Opinion - News Analysis   

"Flab in armed forces needs to be reduced"

The former chief of the Indian Army, General V.P. Malik, offers his views on the military manpower crisis.

THIS HAS reference to the editorial "India's military manpower crisis" (June 5). In early 1998, some of my colleagues and I carried out a review of the organisational structure and operational commitments of the Army, and the need for its modernisation. Our major hurdle towards modernisation was availability of finance. After the review, we decided to `suppress' 50,000 personnel from the sanctioned strength of the Army over a period of three years for the following reasons: Teeth to tail ratio of the Indian Army was comparatively heavier than most other armies; operational commitments, logistics innovations, new options and facilities, and new weapons and equipment allowed some reduction in the strength; quality of human resource in the Army has now become more important than quantity; revenue thus saved could be utilised for force modernisation. This measure would reduce `pensions' load on the exchequer.

Although the Defence Secretary and some of my Army colleagues were sceptical of the proposal for various political, administrative, and procedural reasons, I decided to go ahead. After personally speaking to the Defence Minister, the Finance Minister, and the Prime Minister, we received approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security that the revenue thus saved would be available to the Army for modernisation. This measure, thereafter, was implemented for two years, the Kargil war notwithstanding.

It needs to be clarified that this reduction was not to affect the Rashtriya Rifles. As this force has been raised primarily for internal security (Ministry of Home Affairs' responsibility), and its strength is flexible, based on the internal security situation, we wanted strength/revenue expenditure on account of Rashtriya Rifles to be separated from the defence budget. This, too, was accepted by the government later.

No doubt the Kargil war complicated the problem somewhat and increased in-house opposition to the suppression of Army strength; it was actually the change of guard and Operation Parakram that made the senior staff of the Army and the Ministry of Defence shelve the proposal.

India's case is not merely high-technology replacing combatant manpower. The Indian Army has considerable experience in sub-conventional and conventional warfare. Its doctrine for sub- conventional operations is quite different from that of the U.S. Army.

The issue of mid-career transfer of Army personnel to paramilitary forces, Central Police Organisations, and the State Armed Police was also raised with Prime Ministers I.K. Gujral and A.B. Vajpayee. Both approved the concept in principle. But their Home Ministers failed to carry through the proposal with their Ministry staff, as is happening even today.

Shortage of officers

Officers' shortage has been a persisting problem with the Army. It requires innovative short as well as long-term measures. After the Kargil war, we increased Army officers' intake to the maximum extent possible in the existing infrastructure in the National Defence Academy, the Officers Training Academy, and the Indian Military Academy. We also reduced the training period for Regular Commission entry in the IMA by six months. This was to be reviewed after two years, that is, after the passing out of four batches. This was not a novel measure. It had been done many a time in the past, before and after Independence. Most of the training imparted in the last six months in the IMA is the same as `on the job training' given in units. Unfortunately, the Army decided to reverse this decision after two batches, soon after I retired.

Officers' shortage is acute now and seriously affecting the Army, in quantity as well as quality. The reasons, well known, have been discussed ad nauseam in public. There can be no long-term solution to the problem until the government and society are able to mitigate the following:

Remove stagnation at the middle level and thus improve promotion opportunities of the officers, close to that of civil and police services; improve opportunities for officers and men to be able to spend more time with their families; re-establish social status and warrant of precedence of the armed forces officers at the Centre and State levels; compensate adequately the increased level of personal risk and hardships in the field areas; bridge salary and compensation gap between the private sector and government services, to the extent possible.

However, I must emphasise that all such long-term measures can be processed and implemented more easily if there is absolutely no flab in the strength of the armed forces.

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