P.K. Iyengar

Mumbai: Senior nuclear scientists say unless the U.S. makes substantial changes in its civil nuclear deal with India, back and forth negotiations on the 123 agreement are meaningless.

The tough terms and conditions laid out in the Henry Hyde Act passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2006 and the intent of the July 18, 2005 statement are at divergence and so it is important to resolve it soon, they say.

Most of the senior scientists did not want to be quoted, barring two former chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, M.R. Srinivasan and P.K. Iyengar.

Dr. Srinivasan, Atomic Energy Commission member, said now "it is the U.S. which has to find a way to resolve the issue as the 123 agreement is only the operational arm of the Hyde Act."

Asked about Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's recent suggestion on creating a national reprocessing facility for spent fuel as a civilian facility, he said "those issues can wait and they are matter of details. But what is important at this juncture is for the Americans to comply with the July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006 joint statements and for India it is the Prime Minister's promise on the floor of Parliament."

According to the agreement of March 2, 2006, the reprocessing of spent fuel from foreign plants and Indian plants was based on an "assay mode" or "double mode."

That is not possible without revisions in the Hyde Act, say some scientists of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE).

M.R. Srinivasan

Dr. Iyengar said: "Notwithstanding the fact that in the July 18, 2005 statement the U.S. had recognised India as a developed country with a strategic programme and that the U.S. had to come out with a separation plan for nuclear facilities in March 2006, the U.S. knew that India was very strong."

"Therefore, the negotiations that took place between March and November 2006 have evolved into a modification of the Atomic Energy Act of the U.S. which was not so rigid in November. However, the conciliation committee when making it final, made it very rigid in complete disregard to any of India's objection, which were on the table," Dr. Iyengar said.

"It takes years to understand the intricacies and nuances of nuclear policy and why should we get into the often whimsical and partisan non-proliferation aspects as promoted by the U.S. from time to time? It is quite clear that the U.S. Under Secretary Nicholas Burns, who claimed 90 per cent completion of the 123 agreement talks successfully, seems to have burnt himself," he said.

Setting up of panel

Scientists and policy experts have noted with some amusement the predictable constitution of the "expert committee" intended to examine in detail issues governing non-proliferation, India's deterrent and other related subjects.

The very composition of this hand-picked group (a committee of three) and the fact that they have been asked to look into these issues in the few weeks leading up to the July visit to India by U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice "is the only aspect of the entire saga that is patently transparent," a senior DAE scientist stated.

If indeed the Prime Minister intends to make good his numerous promises to Parliament, no choice remains but to press for substantial changes in the Hyde Act.

Taiwan Act

Officials in the Ministry of External Affairs examining the deal have commented in December 2006 that "the Hyde Act is law and supercedes any bilateral agreement. If anything within the 123 agreement contradicts the Hyde Act, the Act will supercede any and all terms of the agreement."

A known parallel is of the Taiwan Relations Act, which supercedes three previous joint communiqués with China, which is well aware that ultimately the U.S. Government will be bound by the terms of the Act, MEA officials have pointed out.

"We have hurriedly suggested a national reprocessing facility under international safeguards in an attempt to win the `up-down' vote and appease the U.S. Congress," DAE officials said.

Overriding "concession"

The very fact that the U.S. has not responded to India's offer only implies that it does not serve their purpose. Such attempts at subterfuge only highlight that reprocessing is not a right the U.S. wishes to allow India to retain and the Hyde Act can be invoked at any time to override this "concession," say the DAE officials.

Following the latest offer, there is a real fear that bizarre "concessions," including invoking U.S. Presidential certifications for reprocessing the Tarapur fuel (which India can do by right), may be proposed to push through the 123 agreement entirely on U.S. terms, the DAE officials said.

If such certifications are allowed, not only does it set a dangerous precedent for the Indian nuclear programme but also puts India squarely in the path of future U.S. Presidential retractions, they warn.

"Indian negotiators were attempting to convince us that the Hyde Act is an internal U.S. legislation, not binding on India. Here is another example that the U.S. remains bound by its terms and intends to invoke them to bludgeon India into agreeing (to its terms)," a few senior scientists said.

"Why is India running around trying to engage the IAEA and the NSG when the ball is squarely in the U.S. court to deliver as promised," ask a few veteran nuclear scientists. — PTI

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