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The perils of non-proliferation amnesia

Indo-U.S. nuclear cooperation means different things to different people — a reversal of decades of U.S. non-proliferation policy, a promising new market for U.S. nuclear commerce, violation of the fundamental principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the prospect of a strategic partnership among vibrant democracies.

One thing it definitely does not mean is strengthened export controls. Despite efforts by the White House to portray the deal as a plus for combating the spread of nuclear weapons, the terms of the latest round of U.S.-Indian nuclear negotiations confirm the opposite conclusion. Repeatedly outfoxed by their Indian counterparts and hindered by the political unwillingness of a lame-duck administration to walk away from the negotiations, U.S. diplomats have achieved an embarrassing accord. If endorsed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the U.S. Congress, it will virtually ensure the demise of global nuclear export restraints.

The next key round of deliberations on the deal is apt to take place this fall among the 45-member NSG — a body that only three years ago was urged by President Bush to tighten export controls, especially in the sensitive fuel cycle area. Today, however, Washington has a different agenda that closely resembles the one Russia had long sought (and the U.S. had opposed) — to create an exception for India to standard export guidelines that preclude the supply of nuclear material and technology to states lacking safeguards on all of their nuclear facilities. As a result of this shift in U.S. policy, Russia already has rushed to sign new nuclear trade agreements with India without waiting for the NSG to modify its guidelines by consensus as is required. China also has indicated its intent to apply a similar exception to Pakistan, and one can soon imagine Australia, Belarus, France, South Africa, and other states citing the NSG precedent for India as the basis for exporting nuclear commodities to anyone whenever it is commercially or politically expedient.

What is perhaps most unusual and ominous about the current debate over India within the NSG is the extent to which economic considerations appear to override those involving proliferation even among states that are typically regarded as the leaders of the international non-proliferation community. Apparently, gone are the days when Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, and members of the European Union could be counted on to lead the charge in support of strict adherence to non-proliferation treaties.

At the historic 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, which extended the Treaty indefinitely, NPT parties — including all members of the NSG — made a political commitment to refrain from nuclear cooperation with states lacking “full scope” safeguards. And yet, most of these states either are unaware of these obligations or have chosen to ignore them.

The dissonance is most striking with respect to Australia and South Africa — two countries that pride themselves on model non-proliferation behaviour — reflected in part by their ratification of nuclear-weapon-free zones in their respective regions, the Treaty of Raratonga in the South Pacific and the Pelindaba Treaty in Africa. Both treaties have explicit language prohibiting members from engaging in nuclear commerce with states lacking comprehensive safeguards, as is the case in India. And yet Australia and South Africa have each endorsed nuclear trade with India and are supportive of the U.S. initiative to weaken the NSG guidelines to allow such commerce. It is as if they believe they can selectively disavow inconvenient legally-binding obligations — a particularly difficult manoeuvre for Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, who is on record as having acknowledged the restrictive nature of the Raratonga Treaty.

It remains to be seen if the current subordination of non-proliferation objectives to economic and other considerations will be a fleeting phenomenon or a more enduring fact of international politics. However, it is disconcerting that the decision about nuclear trade with India in some capitals has been made by officials who do not have expertise in or responsibility for non-proliferation matters and who have little regard for its proliferation implications. This is the case in Canada and the U.S., and appears to resemble the process by which decisions were reached in many EU countries, as well as other members of the NSG.

Export controls remain an imperfect but useful tool to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the NSG would be well advised to follow Florence Nightingale’s guiding principle that “whatever else hospitals do they should not spread disease.” Otherwise, at a time of mounting proliferation challenges, this body is apt to adopt a policy that intentionally or inadvertently erodes the effectiveness of one of the most important multilateral non-proliferation instruments.

(William Potter is Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Jayantha Dhanapala is a former U.N. Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs and Ambassador of Sr i Lanka to the United States, who served as president of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.)

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