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Protecting India’s interests

Although the text of the draft nuclear cooperation agreement settled in negotiations with the United States has not yet been made public, official accounts of its contents indicate that the assurances provided to Parliament by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have been fulfilled virtually in their entirety. These assurances revolved round three sets of concerns articulated by the scientific community, the Opposition parties, including the Left, and sections of the media and t he strategic community. The first concern was that the implementation of the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative should not have an adverse impact on the country’s strategic programme. Secondly, the integrity of the indigenous three-stage civil nuclear programme should not be compromised. Thirdly, the autonomy and independence of foreign policy must be preserved under all circumstances. After last week’s agreement, it does seem that the first two concerns have been adequately addressed. The last concern is more open-ended, requiring continuous vigilance. Nevertheless, the upfront inclusion of reprocessing rights has probably reduced the vulnerability of the country to future pressures.

The reason these concerns came to the fore last year was the repeated attempt by Washington to dilute its own commitments. These commitments stemmed from the agreements for civilian nuclear cooperation contained in the U.S.-India joint statements of July 18, 2005 and March 2, 2006. Indeed, when the Henry Hyde Act was passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2006, it seemed that the terms of the original bargain had been unilaterally recast to shift the balance of obligations and benefits to India’s disadvantage. For example, when the negotiations for the bilateral agreement — known as the ‘123 agreement’ — began in earnest in 2007, Washington attempted to persuade or pressure New Delhi to forgo the cast-iron fuel supply assurances that had been negotiated as part of the commitment to place civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in perpetuity. A potential deal-breaker was Washington’s insistence on a ‘right of return’ provision that would nullify these assurances if India were to conduct a nuclear explosion in future. Aside from this, U.S. negotiators did not want the 123 agreement to give India the right to reprocess the spent fuel produced by U.S.-supplied reactors. A determined effort was also made to build an additional layer of bilateral ‘fall-back’ safeguards on top of IAEA safeguards for any nuclear facilities or materials India imported from America. Finally, the U.S. was unwilling to allow India to import reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy water-related technology or equipment for use in safeguarded national fuel cycle facilities.

After several rounds of difficult negotiations, the two governments managed to break the deadlock on these issues. Washington ended up conceding ground but New Delhi cannot claim to have had its way wholly either. It appears to have won the crucial prior consent for reprocessing, but the specific arrangements are yet to be agreed upon. Insofar as the parameters for these arrangements relate strictly to IAEA safeguards and protocols, there is little ambiguity about the character of the subsidiary agreement. Yet the U.S. can point out that it has got the Indians to step away from their earlier demand for the detailed reprocessing conditions to be spelt out upfront. On the vital issue of fall-back safeguards and fuel supply assurances, a similar linguistic exercise has closed the gap between the two sides. The U.S. will have the right to demand the return of any material supplied by it — including nuclear fuel — in the event of an Indian nuclear test. However, this right is tempered by the American commitment to ensure the continuous operation of any reactor supplied by it.

This newspaper, and others who have closely followed the course of the protracted nuclear negotiations, will be able to judge how watertight these arrangements are from India’s standpoint only when the text of the 123 agreement is available. If it is confirmed that India has succeeded in protecting its interests, credit must be given not just to the officials of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Department of Atomic Energy, and the Prime Minister’s Office for their negotiating skills — but to all those who took part in the robust and, at times, no-holds-barred debate inside and outside Parliament. The United Progressive Alliance government must place the document in the public domain as soon as the Cabinet approves it. Nothing will be gained by delaying release until the monsoon session of Parliament, which is weeks away. It may also be prudent for India to make an early request under the agreement for consultations on reprocessing arrangements. It will make little sense to do this after billions of dollars have been invested in U.S. reactors.

The next steps towards the completion of a nuclear deal that will end decades of technology denial will not be easy. India needs to negotiate a country-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group needs to amend its guidelines to permit civilian nuclear commerce with India. Washington must ensure that the NSG rule change is a clean and swift affair and that no extraneous conditionalities are imposed on India in the process. While the non-proliferation warriors in the U.S. might gear up for one last fight when the 123 agreement is put to an up or down vote in Congress, the fact that the NSG would have by then made an exception for India will be a powerful disincentive to those tempted to scuttle the deal. From now on, the sequence of reciprocal actions needed to make the July 2005 agreement a reality can be said to favour India.

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