The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : Time for Parliament to step in

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Tuesday, Jul 25, 2006

Opinion

Opinion - Leader Page Articles

Time for Parliament to step in

K.C. Pant

Rarely before has a bilateral accord carried such far-reaching implications for India as the nuclear deal with the United States. It threatens to compromise the country's freedom of action. An extraordinary situation calls for an extraordinary response from Parliament.

FOR MORE than a year now, Parliament has remained on the margins as the nuclear deal with the United States has exercised the nation. Four things stand out starkly. First, what was claimed to be a balanced deal has turned into a continuing exercise involving the progressive addition of one-sided conditions on India. Secondly, the conditionalities have expanded even beyond the nuclear realm to potentially encroach on India's foreign policy and strategic autonomy. Thirdly, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been unable to honour his solemn assurances to Parliament. And fourthly, the balance of the Indo-U.S. agreement announced on July 18, 2005 started tilting against India in later closed-door negotiations between the two governments, but the U.S. legislative process has gone further and changed the basic terms of the Agreement.

Against this background, the marginalisation of Parliament cannot but be a cause for national concern. Both houses of Parliament have had only two short debates on the `deal' — the first time in early August 2005 and then on March 10, 2006. There has been no close scrutiny of its provisions and their ramifications. It is so ironical that the world's largest democracy should leave its fate in the hands of the legislature of a foreign power. For its part, the U.S. Congress has assumed such a central role in determining the shape and implementation of the `deal' that it has, to a large extent, assuaged the concerns of non-proliferation zealots by transforming what was intended to be a civilian nuclear energy accord into basically a non-proliferation arrangement targeting India. It is significant that the added conditionalities have silenced many of the critics in the U.S.

While tabling the July 18, 2005 Joint Statement in Parliament, the Prime Minister committed himself unequivocally on several points. One, the accord would open the way to the resumption of full nuclear cooperation in the civilian sector between India and the U.S. and others. Two, it would not constrict India's freedom to pursue a credible minimal deterrent. Three, India would be treated at par with the other nuclear-weapons states, enjoying "the same rights and benefits" as them and undertaking only the obligations they undertook. Four, reciprocity was the key and "Indian actions will be contingent at every stage on actions taken by the other side." And five, after the U.S. Congress amended domestic laws to give effect to the `deal', India would negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol and work jointly with the U.S. to get the Nuclear Suppliers' Group on board. The Prime Minister also pledged that "before voluntarily placing our civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards, we will ensure that all restrictions on India have been lifted."

The July 18, 2005 accord was itself a compromise, with India making several concessions in return for the U.S. agreeing to "full" civil nuclear commerce. India not only settled for an implicit rather than an explicit recognition of its nuclear-weapons status, but also agreed to carry out a watertight separation of its nuclear programme into civil and military components. The only nuclear power to do a full civil-military separation is the U.S., but without the tight demarcation and firewalls that it is seeking to impose on India. The U.S., for example, sources its tritium for weapons from civilian power reactors.

Further concessions by India have been made in the process of negotiating with the U.S. the agreement on the civil-military separation of its facilities. Such negotiations to secure U.S. approval were itself contrary to the Prime Minister's assurance to Parliament that "it will be an autonomous Indian decision as to what is `civilian' and what is `military'. Nobody outside will tell us what is `civilian' and what is `military'." In those negotiations, India conceded the following — accepting perpetual, immutable IAEA inspections applicable to non-nuclear states and not the voluntary, revocable safeguards that apply to nuclear powers; agreeing to put 35 facilities, including nine nuclear research institutions, under such permanent inspections; and also agreeing to shut down within four years the Cirus research reactor and relocate the fuel core of Apsara, Asia's oldest reactor.

It is important to note that even before the U.S. legislative process began, the U.S. Government compelled the Government of India to abandon the principle of parity and keep aside the principle of reciprocity. But with Congress now taking over the process, even the semblance of a balance of obligations has been lost. It has become more and more an affair involving the laying down of preconditions as well as post-implementation conditionalities by one side. Most of these conditions have little to do with the original intent of the `deal' to allow the export of power reactors and fuel to India. In fact, the House committee version of the bill did not contain even a passing reference to civilian nuclear energy.

The Senate and House versions of the bill contain several provisions that alter the fundamentals of the July 18, 2005 accord and, therefore, should be treated as nothing less than deal-breakers. Yet surprisingly, the Government's initial response was to welcome the passage of the draft legislation by the two panels. It was not until the Prime Minister travelled to St. Petersburg and met with the U.S. President that there was a grudging acknowledgement that the Government had certain concerns over some (but not all) of the new conditionalities. This is intriguing. It suggests that some in the Government are willing to embrace a final `deal' even if its costs are so unreasonably high as to constrict India's strategic autonomy and foreign-policy options. The annual reporting system on India that both the Congressional panels have sought to institute will make our Government accountable to a foreign legislature.

That makes it more imperative for Parliament to have the role of scrutinising whatever the Government may seek to enter into, including a separate bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the U.S. and a safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA. All along, India has refused to endorse any discriminatory international arrangement or enter into any commitment that would compromise its sovereignty of judgment or freedom of action. Yet there is danger that, for the first time, it could enter into a far-reaching arrangement that lacks equity and impinges on its decision-making autonomy. This concern has been reinforced by the manner the Prime Minister's commitments in Parliament have fallen by the wayside.

The July 18, 2005 accord was designed to give a boost to Indo-U.S. cooperation. However, the U.S. Congress has converted it into an instrument to cap and roll back India's nuclear weapons programme, thwart its three-stage nuclear-power development plans, and crimp the conduct of its foreign policy. It has also sought to arrogate to itself the role of monitoring the Indian nuclear programme. Having failed in its past efforts to coerce India into giving up its nuclear weapons option, Washington is now adding conditionalities to limit India's deterrent and prevent its further development and even compromise its reliability.

The question is not what the size of the Indian deterrent should be, but who should decide that. India is situated in a dangerous neighbourhood, and it is for the country to evaluate its threats and prepare to meet them. It is not as though India has frantically built up stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Its nuclear doctrine aims at a credible minimal deterrent. This position is accepted by Parliament and the country. But any suggestion that these decisions will require the annual scrutiny, and implied approval, of the U.S. administration and Congress is simply unacceptable. Nor can the `deal' be allowed to become an instrumentality to influence Indian foreign policy. India, for example, cannot go along with the U.S. policy to prop up a military dictatorship in Pakistan with weaponry that can only be used against India.

Given that national interest is best served by the scrupulous preservation of strategic autonomy, Parliament needs to carve out a role for itself on a `deal' that threatens to compromise India's freedom of action. Rarely before has a bilateral accord carried such far-reaching implications for India as this `deal'. An extraordinary situation calls for an extraordinary response. Taking note of the widespread misgivings being voiced in the country, including by nuclear scientists with impeccable credentials, the Government can make an exception in seeking the approval of Parliament before committing itself irrevocably to the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement or the IAEA safeguards agreement.

In any event, it is imperative for Parliament to define India's bottom-line in the `deal' through a `Sense of House' resolution, as has been proposed by some. Such a resolution has to make clear that the country's lowest acceptable parameters are those enshrined in the July 18, 2005 accord and that India cannot settle for less than the following: a permanent waiver without annual review and certification; international inspections to apply only while the `deal' holds; unhampered strategic and deterrent autonomy; and the right to terminate the arrangement on national-security grounds as provided for to parties under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

It is now up to Parliament to forget party differences on an issue that demands political bipartisanship. It must make it clear that any departure from the July 18, 2005 accord and the commitments made by the Government to Parliament will be a deal-breaker. By doing so, Parliament can help extricate the government from a difficult and awkward situation.

(The writer is a former Defence Minister and Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission)

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