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Pakistan and U.S.: two together, two apart

Nirupama Subramanian

Their dependence on each other by no means makes it an equal partnership. And this is the main cause of the strain in their relations.

UNITED STATES Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld recently lavished praise on Pervez Musharraf for his role in the war on terror. But there is no hiding that relations between the Pakistan President and the U.S. have come under considerable strain in recent weeks, particularly after President George W. Bush's March visit to India and Pakistan.

Inevitably, Pakistan compared the Bush visit to the two countries. A civilian nuclear deal with India; in Pakistan, a statement that the two subcontinental neighbours are "different countries with different needs and different histories." An overnight stay in Islamabad under tight security; a three-day sojourn in India. For Pakistan, a Bush comment that the purpose of his visit was to determine whether President Musharraf was "as committed as he has been in the past to bringing these terrorists to justice," and another that democracy in Pakistan was "definitely a part of our agenda"; to India, an invitation to join the U.S. and its Western allies in nation-building in Afghanistan.

With severe anti-U.S. and anti-West sentiments prevailing among all sections of Pakistanis, expressed vociferously in the media and by the country's political elite, the visit caused a massive loss of face for President Musharraf. It was bad enough being told in public that the U.S. viewed its relationship with India through a different prism from that of its ties with Pakistan. Worse was the injunction to do "more" to bring in Osama bin Laden, and the worst, the suggested role for India in Afghanistan.

For 30 years, the Pakistan military has viewed Afghanistan as falling within its sphere of influence. Starting with the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan has leveraged its geographical location to further relations with the U.S. After 9/11, Pakistan, one of the three countries that recognised the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, recovered quickly enough to land on the right side of the U.S., after more than a decade in the American doghouse. In its role as a frontline ally of the U.S., it has committed 80,000 troops on the ground along the Durand Line, launching "co-ordinated operations" with the U.S. forces in Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) at considerable political cost, and has suffered more casualties in the `war on terror' than the U.S. or any of its western allies in Afghanistan.

As a country that continues to see Afghanistan as providing "strategic depth" against India, Pakistan is deeply resentful of any Indian involvement in that country. President Bush's invitation to India to involve itself more in Afghanistan came at a time when the Pakistan establishment had begun to put out the allegation that India was backing subversive activity in Balochistan. For both critics and supporters of the Pakistani establishment, it was clear after the Bush visit that the country's most important ally did not buy that allegation.

In the months since, President Musharraf has been attempting to regain some of his credibility through methods that seem to border on defiance. For instance, in April, when the U.S. put the Jamaat-ud-dawa — it is linked to the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba — on its Specially Designated Global Terrorist list, the Pakistan foreign office said it was not obliged to follow suit. Other militant and extreme religious outfits banned by the Musharraf Government have made a comeback, especially after the 2005 earthquake. The Herald, a monthly, reported recently that the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, which was banned in 2002 and now goes by the name Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan, was allowed to organise a large public gathering in Islamabad on April 6.

The Pakistan Government has also hit out indirectly against the U.S. by dismissing accusations by the Government in Kabul that it was assisting the Taliban to launch attacks in southern Afghanistan. This is also a U.S. allegation. In strong words, Islamabad has accused the Karzai Government of blaming Pakistan for its own failure to end the conflict in Afghanistan.

President Musharraf has also lost no opportunity to show that unbothered by U.S. opposition to the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, he is determined to go ahead with the project. Another development that seems opposed to what Washington wants from Islamabad is the political changes that President Musharraf has signalled in FATA, the frontline region in the U.S.-led `war against terror.' The U.S. believes that Osama bin Laden is hiding somewhere in FATA, and it is here that it wants Pakistan to do "more," meaning hunt him out by breaking the Taliban and foreign militant networks in the area. The recent appointment of a retired lieutenant-general who is a tribal as the Governor of the North West Frontier Province is being seen as an attempt by the Musharraf Government to begin a reconciliation process with the local people in Waziristan who are upset at the military operations. Pakistan says it wants to find a political solution to terrorism, but some believe that in the current charged atmosphere in the area, this could end up strengthening Taliban supporters.

It is almost as if the man who declared (in a recent interview to The Guardian) that he is not a poodle of the U.S. is desperate to prove as much to his people. Analysts say the ties between the two countries are at their lowest ebb since 9/11. But does this mean that President Musharraf and the U.S. are gradually drifting apart?

Not yet, is the short answer to that. The ties that bind the two are built on the strongly felt basic and immediate needs of both. In simple terms, President Bush needs Pakistan for his `war on terror.' Pakistan, which received more than $3 billion from 2001 to 2005 from the U.S., needs the cash and the international standing. But their dependence on each other by no means makes it an equal partnership. And this is the main cause of the strain in their relations, as it has always been throughout the chequered history of the engagement between the two countries. While the U.S. only wants Pakistan to meet its present military objective, Pakistan, the lesser partner, has always built into the relationship, through what the former Foreign Secretary, Tanvir Ahmed Khan, describes as "auto-hypnosis," expectations that were never agreed upon. Frustration, both in the establishment and on the street, mounts when those expectations are not met. The leadership, which bought public support for the partnership by touting these expectations, has to then address the frustration.

Key to the future

But the key to understanding the future of the relations between President Musharraf and the Bush administration may lie more in U.S. reactions to its ally's apparent defiance. On the one hand, Washington is determined to keep the heat turned up on the Pakistan leader to ensure he delivers on vital issues in the partnership. On the other, the U.S. is also worried that President Musharraf's sliding popularity — on account of his demanding American alliance — may affect his ability to deliver, and has allowed him plenty of slack to recoup political losses.

Perhaps nothing exemplifies this complex pas de deux better than l'affaire A.Q. Khan. After naming him a nuclear proliferator, the U.S. allowed President Musharraf to draw red lines all around the scientist, and the investigation. Dr. Khan was placed under house arrest but got a presidential pardon after a few months. He continues to remain under house arrest, but Pakistan has made it clear it will not give American investigators direct access to its national hero. The U.S. has so far not pushed this issue. All others arrested in the case have been released, and the Government declared the case "closed" a few weeks ago. But the U.S. then indirectly ratcheted up the noise again. Recently, a congressional committee heard a lengthy testimony from a nuclear scientist about the Bush administration not having done enough to get information from the Pakistani scientist. The Daily Times said in an editorial that when the U.S. knew that Pakistan would never surrender the top scientist, the only reason it could be bringing up the A.Q. Khan factor once again was to pressure the Musharraf Government into making other "concessions," perhaps on Afghanistan.

Looking away while President Musharraf indulges extremist religious or militant outfits, and throwing carrots, such as lifting the ban on F16 sales to Pakistan last year, and allowing sales of Harpoon anti-ship missiles last month, all the while saying Pakistan has to do "more," is part of the same deal — ensure the Pakistan leader does not take his eye off the ball and, at the same time, soothe ruffled feathers. No one knows what General Musharraf's plans are for the next elections — he has hinted at another term for himself — but it does seem the Bush administration wants him in the saddle, at least for now.

So where does that leave President Bush's democracy agenda in Pakistan? Seasoned observers like Mr. Tanvir Ahmed Khan point out that given the deep military cooperation between the two, the U.S. may not push the issue. Instead, there may be suggestions to President Musharraf to broaden his political base so that he is in a stronger position to deliver on his commitments to the U.S. While the Bush administration wants its military objectives met at the earliest, President Musharraf is fighting for time until the next elections. Will he in a better position to do what the Americans want after the elections? It may cease to matter. By then, the Bush presidency will be clocking its final year, and President Musharraf, if re-elected, may well decide to wait and see what his options are after the U.S. elections.

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