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Second term for President: history, numbers, and alignments

Harish Khare

The convention against a second term for a President is now set in stone. Given the electoral college numbers, a BJP nominee stands virtually no chance. If a joint candidate of the UPA and the Left is to win, he or she needs sizeable support from within the `Others' category.

AT THE outset in his memoir, Through the Corridors of Power: An Insider's Story, P.C. Alexander narrates the painful details of how, in 2002, he came to be denied a shot at the highest office in the land. He expresses his agony that President K.R. Narayanan flirted with the idea of a second term: "Everyone expected that he himself would publicly declare that he would not run for the presidential election, not only for reasons of health but also because of the fact that there had been an established convention, after Dr. Rajendra Prasad's second innings, that no President should be given a second term. Even after the NDA leadership had sent informal messages through some friends of Narayanan that the alliance was averse to the idea of a second term for him, he appeared willing to wait for the odd chance of an eventual consensus emerging in his favour or even to contest the election if he was assured of the required numbers." (p. 29)

Four pages later, Dr. Alexander notes that on May 30, 2002 Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee called on President Narayanan to tell him "clearly that the NDA was NOT in favour of a second term for him."

On November 25, 2006 the same NDA leadership that invoked the "no second term" precedent against President Narayanan trooped up Raisina Hill to tell A.P.J. Abdul Kalam of its support for him for a second term. Since then the NDA seems to have lost its enthusiasm for its proposal but the friends of President Kalam have stepped up the campaign in his favour. Political parties are sullenly watching a Kalam second-term bid, which they think is being choreographed from Rashtrapati Bhavan.

If they are right, Mr. Kalam is not the first President to want a second term. Virtually all denizens of the magnificent Rashtrapati Bhavan have been reluctant to leave and have pined for a second term. The story-line in every case is the same: Barkis is willing, provided there is a consensus in his favour.

The first conflict between Indira Gandhi and Congress President K. Kamaraj determined the fate of Dr. Radhakrishnan's evident desire for a second term. By that time, relations between the President and the Prime Minister had pretty much soured up. The Congress of those days had, of course, an overwhelming majority of the value of votes in the presidential electoral college — so it was a matter to be settled primarily within the party. The Prime Minister's camp suspected that her rivals in the party were out to install a President who wanted to carve out a rival centre of authority. Mrs. Gandhi saw to it that Dr. Radhakrishnan did not get a second term. A precedent of "no second term" had been set.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's suspicions were confirmed in 1969 when, after the republic's third President, Dr. Zakir Hussain, died suddenly, the Syndicate insisted on sending one of its leading members, N. Sanjiva Reddy, to Rashtrapati Bhavan. The Prime Minister was determined to make the point that Rashtrapati Bhavan would not be a source of mischief in a parliamentary system of government. A contest became inevitable. The face-off between V.V. Giri and Reddy re-configured Indian politics. Indira Gandhi defied the party bosses; sponsored her own candidate; called for a "conscience vote"; and saw to it that Giri made it to Rashtrapati Bhavan.

Sure enough, when his innings was coming to an end, President Giri was not averse to a second term. The "no second term" precedent became a convention, and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed became President. He died prematurely, on February 11, 1977, in the midst of a general election that turned out to be a popular revolt against the Emergency.

The Janata Party government that came to power succeeded in installing Sanjiva Reddy in Rashtrapati Bhavan. By the time Reddy's five year term ran out, Indira Gandhi and the Congress had regained political dominance in the country. There was no question of Reddy wanting, or being given, a second term. Who should succeed him was to be a purely Congress decision. Indira Gandhi's choice was Zail Singh. When his term was about to end, Zail Singh wanted a second term but Rajiv Gandhi had made up his mind in favour of Vice President R. Venkataraman. The "no second term" convention was now set in stone, consecrated.

In turn, President Venkataraman was keen to stay on for a second term. Naturally Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao invoked the "no second term" convention, and the presidency went to Shankar Dayal Sharma. When his turn came to leave Rashtrapati Bhavan, President Sharma had a burning desire to adorn the office for another term. However, by that time the Congress party had made way for a United Front government and the matter had to be negotiated between the ruling coalition and the supporting Congress. The compromise was to elevate Narayanan to Rashtrapati Bhavan and have N. Chandrababu Naidu's nominee, Krishna Kant, as Vice President.

By the time of the 2002 presidential election, the balance of political power had shifted in favour of the National Democratic Alliance led by the Bharatiya Janata Party. Now (as Dr. Alexander narrates it), it was Prime Minister Vajpayee's turn to re-affirm the "no-second term" convention. Thus, in the history of the Indian presidency, the bottom-line is a firmly established convention: no one gets to stay more than five years in that resplendent house on top of Raisina Hill.

The "second term for Kalam" campaign hinges on an assumption that since no political party or grouping enjoys a majority in the presidential electoral college, the major parties will be keen on avoiding a contest; and that, given the incumbent President's presumed popularity, they will be willy-nilly forced to concede him a second term.

The electoral college numbers do reveal a kind of stalemate. A provisional calculation gives the following vote values for the four groupings or categories that will determine who will be elected the next head of state. First, in a situation of flux where loyalties at least at the periphery may be shifting, it is extremely difficult to make precise calculations. Secondly, this provisional calculation does not, of course, include the vote value (83,824) of the soon-to-be-constituted U.P. Legislative Assembly. (The vote value of the Goa Assembly [800] is included because, although Goa will have its Assembly election on June 2, the outcome will make no difference to the presidential election.)

The total value of 4896 electors in the electoral college is 1,098,882. India's two leading political parties together have less than half of this: the Congress has a one-fourth, and the BJP just over a one-fifth, share of this vote value. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance has a vote value of something over 390,000. The Left parties have a strength of something over 110,000. The BJP-led NDA has a vote value of something over 335,000, excluding the Telugu Desam Party (14,744). The fourth category is a truly mixed bag: the Samajwadi Party, the Bahujan Samaj Party, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the Janata Dal (Secular), the TDP, minor parties, and a large number of unclassifiable `independents.' Once the U.P. Assembly election results are out, the aggregated vote value of the amorphous fourth category, "Others," is likely to be in the region of 200,000.

The U.P. Assembly election results will matter but the difference they will make to the election of the next President need not be overestimated. Even assuming that the UPA and the Left will be able to win 40 Assembly seats in India's most populous State, the combine's total tally, something around half a million, will fall a good way short of a majority in the electoral college. It follows that if a joint candidate of the UPA and the Left is to win, he or she needs sizeable support from within the "Others" category.

The BJP and its NDA allies can count on a majority only if they are able to enlist every formation outside the UPA-Left on their side. To have its candidate win, the BJP will have to achieve an unheard of political polarisation across the length and breadth of India. This can be effectively ruled out.

Given the major divisions and fissures in the electoral college, the presidential election will test the maturity and statesmanship of the political parties. They must ensure that this contest does not degenerate into a bitter alignment of forces. Nor must the contest be approached as a stratagem to checkmate the incumbent Prime Minister.

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