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Saturday, Sep 02, 2006

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Opinion - Leader Page Articles

The `war on terror' and West Asia circa 2007

Hamid Ansari

The U.S. approach has been uniformly unsuccessful and raises questions about its major and minor premises, the efficacy of its methodology, and, in the final analysis, of its intent.

"VICTORY IS the main object in war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale [is] depressed. When troops attack cities, their strength will be exhausted." So wrote Sun Tzu, adding "there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited." Soldiers also know that the best laid plans become irrelevant after the first shots have been fired in a conflict. These maxims stand sustained in West Asia. Philosophers use language to clarify concepts, politicians to obfuscate them. A good example of the latter is Iraq since 2003; Lebanon added to it in good measure. "Birth pangs of a new Middle East" seemed to rule out natural birth, evidently referred to a caesarean section, perhaps a stillbirth, possibly resulting in the mother's death. Nothing, of course, was said about the skill of the midwife or the surgeon.

The outcome of the Lebanon War II is to be assessed in local and regional terms. With American knowledge, consent, and encouragement, Israel unleashed its war machine against a well-organised and highly motivated resistance group. When hostilities ceased, victory was not achieved.

Hizbollah's military capacity was dented but its fighting will and command structure remained intact. Its support base in Lebanon transcended the sectarian divide and registered a significant increase. In the Arab and the Muslim world, it touched unimaginable heights; American reputation suffered in equal but reverse measure. Its Arab friends were embarrassed and politically handicapped.

The impact of failure is evident in Israel. A military enquiry on the tactics of war, and a political post-mortem on the decision to initiate hostilities and its subsequent handling, is under way and will take its toll. Will it be sufficiently incisive and go to the root cause of this and other wars: the Israeli desire to keep settlements on land acquired by conquest and sought to be annexed on illegal and immoral pretexts?

Israel's international standing is at an all-time low. Both Human Rights Watch (New York) and Amnesty International (London) have explicitly accused it of having committed war crimes and crimes against the international humanitarian law and called for an international enquiry. Even the U.S., according to The New York Times, "is investigating whether Israel's use of American-made cluster bombs in southern Lebanon violated secret agreements" made in 1976.

The war has taken its toll elsewhere in the region. In an interview on Al Jazeera on July 20, Hasan Nasrallah was asked about attitude of the Arab regimes: "We expect them to sit on the fence. And, if they do not want to sit on the fence, then they should at least equate between us and Israel. We even agree to have them equate between the victim and the executioner. But we did not expect them to take part in shedding the blood of the victim and cover the crime of the executioner. Yes, this was a surprise."

The activism of the Arab League in New York in the crafting of the Security Council Resolution 1701 was to come later. Sheikh Nasrallah's remarks pertained to the bigger Arab states and the story has been spilled by one of them.

Nawaf Obaid is director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project and is conversant with the official thinking in Riyadh. In an interview to the Saudi-U.S. Relations Information Service on August 22, he was asked about the effect of the Lebanon crisis on U.S.-Saudi relations. His response was candid and revealing and sheds light on relations between "strategic partners":

"The handling of the crisis has caused a substantial amount of embarrassment for the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia came through with, what could be called `its part of the bargain.' The Kingdom was forthright in its perspective of what Hezbollah was doing. It stepped up to the plate by offering political coverage for other countries to come in and condemn what Hezbollah had done. That was made with the hope that America would rein in the Israelis. The reality proved to be the complete opposite.

"The expectation was that both sides would rein in their respective, if you want, constituencies. That would put an end to it, to put an end to the Israeli attack on Lebanon while beginning to isolate or sideline Hezbollah's operation there. It actually backfired because one side did do what was needed — Saudi Arabia came out with strong statements — and the other side, the Americans, did absolutely nothing ... If there is any fallout, it is the matter of trust. This episode has really dampened trust towards the Bush Administration. The view creeping up in government circles now is that America can no longer be trusted."

The Saudi leadership rarely gives vent to annoyance so publicly; nor does it take kindly to public humiliation. Mr. Obaid's remarks, and the channel used, highlight problems in the bilateral relationship that was carefully re-crafted in the Bush-Abdullah joint statement of April 2005. A somewhat similar position is said to have prevailed in Cairo and is reflected in the media in ample measure. King Abdullah of Jordan has also expressed his apprehensions.

The implications of this have been summed up by Anthony Cordesman of CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies): "There is a very real prospect that even if the Israel-Hezbollah war does not rekindle, it has generated forces in the Arab world that will thrust Israel into a broader, four-cornered struggle with radical Arab elements as well as pose growing political problems for moderate Arab states."

The U.S. approach has been uniformly unsuccessful and raises questions about its major and minor premises, the efficacy of its methodology, and in the final analysis of its intent. The `global war on terror' has enhanced American and western insecurity; Iraq has regressed from a functioning albeit dictatorial society to a state of nature as described by Thomas Hobbes. Palestinians remain defiant in their legitimate demands and, much to U.S. annoyance, are learning the use of democratic tools. Hizbollah has demonstrated the extent to which human will can prevail over brute force.

That other obsession, Iran, also remains on the agenda and no nearer a solution. A recent report for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence makes bland recommendations in line for a hardline approach. More relevant is the finding of a new Chatham House report on Iran: "The U.S.-driven agenda for confronting Iran is severely compromised by the confident ease with which Iran sits in the region." As a result, "the complexity of regional relationships currently emerging highlight the dimensions of the regional crises that neither the U.S. nor the EU can afford to ignore."

Iran seems to be at ease with the chess and poker game being played as the Security Council deadline of August 31 has expired. The critical question relates to the precondition for negotiations — the suspension of enrichment. Iran is unwilling to concede the point prior to negotiation, and without receiving specific and credible guarantees about regime security and lifting of sanctions. Hence the hundred queries about the Western package.

The ground reality is that Iran has acquired the rudiments of enrichment technology and this cannot be rolled back; at the same time the transition, from 2.5 per cent enrichment now achieved to 95 per cent needed for weapons grade, is yet to be made. As such, making suspension a pre-requisite is unrealistic. Suspicion is not fact and cannot be substituted for facts except in the lexicon of the neo-cons who insist "we are suckers if we trust Iran."

Primarily as a result of Western action, chain reactions that are qualitatively different have been set off. Olivier Roy has commented on the resulting option: "If the west wishes to counter the synergy between Arab nationalism, Sunni militancy and Shia crescent, which will link the battlefields from Afghanistan to Lebanon, it must draw movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah further into the mainstream." An essential requirement for this is course correction on Palestine.

The Chatham House report arrives at a similar conclusion: "Focusing on Iran's nuclear capabilities alone — or extending criticism to include Iran's support for Hezbollah — will neither explain nor address the positions being adopted across the Middle East and Asia towards what many see as a struggle for the interconnected future of this wider region."

These are damning indictments, by western analysts, of decades of western policy in the region. Arab observers like Abdel-Moneim Said of Al-Ahram Centre go further, and develop a historical perspective on "third generation revolutionaries" of the Arab world: their focus on Islam as the motivator, their belief in the catalytic role of the Iranian revolution, their willingness to challenge globalisation as an indirect form of Western hegemony. It is readily admitted that these movements are carried "on fragile backs."

Perhaps the expectation in the West is that these backs can be broken. History, however, records that slave revolts can be unsettling, at times even successful. The alternative is to develop an accommodative paradigm that is, above all, equitable and just. The choice is stark and unambiguous; it is also urgent.

(The writer has been India's Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, Afghanistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.)

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