NEW DELHI: The services of a probationary employee of the government or its instrumentalities can be terminated without a regular inquiry contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has held.

Fact-finding inquiry

Even a formal fact-finding inquiry behind his back is sufficient to ascertain and prove his misconduct, and termination thereafter cannot be said to violate the principles of natural justice. "Generally speaking, when a probationer's appointment is terminated it means that the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of misconduct or ineptitude, whatever may be the language used in the termination order," a Bench of Justices G.P. Mathur and A.K. Mathur said.

Rejecting the contention that such termination would cast a stigma on the employee, the judges said: "A termination order, which explicitly states what is implicit in every order of termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not stigmatic. In order to amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the job."

In the present case, the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) sacked Arunkumar Madhavrao Sinddhaye, a probationary physical education teacher who inflicted corporal punishment on a student by making him run six rounds (approximately four km) even after he was informed that the boy was unwell.

High Court order

The teacher's services were terminated after a fact-finding inquiry. Though he failed in the lower court, the Bombay High Court ordered his reinstatement with full back wages. The present appeal by the KVS is directed against the order.

Allowing the appeal, the Bench said: "Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy himself whether the employee concerned should be continued in service or not, makes inquiries, it would be wrong to hold that the inquiry which was held was really intended for the purpose of imposing punishment."

Writing the judgment, Mr. Justice Mathur said the intention behind such an inquiry against a probationer was not to hold a full departmental trial but only to determine his suitability to continue in service or not.

In this case, the probationer was given ample opportunity to answer in writing whatever was alleged against him.

Setting aside the impugned order, the Bench held that the innocuous order of termination following such summary inquiry could not be said to be an order of punishment that entitled him to a full-fledged inquiry contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution.

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