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Towards an East Asian model of diplomacy

P.S. Suryanarayana

The failure of the ASEAN leaders and their dialogue partners to reach a consensus on West Asia is traceable to the complexities generic to that region and the political composition of the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit.

THE CONTRAST between the diplomacy of dialogue in East Asia and the politics of war in West Asia was quite conspicuous during the annual series of ministerial meetings, which the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) organised in Kuala Lumpur in the final week of July.

Significantly thereafter, some East Asian states played a part in finalising the ceasefire resolution that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted on August 11 to defuse the current West Asian war. These players are China, the only veto-empowered permanent member in the UNSC from Asia, and Japan, currently a non-permanent member.

Moreover, even before August 11, at least two ASEAN members — Indonesia and Malaysia — offered to send peace-keeping troops to Lebanon under the U.N. auspices. Malaysia said Hizbollah was not a terrorist organisation and that the Israeli action was "state terrorism." Indonesia wanted the U.N. to allow the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) to "set the terms of reference and the rules of engagement" in regard to any U.N. peace force in Lebanon. Jakarta suggested that the OIC, currently headed by Malaysia, be allowed to send a high proportion of peace-keepers. This accent on the OIC did not, however, eclipse the overall East Asian activism.

In a different political sense, South Korea's August 1 version of a brief exchange of fire across the highly fortified demilitarised zone, which divides the Korean peninsula, does not alter the big-picture contrast between the eastern wing and the western arena within Asia.

And, to notice this stark reality is not to evaluate the vastly different political dynamics of these two regions by the same standards of diplomacy.

However, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the East Asia Summit (EAS) — two major entities that met at the ministerial level in Kuala Lumpur at this time — took a close look at the Israeli military action against Lebanon and Hizbollah. There was no unanimity. Yet this will not detract from East Asia's evolving diplomatic culture of dialogue.

Now, the failure of the ASEAN leaders and their dialogue partners to reach a consensus on West Asia is traceable to the complexities generic to that region and, more importantly, the political composition of the ARF and the EAS.

Some key states with vital stakes in West Asia are among the 26 ARF participants (official parlance for members). These include the United States, Russia, and China, all veto-empowered permanent members in the UNSC. The other two in this elite category, Britain and France, are represented at the ARF through the European Union's single-seat participation. In addition, countries like India and Japan, with varying degrees of interest and influence in West Asia, are also among the major ARF participants.

There is a political story behind the composition of the ARF and the other entities that the ASEAN has fashioned over the years. As an association of all the 10 Southeast Asian states, the ASEAN remains the core group but its outreach extends to most of the major states and groups, wherever they be, with recognisable relevance to the entire East Asian region in one way or another. And, in a globalising world, some of the ASEAN's outreach associates have stakes in not only East Asia but also West Asia and other places. The U.S., China, Russia, India, and Japan are some in this category.

Even in this setting, the EAS, for significant reasons, does not encompass the U.S. and Russia at this stage. However, the 16 EAS participants include China, India, Japan, and Australia.

The ASEAN was originally formed as a smaller group to resist the possible spread of communism from China and to do so with the political blessings of the U.S. but not necessarily its material help as well. However, the association recognised, as it evolved, the growing importance of China as a regional power with a potential global role. And with that, the Southeast Asian states began their non-ideological courting of regional and extra-regional powers on the sole strategic consideration of their relevance to East Asia.

Now beyond the complexity of numbers at the latest series of ASEAN's meetings with its outreach associates, it became clear that the participants could not bridge the gulf between the U.S. and two key majority-Muslim states — Indonesia and host Malaysia.

On a different plane, ASEAN+3, which does not include the U.S., was relatively more forthright in expressing "deep shock and distress" over the "apparently deliberate targeting by the Israeli Defence Forces of the U.N. observer post in southern Lebanon on July 25." China, Japan, and South Korea are the `+3' participants. So, China, whose national was among the victims of this Israeli action, was able to put the issue in perspective, and Japan, a U.S. ally, agreed to uphold the ASEAN+3 solidarity on a humanitarian matter.

On the North Korean missile issue, too, the ARF found itself unable to strike a common denominator. This was unsurprising because North Korea itself is an ARF participant. Therefore, the unanimous UNSC Resolution 1695, adopted on July 15, did not receive endorsement, although at least four ARF participants — the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan — had voted for that resolution.

One of the few major issues that found no dissonance within the ARF related to the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on July 11. All the assembled Ministers, including Pakistan's representative, strongly condemned the terrorist blasts. Significantly, Pakistan did not raise any of its India-specific bilateral concerns, in line with a commitment that Islamabad had given the ARF while joining it not long ago.

These instances, on the whole, illustrate the ARF's limitations. But the factors at work — the U.S. support for Israel or the self-esteem of North Korea — do not also undermine the ARF's doctrine of security dialogue.

The relatively new EAS, which is yet to complete its first year of existence, has, at this time, held its first ministerial-level consultations among all its 16 participants. These consultations marked a confidence-building exercise within the EAS.

India and a few other EAS participants wanted the new forum to show a sense of urgency in putting the broken global trade talks on course once again. The EAS meeting was, on the whole, noteworthy for a recommendation that the leaders of the participating countries, all heads of state or government, should consider mandating the forum to have a start-up agenda. This would cover energy security, financial matters including those relating to multilateral trade, public health issues, and disaster management.

`Leaders-driven forum'

The EAS leaders will meet, for only the second time, in the Philippines later this year. And, according to authoritative Chinese sources, the mood among the EAS participants is to turn the new entity into "a leaders-driven forum." Indicating that the EAS is also not inclined to open its doors immediately to more participants, ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong told this correspondent that the East Asian heads of state and government want to nurture their grouping as a "unique, strategic, brain-storming forum." Of the plethora of ASEAN-organised entities, the ASEAN+3 and the EAS are seen as the possible springboards for the eventual establishment of an East Asia Community — the model that the leaders of this region have envisioned. While the well-established ASEAN+3 is not keen on inviting either India or the U.S. for as long as possible, the EAS, as of now, is conspicuous for its exclusion of Washington.

In this political ambience, a reality check shows that two political universes overlap in East Asia. Of these, the security-related universe consists of China and the U.S. as the prime players. India, Japan, and Australia are now peripheral players. The other universe, which can evolve into an East Asia Community over time, is dominated by China and, to a lesser extent, by Japan, while India is waiting to move to the inner circle. And, the politics of this model-building can prove problematic.

According to Zheng Bijian, formerly Vice-President of the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China, there is no "Asian version of the Monroe Doctrine" in Beijing's world-view. In a documented address to the Brookings Institution in Washington in June 2005, the well-known exponent of "China's peaceful rise," said: "The argument that China is pushing for the United States to be ostracised from the Asia Pacific region is groundless fabrication, designed only to sow discord between the two countries."

No less significant was his statement that "China holds a pragmatic attitude towards the American presence, including its military presence, in the Asia Pacific region." And, "open multilateralism" would define China's long-term position on "Asia Pacific integration [as] propelled by an East Asia Community." It is evident, therefore, that the East Asian model will be determined by China, with or without the U.S. as a partner.

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