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India and China: reassessing relations

Pallavi Aiyar

China's President Hu Jintao's visit to India from Monday is one more step on a long road ahead for bilateral ties.

EVEN AS China has become a "model" that India's political and business classes look to emulate whether it comes to special economic zones or urban planning, until recently the Chinese were usually too busy benchmarking themselves against the Americans to pay their southern neighbour much attention.

But as Chinese President Hu Jintao gets ready to make his first official visit to India on November 20, India-watchers in China argue that a major shift in Beijing's assessment of its southern neighbour is ongoing. Ma Jiali, a veteran South-Asia expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), says India's recent economic performance combined with its growing importance in international affairs has led to a rethink in Beijing of India as "zhong he guoli," a Chinese term that translates roughly as a "comprehensive national power."

For Beijing, relations with India are now considered the highest priority, according to Professor Ma, given that India is what he calls a "four-in-one" country. "India falls into each of the four major categories of countries that it is China's foreign policy objective to focus diplomatic energies on," he explains. The four categories are: developing countries, neighbouring countries, rising powers, and influential actors on the international stage.

"China realises that its ties with India will be key to ensuring stability in Asia and that given its fraught history, this relationship requires personal care at the highest level," adds Rong Ying of the China Institute for International Relations, a government-think tank in Beijing. According to Dr. Rong, the proof for his observation lies in the fact that President Hu is the second top leader to visit India in a year and a half, Premier Wen Jiabao having made the trip in April 2005.

"President Hu's visit breaks with accepted practice in China, in that it is the second top level visit to India without a reciprocal visit from either India's Prime Minister or President," says Dr. Rong.

Mr. Hu's visit to India will be the first by a Chinese President in a decade, but expectations regarding outcomes are somewhat muted in Beijing. Most analysts say the visit will help to keep the momentum of improving ties going, but that no major breakthrough should be expected.

"I don't think that any huge announcement on our outstanding problems like the border will be made," says Hu Shisheng, the Director of the South Asia Department at CICIR. "But in many ways this shows that our bilateral ties have now become more mature and normal. Its only when a relationship is immature that breakthroughs are expected from every high-level visit."

Professor Hu says the Chinese President's visit will focus on improving relations on the economic front. New trade targets are likely to be set, as is an agreement to protect mutual investments. This latter agreement is particularly significant in the context of recent moves in India to restrict Chinese investments in certain sectors such as telecommunications and port development on security grounds.

Border question

On the unresolved boundary issue, analysts in Beijing are uniformly cautious. "The general principle of `give and take' is the guiding one when it comes to the boundary," says Dr. Rong referring to the political parameters and guiding principles for the settlement of the boundary that were agreed upon during Mr. Wen's India visit last year.

The idea of a territorial "swap" involving Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh as the basis for a boundary settlement is the one thought to be the most viable. India, however, has ruled out any "populated areas" as part of a border deal, which makes concessions in Arunachal Pradesh unacceptable. The area of Tawang is a particular sticking point since the Chinese claim it to be a part of Tibet pointing to the fact that the sixth Dalai Lama was born there.

Feathers were ruffled earlier this week when the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi restated China's claim to all of Arunachal Pradesh during a TV interview. The claim drew a sharp response from India, with External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee reiterating that Arunachal Pradesh was an integral part of India. Beijing then sought to play down the Ambassador's comments and said that resolving the border issue would require "mutual compromises" through negotiations and dialogue.

Eight rounds of border talks between the Special Representatives of India and China have already taken place since the boundary negotiations were taken to a political level in June 2003. Even before the decision to give a political touch to the negotiations, eight rounds of border talks had been held between 1981 and 1987 and an additional 14 Joint Working Group meetings between 1988 and 2003.

The Chinese Ambassador's remarks this week thus highlight how little entrenched positions on the border question have changed despite all these discussions at varying levels. The two sides have, in fact, never even agreed on a military line separating the two armies.

"I think the point to keep in mind is that while the border is an important issue in bilateral ties, it is no longer the only issue. The negative impact of this problem exerts much less influence on our relationship than it once did because both sides have agreed to live with it while seeking a political solution," says Dr. Rong.

Professor Ma believes both sides will express a "more active stance to speed up negotiations" during Mr. Hu's visit, but others say that given the seemingly intractable nature of the issue, the leadership is, in fact, keen on putting border talks on the backburner, to be resolved by the next generation of leaders.

If this is indeed the case, full normalisation of China-India ties remains impossible. Even progress on the economic front will eventually run up against the limits imposed by the unresolved boundary question. The controversy over restrictions on Chinese investments is one example.

Professor Hu agrees that until the border is clearly demarcated a true "strategic partnership" between New Delhi and Beijing will remain wanting. But, like the other analysts, he is unable to suggest a way to break the deadlock.

The Assistant Chinese Foreign Minister, Cui Tiankui, recently said active progress on the boundary settlement was taking place and that a framework agreement was now being explored. But given the closed-door nature of the negotiations, little information is available on the details of what, if any, progress has taken place.

"There are signs of slow progress on the border," says Professor Hu, but rather than dwelling on the boundary, the two countries should "spend more energy focussing on economic relations and regional issues aimed at maintaining stability and promoting the development of their shared neighbourhood."

However, with New Delhi concerned about Beijing's all-weather relationship with Pakistan and China discomfited by India's growing closeness to the United States and Japan, there are several regional issues that remain contentious as well.

President Hu will visit Pakistan directly after his India trip and it is expected that while in Islamabad he will ink a wide-ranging energy deal that will assure Chinese assistance to Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. New Delhi is understandably watchful.

Professor Hu claims India "places too much emphasis" on China's relationship with Pakistan, a relationship that, he says, is no longer that of a "military ally" but is a "normal one in a post-cold war scenario." Adds Professor Ma, "Beijing has de-linked its relationship with India and Pakistan. We are friends of both but whereas we are upgrading our ties with India, our ties with Pakistan remain the same as always."

According to Dr. Rong, China's close ties to Pakistan are not directed towards India but towards ensuring the security of China's Western borders. There are, in fact, a range of explanations offered by Chinese analysts concerning Beijing's military and nuclear relationship with Islamabad, but to New Delhi these are cold comfort.

What is increasingly clear is that in many respects India and China face similar foreign policy challenges. It is the stated objective of both countries to maintain an independent foreign policy with regard to specific nations on the basis of their national interest. In other words, to build trust and create healthy bilateral ties with countries that might themselves hold reservations about each other.

Thus, China wants to develop a strategic relationship with India even as it continues its close friendship with Pakistan. India, in its turn, must balance its relationships with China, Japan, and the U.S.

Just as it is difficult for New Delhi to accept Beijing's close ties with Islamabad, in China too there are widespread fears that India's civilian nuclear energy deal with the United States is, in fact, a ruse for Washington to ally itself with New Delhi in a bid to contain Beijing. As a result, Beijing has been lukewarm to the deal.

A consequence of all these factors is that despite the ostensible "strategic partnership" India and China established last year, a serious trust deficit remains between the neighbours. "The strategic partnership we have is less a reality and more an orientation," concludes Dr. Rong.

In this context, the task of strongly strengthening China-India ties will require painstaking work, changing ossified mindsets, and balancing a complex set of factors. It will also take courage and political vision on both sides. President Hu's visit is just one more step on a long road ahead.

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