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Militant versus militant in Waziristan?

Nirupama Subramanian

Is Islamabad's strategy to clean up the northwest tribal region finally paying off?

— PHOTO: AP

Members of a local tribal militia stand guard before a house used as private jail by foreign militants in Wana, South Waziristan, on March 26. — PHOTO: AP

PAKISTAN'S NORTHWEST Frontier tribal areas are churning anew but what this will bring up is anybody's guess. For the moment, as local tribesmen battle it out with foreign militants, it has allowed Islamabad to declare that its strategy to clean up this terrorist-militant hotbed is finally paying off.

Mullah Nasir, a local militant commander in South Waziristan, has suddenly emerged as the good guy in the badlands. He has sworn not to rest until he has driven out the last Uzbek militant from the area. The Uzbeks were engaging in criminal activities, he said, and if they wanted to stay, they would have to surrender their weapons first. The clashes that began in the first week of March have intensified.

More than 1,000 Uzbeks are said to live in the region. They are affiliated to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan led by Tahir Yuldashev. Many Uzbeks have married into local families, and have substantial numbers of supporters among the local tribes.

Attempted truce

A group of "neutrals" tried to broker a truce between the two sides but failed. Among them were parliamentarians of the Jamaat-e-Ulema-Islami, a pro-Taliban religious party that is in the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal coalition, which rules the North West Frontier Province (NWFP); Taliban commanders including Beithullah Mehsud, who is blamed unofficially for the suicide bombings in Pakistan; local religious leaders, and tribal elders.

Restrictions on reporters covering the area means none of this information is independently verified. Government officials say some 200 Uzbeks and some 50 local tribesmen have died in the fighting so far. Some reports said the numbers were exaggerated, but there is no doubt that the clashes are taking place, and that both sides are blasting each other with heavy weaponry.

The Pakistan Government stoutly denies any role in fuelling the continued hostilities or giving any assistance to the local tribesmen. It claims it has taken a back seat and allowed tribal dynamics to take over, the intention of its deals with the Waziri tribes. The Government says those deals are now paying off.

Observers say the sudden hostility between the local militants and the Uzbeks could not have come about without some prodding by the Government.

"These foreigners were hosted by the locals, which really means they bought their hospitality. I think the government has simply upped that [the money the locals were getting from the foreigners]," said Daily Times editor Najam Sethi. "It's classic divide and rule." The Government's aim, Mr. Sethi said, was to restore the old system of ruling these areas — destroyed when the Pakistan military went in — by creating vested interests and a band of pro-government tribesmen and "maliks," who would acquiesce to nominal government control through the area "political agent."

It may also explain the sudden turnaround in other tribal areas. Last week, tribal elders in Bajaur, considered a particularly "talibanised" agency, suddenly pledged they would not allow foreign militants to take shelter in the region. And in Tank, an NWFP district neighbouring South Waziristan, local tribal elders in the town joined the growing chorus of voices against militancy after a fierce battle between militants and security forces.

The roiling in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) began just a week after the visit of U.S. Vice-President Dick Cheney to Pakistan, when American media reported that he delivered an ultimatum to President Pervez Musharraf to show results in the "war on terror."

In recent months, Pakistan has been under enormous pressure to show that its "holistic" approach to clean up the tribal areas is working. The semi-autonomous FATA has been the focus of world attention since 9/11 for the sanctuary it provided to pro-Taliban Islamist militants of all shades and nationality who took refuge there to wage jihad against U.S forces in neighbouring Afghanistan. In the process, the local tribes too underwent a "Talibanisation."

Under pressure from the U.S., Pakistan sent troops into these areas to battle the militants. But high casualties, and resentment within the army, and across the country against President Musharraf for succumbing to U.S. pressure to use the Pakistani military against its own people, forced a retreat. The Government signed "peace agreements" with tribesmen in South Waziristan first, and then in North Waziristan. The Pakistan Government stopped military operations in these areas. In return, the tribes made commitments to stop sheltering terrorists and to prevent cross-border incursions into Afghanistan.

But the deals did not seem to be working. Tribesmen, many of them pro-Taliban, reneged on their commitments. The militants took control of these areas, and began enforcing their brand of extreme Islam and even spread their influence into the neighbouring "settled" areas of the NWFP.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan kept up the allegations of cross-border incursions. American and European think tanks and media sank their knives into the peace deals, accusing Pakistan of surrender to the militants. The November 2006 air strike on a madrassa in Bajaur that killed 80 people set off a spate of retaliatory suicide bombings in Pakistan, starting with an attack that killed 40 soldiers in the NWFP.

With the international community continuing to ask Pakistan to "do more" to curb the militants, Islamabad maintained that an all-out military approach would exacerbate the situation. But with NATO commanders in Afghanistan warning of a spring offensive by the Taliban, Pakistan had to show some evidence that its "multi-pronged" approach was working. Mr. Cheney's Islamabad visit at the end of February may have been a turning point.

Immediately after, local tribesmen in South Waziristan clashed with Uzbek militants for the first time. By all accounts, the foreign militants in South Waziristan are offering stiff resistance. According to some reports, the Uzbeks were getting assistance from across the border in Afghanistan and Mullah Nasir has been unable to cut off their supply lines but observers are warning the Pakistan military from offering any overt assistance to him, as the presence of security personnel in the area could turn off neutral and even pro-Nasir tribesmen.

"The best way to do this is through the tribal system, through their own structures. Sending in our own people would be wrong. He [Mullah Nasir] has to do this on his own, and I don't think he will fail," said Lt. Gen. (retd.) Asad Durrani, former head of the Inter-Services Intelligence.

Anti-Uzbek campaign

At the moment, no one seems certain where this will end. Right now, it is entirely an anti-Uzbek campaign, which means the region may continue to play host to other Al-Qaeda-linked foreigners such as Arabs and Chechens. Some reports even say that the Mullah Nasir turned against the Uzbeks because he suspected their hand in the killing of an Al-Qaeda-linked Saudi, Sheikh Asadullah, who was also living in the area.

Lt. Gen. (retd.) Talat Masood, who heads the Pakistan chapter of Pugwash, a conflict resolution group, also warned of unending bloodshed as one consequence of the apparent attempt to "divide and rule" by the government. "That whole place is already in such a mess. This can only increase the fragmentation and lead to the type of blood feuds that go on forever," he said.

Predictions are that once the locals have driven out the Uzbeks, there will be another round of clashes between the anti-Uzbek tribes and the pro-Uzbek "collaborators."

The Pakistan government may well believe such fighting will weaken all sides, paving the way for an eventual "taming" of the region.

But the Awami National Party, which claims to speak for moderate Pashtuns, said the present fighting would only replace one set of militants with another. A total cleanup would require the integration of the tribes into a democratic political process and applying the laws of the country to them. "If they are serious about completely eliminating militancy, the government must allow political parties to work in FATA so that the local tribesmen develop stakes in Pakistan. The writ of the courts must extend to these areas. Eventually, they must become part of the North-West Frontier Province," said Haji Mohammed Adeel, a leader of the ANP. "This is the only solution."

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