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LTTE uses air power to make a statement

R. Hariharan

The air raid was perhaps a bid to shore up credibility, not only among its cadres but also among Tamils both at home and abroad.

THOUGH THE attack by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's fledgling air force on the Katunayake airbase near Colombo on March 27 stunned Sri Lanka, it was not unexpected. Since 1998, the LTTE was known to be trying to build an air arm. However, the effort suffered a setback when Sornalingam alias Colonel Shankar, the brain behind it, was killed in a Sri Lankan Army raid. The LTTE built up its air arm during the ceasefire period from 2002. This was partly confirmed by reconnaissance flights over its airstrip at Iranamadu. Though the intelligence services and media had reported the build up of the LTTE's air capability in 2003, the Sri Lankan Government perhaps chose to ignore the reports so as not to jeopardise peace parleys.

After the LTTE walked out of the peace talks and continued violating the ceasefire, Sri Lanka raised objections to its development of facilities for an air arm. India had also expressed its growing concern. The Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission then took up the matter with the LTTE. Though the LTTE acknowledged the existence of an air wing, it did not give any other information. During the ceasefire period, it also developed a second airstrip at Pudukuduiruppu (about 26 km northwest of Mullaitivu). When the security forces started hitting back in December 2005, LTTE air assets were one of the earliest targets. The Sri Lankan Air Force bombed both the airstrips on more than one occasion during 2005-2006. However, the air raid on Katunayake shows these strikes have not affected the LTTE's ability to fly.

Intelligence services have estimated the LTTE fleet strength as two light aircraft and two helicopters apart from some micro-lights. But this does not minimise the significance of its possessing an air arm. The Katunayake attack has shown the LTTE's ability to introduce a few technical sophistications: it improvised the undercarriage to mount four bombs and claimed to have designed the electronic bomb release circuitry in house. Of greater significance is that its pilots flew over nearly 400 km of unfriendly terrain to conduct a mission against a high security air base.

The LTTE's use of aircraft also introduces a new dimension in the present conflict in Sri Lanka. Air power is a vital force multiplier in conventional warfare. Though air strikes may not always result in high battlefield casualties, they are a tremendous boost for the land forces as they sap the morale of the opponents. The LTTE's vulnerability to air strikes has been exposed during this Eelam War IV. Between 1998 and 2001, the LTTE had managed to procure surface-to-air missiles from different sources (including the Pakistan-based terrorist group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen) and use them effectively. However it appears to have run out of these missiles by 2001 and now lacks an effective anti-aircraft defence system.

For quite sometime now, the LTTE had been scouting the global grey market for anti-aircraft missiles. Only last month, a retired Indonesian Marine Corps General Erick Wotulo, trapped by the FBI in a sting operation in Guam, was convicted for involvement in procuring arms including anti-aircraft missiles for the LTTE. So far the Sri Lanka Navy had effectively neutralised LTTE efforts to bring in shipments of arms and ammunition. The Navy intercepted and sank two ships on March 18, 2007, off Arugam Bay. The ships were reportedly carrying spares for aircraft, a number of anti-aircraft missiles, and artillery ammunition for the LTTE.

In this setting, possession of even a limited air capability will boost the sagging morale of LTTE cadres. In the operations so far the LTTE has taken a beating, suffering heavy losses of men and material. The Sri Lankan Navy has curtailed the Sea Tigers freedom to roam the seas and security forces have flushed out the LTTE from most of its strongholds in the East. They have intensified their offensive posture in the Mannar-Vavuniya area and along the frontlines in Jaffna. The security forces are now poised to launch operations in the North. Thus the LTTE's air raid was perhaps a bid to shore up its rapidly dwindling credibility, not only among its cadres but also among Tamils both at home and abroad.

Security system exposed

The LTTE air operation, though limited in scope, has exposed the holes in Sri Lanka's security system. According to media reports, policemen and service personnel in Vavuniya saw the aircraft and reported the crossing of the forward lines at least an hour earlier. However, apparently no action was taken to check the aircraft or prevent the surprise attack. The raid has also exposed the limitations of security at the airbase, which was apparently not geared to rebuff a bombing raid. Airspace can never be sealed completely from stealth raids by light aircraft with their minute radar signature. Such aircraft flying low at tree top level, below the radar horizon, can penetrate high security zones. Conventional measures are not enough to defend an airbase against terrorist threats. An integrated strategy involving counter intelligence measures to eliminate moles, intelligence efforts directed at gaining early warning, a modern air defence system with a ground observation network, and physical security measures at the base with well-rehearsed operational readiness drills has to be devised. This was probably missing at Katunayake.

The idea that the LTTE risked precious aircraft just to lob a few bombs in the night appears simplistic. It is possible that plans to carry out the air raid in tandem with a ground strike did not come through. Ground support for the LTTE could have been in one or more forms: a mole in the airbase, an attack by its commandos, a diversionary effort elsewhere to prevent retaliatory action, and so on. Security authorities are probably exploring these possibilities, if not they would be well advised to do so.

According to reports, the LTTE's military spokesman Irasaiah Ilanthiraiyan confirming the raid had said: "It is not only pre-emptive, it is a measure to protect Tamil civilians from the genocidal aerial bombardments by Sri Lankan armed forces." If he had meant that the raid was aimed at crippling the air force, the mission did not succeed as the damage inflicted was not heavy. However, he warned that more such attacks would follow. That should caution not only the air force but also the airlines in the civilian airport close by. In an earlier LTTE ground attack on Katunayake, on July 24, 2001, Sri Lanka's airlines and air force lost over a dozen aircraft.

How can the LTTE's possession of a few light aircraft pose a threat to any country? Hagrup Haukland, the head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, had clarified this aspect in February 2005. He said the skies over Sri Lanka were under the sovereign control of the government. Any flying in Sri Lankan skies needed the express sanction of the government. In other words, the LTTE's air operation impinges on the sovereignty of Sri Lankan skies. Treaties and agreements govern the use of international airspace. The flying of aircraft at will by a non-state actor like LTTE, with its record of killings and suicide bombings, is against international law. Mr. Haukland said: "The acquisition of aircraft by an organisation like the LTTE means a lot. It is a serious matter, which impinges on Sri Lanka's security. India is concerned too."

As far as India is concerned, the air raid has brought the potential threat from the LTTE nearer home. Whether the LTTE intends to use its newly acquired capability against India or not does not matter. Disclaimers with regard to India sound hollow because of the LTTE's low credibility and record of double-dealing. It is heartening to note the serious reaction of South Block to the LTTE raid. But these thoughts need to be translated into action in the interest of national security. Already, LTTE efforts to smuggle supplies for its war effort from Tamil Nadu are continuing relentlessly despite the apprehension of a few boats in the Palk Strait. That should not happen in the air. As a nation we should not let our airspace be violated by any group acting outside the pale of international law, if we respect our sovereignty.

(Colonel R. Hariharan is a retired Military Intelligence officer who served as the head of intelligence with the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90. E-mail: colhari@yahoo.com)

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