A.Y .Tipnis

New Delhi: The Army was "reluctant" to inform the Government aboutthe presence of Pakistan-backed intruders in Kargil in early 1999 and did little initially to jointly plan and carry out operations to evict them, Air Chief Marshal (retired) A.Y. Tipnis hassaid.

The Army top brass kept saying they could handle the situation but insisted the Air Force should provide helicopter gunships to support ground troops — a request Air Chief Marshal Tipnis turned down several times as he felt helicopters would be vulnerable to missile attacks and the use of air power would lead to an escalation in a conflict.

"I observed that the ground situation was grave. Army required Air Force help to evict the intruders. Army Headquarters was reluctant, possibly because it was embarrassed to have allowed the present situation to develop, to reveal the full gravity of the situation to [the Ministry of Defence]," Air Chief Marshal Tipnis said in a signed article in the latest issue of Force, a leading defence publication.

"Thus it [Army] was not amenable to Air Headquarters' position to seek Government approval for use of air power offensively," said Air Chief Marshal Tipnis, who headed the IAF during the Kargil conflict.

At two meetings of the three service chiefs on May 23 and May 24, 1999, the Army Chief, Gen. Ved Malik, "appeared to get agitated" on the reluctance to use helicopters.

Air Chief Marshal Tipnis said that at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on May 18, 1999, the Army could not give a "satisfactory answer" to a question from the External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh about an "assessment in respect of the enemy's intentions."

"It was apparent the Army had not applied its mind to this aspect; they were engaged in getting out the intruders without having quite established the nature of the intrusions or the identity of intruders," he said.

"I felt strong sympathy for the Army Headquarters staff. Having been caught off guard in the field, they were unable to make up for their initial lapse due to inadequate intelligence and possibly indifferent involvement from the command headquarters."

Air Chief Marshal Tipnis was "troubled" by the "total lack of Army-Air Force joint staff work" since the intrusions in Kargil were reported in early May.

Noting that "proper joint staff-work" could have helped both sides appreciate the strengths and limitations of each other, he said "there had been no joint deliberations at any level."

The CCS took note of Air Chief Marshal Tipnis' reservations about the use of air power at several meetings and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee finally authorised the use of the IAF at a CCS meeting on May 25, 1999. Air Chief Marshal Tipnis said that Mr. Vajpayee, however, turned down his request seeking permission to cross the Line of Control during operations.

At a meeting with Air Chief Marshal Tipnis on May 14, 1999, Army Vice-Chief, Lt. Gen. Chandrashekhar said his force was "capable of throwing back the intruders on its own" and "air support will hasten the process."

Lt. Gen. Chandrashekhar felt "political go-ahead was necessary only in case fire support was being provided by fighters; use of helicopters...was an in house services' headquarters' decision." But Air Chief Marshal Tipnis again turned down the Army's request, saying, "Government authorisation was mandatory."

The IAF lost an Mi-17 helicopter, a MiG-21 and a MiG-27 and five personnel in the early days of the Kargil operations before it began using precision-guided munitions to destroy enemy positions and supply dumps from a great height. IAF officials had earlier claimed that their operations were hampered by lack of intelligence. Air Chief Marshal Tipnis said in his article that MiG-25 strategic photo reconnaissance aircraft had to be specially modified to enable them to gather information about the intruders. He himself flew in a Mirage 2000 jet during Operation Safed Sagar and participated in a mission against the enemy position on Tiger Hill. "It would be a gross under statement to say the experience was unforgettable!" he said. At the end of the article, he, however, acknowledges: "It was the Army's leadership in this operation, we were only in support." — PTI

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