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An open letter to American Senators

M.R. Srinivasan

The draft Senate Bill on the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal of July 2005 has been worded as though dealing with a normal non-nuclear weapon state. Any additional obligations imposed on India are unacceptable.

THE AMERICAN Senate is set to take up for consideration the "United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act," S.3709, a landmark bill with the potential to transform bilateral relations. It could also enable the two democracies to contribute significantly to the orderly growth of the world economy and to a more acceptable process in managing global conflicts. Besides, an end to some four decades of estrangement on the nuclear question is achievable.

In July 2006, the House of Representatives adopted Bill No. H.R.5682 (entitled differently from the Senate Bill as the `United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006') with overwhelming bi-partisan support. Normally this process should have been greeted with enthusiasm in India. The reaction was exactly the opposite. Large sections of public opinion, the media, and the nuclear scientific community, were dismayed to find that many new obligations, going far beyond the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, have been imposed on India. When Prime Minister Singh met President Bush during the G8 summit at St. Petersburg, he had drawn attention to these additional obligations, not agreed to by India. During much of July and August 2006, politicians, Members of Parliament, media, public opinion, and the scientific community have been greatly agitated over the attempts of the U.S. Congress to rewrite what India perceived as a settled agreement.

To allay these genuine concerns, the Rajya Sabha took up this matter for discussion on August 17, 2006, and the Prime Minister gave a reply detailing what India has agreed to and what India cannot agree to. It is now for the U.S. Senate to take note of the views of the Indian Prime Minister and adopt a Bill essentially in keeping with the July 2005 and March 2006 agreements.

The House Bill states it is the policy of the U.S. to achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosion purposes by India, Pakistan, and China at the earliest possible date. The Senate Bill talks of cessation of production only by India and Pakistan. These propositions are clearly unacceptable to India. India is willing to join only a non-discriminatory, multilaterally negotiated, and internationally verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.

In the draft Senate Bill S.3709, there is a provision that any waiver on nuclear transfers to India "shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this Act." It is true this is consistent with the U.S. Atomic Energy Act 1954. The intent then was to prevent non-nuclear weapon states receiving cooperation from the U.S. acquiring nuclear weapons. Some years ago, France undertook a series of tests in the Pacific and this did not lead to a breach of cooperation between U.S. and France. India announced a voluntary moratorium on tests after the Pokhran II tests of 1998. However, a new situation would arise if the U.S., China, Pakistan, or some other state were to conduct a test in future. It is also conceivable India may have to carry out a test for technological reasons including ensuring safety of its arsenal. But India has demonstrated its sense of responsible restraint by testing in 1998, 24 years after the first test in 1974.

If nuclear reactors were to be stopped midway through construction or if operating reactors are starved of enriched uranium, dislocation to the Indian economy would be serious. The situation has been made even more onerous by a provision in H.R. 5682 that the President "should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source." Since India is a de facto nuclear weapon power, these provisions are both unfair and unacceptable.

The July 2005 agreement had promised India full civilian nuclear cooperation. But the Senate Bill S.3709 specifically excludes "export or re-export to India of any equipment, materials, or technology related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel or the production of heavy water." Some exceptions from this embargo are provided for a multilateral facility or a multilateral programme to develop a proliferation-resistant fuel cycle. India has developed its own technologies in these areas and they have provided inputs to the strategic programme and will continue to do so in the future. However, when civilian nuclear power is poised for a large scale expansion, India would like to benefit from global advances in nuclear fuel cycle technologies.

Additional protocol

When discussing "an Additional Protocol" India is expected to sign with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the draft Senate bill had stated that "Additional Protocol means a protocol additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated between a country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540." The latter applies to non-nuclear weapon states, is highly intrusive, and requires extensive reporting practices. India expects the specific safeguards to be generally on the lines of IAEA INFCIRC-66 and the additional protocol somewhere between those applicable to weapon states and non-weapon states.

The draft Senate bill requires the U.S. President to make an annual report to Congress that India is in full compliance of its non-proliferation and other commitments. Such certification will diminish a permanent waiver into an annual one and introduce uncertainty. This is not conducive to embarking on nuclear power projects with international cooperation and large financial investments.

There has been some confusion regarding sequencing of various actions in implementing the agreement. India cannot agree to the implementation of safeguards on the civilian facilities prior to lifting of restrictions on nuclear commerce by the U.S. and the NSG.

The July 2005 agreement recognised India as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology. That India's case was unique was evident from the wording. However H.R.5682 and the draft S.3709 have been worded as though dealing with a normal non-nuclear weapon state.

The July 2005 agreement talked about the "significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner." The backdrop was the growth rate of about 8 per cent achieved by the Indian economy in recent years and its growing dependence on coal and hydrocarbons. Access to civil nuclear energy could in due course reduce carbon emissions and also the pressure on global hydrocarbon supply.

In any event, India has been pursing its own nuclear power programme and the growth rates could be enhanced significantly if it could access civil nuclear technology from the other advanced countries. The Bill passed by the House and the one to be taken up by the Senate focus entirely on the question of non-proliferation and make no mention of the impact of the agreement on energy security and on mitigating the greenhouse gas problem. This total emphasis on non-proliferation is especially intriguing in an agreement with India, which has an impeccable record on non-proliferation.

Given that it is a multireligious, multilingual and multi ethnic democratic state, India is also acutely aware of the dangers posed by non-state actors getting access to weapons of mass destruction. It can therefore be expected to play a responsible role now and in the future to prevent proliferation, whether called upon to so in a bilateral agreement or not.

India is already a leader in pressurised heavy water reactor technology, in production on industrial scale of heavy water, and in processing of low grade uranium ores. It is poised to become a world leader in fast breeder reactor technology, large scale reprocessing of spent fuel, and thorium utilisation. If the Senate, in its wisdom, passes a bill fully reflecting the agreements reached between the U.S. Administration and the Indian Government, as agreed to in July 2005 and March 2006, India can receive civil nuclear cooperation from the U.S. and the NSG countries. This will enable India to increase its nuclear power capacity substantially in the next two or three decades. It is clear India has no intention to use any equipment, materials or technology it may receive from overseas for civil nuclear power to augment its strategic programme. The latter will remain, as it has in the past, a totally Indian effort based on Indian equipment, materials and technology.

If the Senate, on the other hand, passes S.3709 in the form prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the end product will be one that goes far beyond what India had agreed to in July 2005 and March 2006. As stated by Prime Minister Singh in Parliament on August 17, 2006, the additional obligations imposed on India are unacceptable. Hence the legislative exercise by the U.S. Congress would be futile. The U.S. and India will lapse back into the phase of estrangement in the nuclear field that has spanned a long period of time. There will an inevitable impact on the growth of robust relations in other fields also.

I would urge you to take a broad and enlightened view on the question of civil nuclear cooperation so that the Senate Bill will allow the U.S. and India to move ahead in making available nuclear energy in abundant measure to power the Indian economy.

(The writer is a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.)

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