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The end of a long friendship?

Pallavi Aiyar

North Korea's recent moves have pushed China into a corner.

PYONGYANG'S NUCLEAR test has sent shock waves across North East Asia, upsetting the already precarious balance of power in the region and forcing a rethink of military and foreign policy strategies amongst its neighbours from Tokyo to Seoul. But nowhere has the impact been as profound as on North Korea's long-term supporter, China.

In the past, Beijing has described its relationship with Pyongyang as being as "close as lips and teeth." But following the October 9 test, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared that the two countries should no longer be described as "allies."

"The DPRK's nuclear test has led to a fundamental, deep change in China-North Korea relations," says Professor Yan Xuetong of Beijing University's International Relations Department. "We used to be `brothers and comrades,' now we are just short of enemies. China has joined in slapping sanctions on the DPRK. Friends don't do that."

Strong language

Last week, Beijing condemned Pyongyang's test using language that is unprecedented in the context of bilateral relations, calling it a "brazen" move in "flagrant disregard" of international norms.

China and North Korea have a relationship going back half-a-century to the Korean War when Chinese volunteers poured across the border to help their North Korean "comrades" secure an American defeat. The two countries share an 870-mile border and China is North Korea's largest trading partner, supplying nearly 90 per cent of its oil and 80 per cent of its consumer goods. It is also DPRK's largest food donor.

However, despite historic and economic linkages, relations between the neighbours have grown increasingly complex with China embarking on the path of market reforms while Pyongyang has stuck resolutely to a brand of Stalinism. A palpable divergence of interests between Pyongyang and Beijing has developed in recent years.

The North Korean leader has reportedly told his Ambassadors that China is fundamentally unreliable and cannot be trusted when push comes to shove. Pyongyang's media have described Chinese economic reforms as "revisionist."

Pyongyang's behaviour has deeply infuriated Beijing, which sees it as ungrateful and defiant. By refusing to return to the six-party talks — China's main foreign policy initiative to resolve the impasse on the Korean peninsula — North Korea has created a situation where China has been left with little choice but to join the international community in slapping sanctions on its neighbour.

In the past, a "buffer zone" theory conditioned much of China's policy towards the DPRK. According to this theory the existence of North Korea is of strategic value to Beijing in and of itself, serving as it does as a "buffer" between China and the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

But according to Professor Yan, concerns for "buffer zones" are clearly a thing of the past and China has now reached the end of its tether. "It is clear to me that China has made a decision that the U.S. is strategically more useful to it than North Korea."

However, to read the situation as a straightforward alignment of U.S. and Chinese interests would be simplistic. While the two countries find themselves in agreement on denuclearising North Korea, their reasons for wanting this differ. For the United States, the North Korean test is a fundamental threat to the global order and, hence, a problem in its own right.

For China, the test is less of an issue in itself. Its concern is more that the test will lead to other headaches. "From Beijing's point of view the DPRK getting nuclear weapons is not the worst part of the issue. China is surrounded by nuclear neighbours: India, Pakistan and Russia," says Professor Yan.

Beijing 's worries

Beijing worries that Pyongyang's defiance could lead to the destabilisation of the Korean peninsula, the militarisation of Japan, and growing influence for the U.S. in the region, in addition to sending a flood of North Korean refugees across its borders.

Already there have been calls in Japan for a debate regarding modifications to the country's pacifist constitution. A nuclear Japan is a worst-case scenario for China. Chaos on the Korean peninsula would also draw Beijing into an international conflict when its current priorities are domestic.

China is experiencing industrialisation and urbanisation on a historically unprecedented scale. This has led to a host of internal uncertainties and a rich-poor divide that is threatening Beijing's much cherished social stability. The spectre of armies of North Korean refugees adding to these challenges is not one that China cares for. It would threaten carefully constructed plans for the economic rejuvenation of the under-developed north-east provinces.

As a result, China's approach to the North Korean issue has thus far been conciliatory aimed at facilitating dialogue and averting a military confrontation. But the collapse of the six-party talks last year and the DPRK's recent moves have pushed China into a corner.

The stresses that China faces as it tries to resolve the situation to its own best advantage are evident in the contrary signals sent out by Beijing in the test's aftermath. Swift condemnation of the test was tempered by a statement that China would "continue to develop good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation" with the DPRK and that this policy was "unshakeable."

A few days later China joined the United Nations Security Council in its decision to impose sanctions on Pyongyang but almost immediately expressed reservations over the resolution's call for inspecting cargo in and out of the country.

"China wants to prevent the deterioration of its relations with North Korea which will inevitably worsen if it complies with the sanctions. However if it does not implement them, China will lose its credibility in international eyes," says Professor Yan.

The big question that remains unanswered is whether China will support military action against North Korea were Pyongyang to continue to defy the U.N. and conduct more tests, as it is presently threatening. Beijing and Pyongyang are signatories to a "Friendship Treaty" that binds them together in a military alliance.

The treaty has never been formally abrogated although few analysts believe it to have continued validity. While it is still extremely unlikely that China would endorse or participate in any military conflict with North Korea, old certainties have melted away in the post-test world. It is equally unlikely Beijing will militarily assist its former ally in such an event, as it had once pledged to do.

Concludes Professor Yan: "China is to a certain extent lost. It is groping to find the right way forward but no ready answers are available."

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