at no time until now had such powerful means of haggling nor the influence we have in Iraq and Palestine. Now that we have the power to haggle, why don't we?"

Carpet sellers haggle; so do negotiators. Both seek the deal; both approach the task with an eye on maximum gains for minimum concessions; both need patience, persistence, and favourable conditions. Two of the latter handicap the United States: the situation in Iraq and the escalating political cost of military action against Iran. Has this induced President Bush to reconsider his options?

Despite the grandstanding in the May 31 statement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the willingness to explore a new course is evident. It could have a profound impact on the region.

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