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Will the fragile peace last in Lebanon?

Vaiju Naravane

The prospective members of UNIFIL have failed to agree on or even properly discuss the exact nature of UNIFIL's mandate.

WITH THE Israelis themselves questioning the extent and nature of their "victory" in the recent attacks on Lebanon and with most regional and strategic experts agreeing that Israel failed to realise its minimum goals — destroying Hizbollah and freeing two captured Israeli soldiers — it is clear the conflict in Lebanon is nowhere near its end. Continued Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon is now written into the script.

Already Israel has begun to pick holes in UNSC Resolution 1701, with Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni qualifying the failure to secure the release of the soldiers as a "violation" of the resolution and Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, head of the Israeli army, declaring that Israeli forces were likely to remain in Lebanon "for months."

The most pressing question to which no satisfactory answer has yet emerged is: Who is supposed to disarm Hizbollah — is it the Lebanese Army or the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)? The expanded UNIFIL has not been specifically asked to disarm Hizbollah. The text of the U.N. resolution simply says UNIFIL's strength will be increased to 15,000. It says absolutely nothing about how or by whom Hizbollah should be disarmed."The Lebanese army and the United Nations force do not have a mission to do so. Hizbollah arms will thus remain hidden and will be used in case conflict resumes," said Amal Saad, author of Hezbollah: Politics and Religion. "The Lebanese government will hit an impasse over Hizbollah's disarming. So, hiding the arms of Hizbollah may be the way out to allow the deployment of the Lebanese army in the south," said the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat.

Hizbollah has already declared there is no question of its laying down arms although its leaders agreed to "allow" the Lebanese army to "seize" any arms caches it finds during its deployment.

The Lebanese army itself is a pitiful fighting force of some 61,000 men. Of these 15,000 are to be deployed in the south. With Hizbollah picking up massive public support from the fighting, are any of these soldiers able or willing to forcibly disarm the Shiite militia? Lebanese leaders themselves have avoided speaking of "disarmament" with Defence Minister Elias Murr saying the 15,000 troops deployed in the south "would expect the guerrillas not to carry arms in the region." In other words, no one will actively seek out Hizbollah weapons.

The prospective members of UNIFIL, whose numbers are expected to swell to 15,000 over the coming weeks with the participation of France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, among others, have failed to agree on or even to properly discuss the question of disarming of Hizbollah or the exact nature of UNIFIL's mandate. Talks at the United Nations on Thursday did not call on the U.N. forces to disarm Hizbollah given the reservations already expressed by probable contributing countries. And no clear mandate for the U.N. force has emerged.

The U.N. is concentrating on getting together a force of just 3500 men "in the next ten days" and even that is proving difficult. Past experiences in Lebanon have made contributing countries cautious. The British, pleading a lack of available forces, have decided to stay out as, wisely, have the Americans.

France, which was originally expected to command the force, supply up to 4,000 soldiers and become its "backbone," has backed out. President Jacques Chirac said he would send "200 extra troops as an urgent measure doubling the number of French soldiers already in UNIFIL" but has kept mum on what is likely to follow, an understandable silence, given the country's bitter experiences in Lebanon and extremely strained relations with Syria.

A senior Turkish diplomat told the AFP: "We have in mind humanitarian and logistical missions. Our soldiers will not be chasing people, arms in their hands ... We are definitely not going to send combat forces. Missions such as disarming Hizbollah or cracking down on militant bases are out of the question for us. We want to contribute to maintaining what is a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel."

Italian officials said they are prepared to contribute up to 3,000 soldiers to the peacekeeping effort but Defence Minister Arturo Parisi confirmed that the country was awaiting a "clear mandate" on the rules of engagement with "strong and clear" answers to questions about command structures and interpretation of the mandate. He said Italian troops would not disarm Hizbollah, and only help Lebanon re-establish its authority in the south. Germany has decided to send "non-combat" troops but with so many conditions attached that it is unclear whether the Germans will ultimately participate.

So the question remains, who will bell the cat? Israel has already warned that if Hizbollah is not disarmed, its army will again attack its northern neighbour. Already there are signs that the Israeli Defence Force may not evacuate Lebanon for a very long time. Israel has little interest in doing so, especially now that its misadventure in Lebanon has been severely criticised both within and outside the country — although for completely opposing reasons.

In many ways this has been a double defeat for Israel — a public relations disaster for the country's image abroad and no real gains in combat. Hizbollah might have been weakened, but it certainly has not been vanquished. The Israeli army was caught off guard by its own lack of intelligence on the ground and the Zionist state has no taste for setbacks of this nature.

`Israel trapped'

According to Charles Enderlin, who has written several books on the Middle East, notably Le reve brise (The Shattered Dream), Israel has been trapped by its own policy of unilateralism, adopted over the past decade. It is time Israel abandoned its penchant for unilateralism and returned to the negotiating table, he argues.

"Israel's lack of preparation in this latest conflict became apparent at all levels: military, administrative and governmental. This is the result of Israeli perceptions of itself and its neighbours. Since 2000, Israeli policies have been based on the premise that it has no viable partner for peace and that its military might allows it to impose its decisions on weak adversaries. The Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 is the first example of this unilateralist view."

The decision to evacuate southern Lebanon was taken without consulting either Lebanon or Syria (whose troops initially deployed in Lebanon at the government's request were still present in the country). A little later, following the failure of the Oslo process, Prime Minister Ehud Barak declared that Yasser Arafat was no longer a partner for peace. His successor Ariel Sharon shattered any hope for dialogue by placing Arafat under virtual house arrest. These policies later led to the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and the construction of the wall, which Palestinians fear will become the future border between Israel and an eventual Palestinian state.

"Not once did Israel respond to calls for restarting negotiations on the final status of Palestinian territories made by the very moderate Mahmoud Abbas. These unilateral decisions were anchored in policies emanating from a think tank of reservist generals in the senior officers' training school. The main plank of their thinking was "to engrave on the Palestinian consciousness" that they would obtain nothing through violence. For that, maximum pressure had to be applied on the Palestinian population, with curfews, police checkposts and an economic blockade," explains Mr. Enderlin.

Hence the wanton destruction of life and property as collective punishment meted out to the Palestinians whether in Gaza or the West Bank. Another plank of this doctrine was the creation of a "lever." According to General Gal Hirsh, one of the authors of this theory, continuous and permanent pressure had to be put on the Palestinian Authority "to lever it to fight terrorism." Israel's military operations, the general argued, "aimed to show the Palestinian Authority that it would be made to pay for its support to terrorism."

Military experts and security analysts now say this strategy backfired. After five years of relentless repression of the Intifada, moderate Palestinians have been marginalised and Hamas has emerged as a significant political force.

In Lebanon too, the Israeli government tried to apply the same tactics — bombing Beirut and destroying infrastructure to pressure the Lebanese government to act against Hizbollah. Once again the result has been negative — the soldiers have not been released, the Lebanese-Syrian frontier is not closed to prevent Hizbollah from rearming and Hizbollah rocket launchers, hidden in bunkers deep beneath the soil, have remained largely intact.

"The alternative to such a politico-military strategy lies in the proposals for peace made by General Ouri Saguy, who was involved in secret negotiations with Syria, or others contained in the Geneva Initiative. That is to say direct negotiations with Syria and the Lebanese government coupled with an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan plateau for a lasting peace, and an agreement with President Mahmoud Abbas on the principle of "land for peace." Failing which, radical Islam will continue to progress in the region," concludes Charles Enderlin.

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