BANDIPORA: Four days ago, a little after midnight, the Lashkar-e-Taiba's top commander for northern Kashmir emerged from the forests above the small mountain hamlet of Sumlar, and ordered its residents to gather in the local mosque.

"I don't want to see young girls and boys roaming around with mobile phones," said the imposing 6-foot 6-inch Pakistani national, who is known only by the multiple aliases `Bilal,' `Salahuddin' and `Haider,' "for it will lead to immorality and vice." Three terrified teenage girls found in possession of the offending instruments were dragged into the centre of the mosque and tonsured in full public view.

Bilal's concerns in fact had little to do with morals. Cellphone communications are the one few means through which informants can report on Bilal's rare movements out of the dense forests that run north from the mountains above Bandipora to the Line of Control. Now, Bilal's forest fortress is at the centre of a debate on the strategies needed to end the continuing terror offensive in Jammu and Kashmir, and elsewhere in India.

Bandipora base

Just why is it that Bandipora has acquired such significance? Ever since 1999-2000, the Lashkar started developing a well-hidden fortified hideouts in the Patwan and Chatarnar forests, which served as secure bases for terrorists who crossed the LoC through the Gurez sector. Defended by an elaborate system of lookouts, Lashkar operatives proceeded to develop weapons caches and sophisticated communication centres.

Most important of all, the Bandipora base served as a centre from which operatives and explosives could be despatched for high-profile operations, like the 2004 attack on the Prime Minister, the Delhi serial bombings and the assassination of Jammu and Kashmir State Minister Ghulam Nabi Lone. In these over a dozen other cases, Lashkar operatives were despatched from the Bandipora forests.

Intelligence Bureau and Jammu and Kashmir Police counter-terrorism investigators often succeeded in terminating the local cells which facilitated these operations. However, the Bandipora base remained untouched. Bilal his predecessors could thus continue to funnel personnel and material towards Srinagar and elsewhere. Satellite-phone communications ensured directing their operations was no great obstacle, either.

Army dilemma

Now, though, matters have begun to come to a head. Sources told The Hindu that, at a June 20 briefing organised for United Progressive Alliance chairperson Sonia Gandhi, the Northern Army Commander Lieutenant-General Deepak Kapoor argued that the core problem as the lack of will among 31,000 men the Jammu and Kashmir Police and Central Reserve Police Force have committed to the State capital.

At a subsequent meeting with National Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, though, police and intelligence personnel hit back. Officials argued that it was impossible to secure Srinagar unless the Lashkar's mountain bases were destroyed. Local operatives working for the Lashkar had repeatedly been arrested since 2002, Mr. Narayanan was told, but their commanders in Bandipora continued to operate with relative impunity.

Targeting the Lashkar's north Kashmir fortress — or similar strongholds like Yaripora in southern Kashmir and the Harwan forests in central Kashmir — will not be an easy task. Since at least 2000-2001, Indian military strategists have considered the prospect of a pincer action against the Bandipora forests, involving simultaneously pushing troops south from the Bod Kol river near Gurez and north through Patwan and Chatarnar.

However, such action has been deterred by the twin prospects that the estimated 50-75 Pakistani terrorists hidden in the Bandipora forests might evade a large military operation — or, in the alternate, that an offensive push against well-defended positions could result in casualties not commensurate with the potential dividends. What is clear, though, is that even successful counter-terrorism operations of the kind that has led to the arrest of twelve Lashkar operatives in Srinagar could prove of only limited use until means are found to evict terrorists from the forest fortresses.

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