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India’s ‘rising profile’ in East Asia

The United States-India civilian nuclear energy deal has added a new dimension to New Delhi’s rising profile in East Asia. While being mostly visible under the sun, India’s changing profile is also lost in the shade on a few other occasions.

This complex reality came into sharp focus during External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s recent visits to the region. He visited Jakarta and Singapore in June for bilateral meetings and public lectures; Manila in August to attend a regional security dialogue forum; and Bangkok and Seoul in September for country-specific talks and a firm presentation of India’s new profile.

Besides the nuclear deal, India’s identity in this region, widely believed to be the next big theatre in world politics, is traceable to economic diplomacy and some basic strategic thinking.

Relevant to this sub-context are India’s continuing challenges in negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs) with individual countries and also the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). While it is unclear whether the ASEAN-India FTA will be ready in time for their summit in Singapore in late-November, New Delhi has not had a smooth ride in firming up several country-specific agreements either.

On a fundamental strategic plane, India’s long-term presence in East Asia will be determined by the political fate of a relevant Japanese proposal. Now somewhat in eclipse, Tokyo’s initiative relates to the possible formation of a quadrilateral forum of major Asia-Pacific democracies, consisting of the U.S., India, Japan and Australia. A related question is whether India can, and should, carve out a niche role for itself in East Asia, regardless of the success or failure of the quadrilateral idea. There is no definitive indication yet from New Delhi about this alternative. And, although assiduously articulated by the former Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, the quadrilateral idea is indeed blessed by the U.S.

Surely, in this broad context, Mr. Mukherjee himself has not sought to project India as an emerging U.S.-friendly power of utmost consequence to East Asia. While not at all distancing India from the dynamics of forming this quadrilateral forum, he also abundantly emphasised that the idea of this collective entity is not directed against China. No surprise, of course. China, with capabilities for worldwide roles in varied fields, straddles East Asia in a way that no other country does, except the U.S. as the wounded but sole superpower and Japan as a resurgent economic force with political ambitions.

As seen by authoritative Western diplomatic sources in Seoul, the Republic of Korea (RoK), a long-time U.S. ally, has substantially reversed, only very recently, its gradual estrangement with Washington. Significantly, Mr. Mukherjee emphasised, while in Seoul on September 17, that he did “not visualise any constraints” on the development of “bilateral relations” between India and the U.S. in the present situation. He was answering questions from the audience after addressing the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. He was asked about the “implications” of the India-U.S. nuclear deal for “regional stability” in East Asia and about the “concerns of some people whether that kind of rapprochement [between New Delhi and Washington] will continue.”

For the first time during his recent visits to East Asia, Mr. Mukherjee, while in Seoul, was very emphatic about India’s equation with the U.S. He said the relationship “is expanding very fast … and … has assumed new dimensions, new angularities” in a positive sense. And, in a balancing act of diplomacy, he delivered two punchlines.

“The latest … civilian nuclear cooperation, if it is finally materialised, would be a landmark agreement for bilateral cooperation in the context of the multilateral framework.” This framework, he pointed out, entailed “the [possible] involvement of a large number of NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] countries and also India-specific arrangements with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].” Besides RoK, the prime members of NSG from greater East Asia are China, Japan, and Australia. And, India needs NSG’s support to access the state-of-the-art know-how and materials for deploying atomic energy as an ‘environmentally safe’ source of electricity.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, Mr. Mukherjee underscored India’s confidence that its “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” with China “will mature and steadily develop.” No less important is the position that RoK took after his visit to Seoul. Speaking to this correspondent in Seoul, RoK Foreign Minister Song Min-soon said his country would have, in the NSG context, no reservation over the India-U.S. nuclear deal. RoK would not, however, wish to fast-forward its NSG-related decision and announce it openly at this stage. The aim is to prevent the “unintended” negative impact an India-friendly gesture at this stage might have on RoK’s “sensitive” efforts to disarm its ethnic northern neighbour in the nuclear domain.

RoK’s game plan, therefore, is to sail along the India-related current inside the NSG. And, the assumption, on the part of RoK, is that India, with its “credible” commitment to worldwide nuclear non-proliferation, can indeed hope to woo this elite club. Also relevant to Seoul’s position are the views of Korean foreign affairs experts such as Ra Yoon-dho that the U.S. has now recognised India as a nuclear power, and it “has emerged as a new axis of the international order.” Equally relevant is the opinion of India’s Ambassador to RoK, N. Parthasarathi, that the two countries are now engaged in “a comprehensive dialogue” of cooperation.

Authoritative Western diplomats, too, do not think that the India-U.S. nuclear deal, which “strengthens” the global non-proliferation regime, can torpedo the China-hosted talks on the de-nuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Australia, an ally of the U.S., has been somewhat enthusiastic about this India-America deal. But Japan, conscious of its constitutional pacifism and ties with the U.S., is biding time to swim along a pro-India tide, if any, inside the NSG in due course.

China has offered to cooperate with India in the domain of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the caveat being the principle of non-proliferation. India’s response is that the deal with the U.S. advances this objective.

In this big picture of diplomacy, India has, during Mr. Mukherjee’s visit to Bangkok, expressed willingness to cooperate with Thailand in the civilian nuclear energy sector. He said this was possible “once the India-specific arrangement is in place” after discussions between New Delhi and the IAEA and after a relevant decision by the NSG. Such India-Thailand cooperation in a sensitive area is the stuff of thinking out of the old-style nuclear box. And, this has been made possible by what India’s Ambassador to Thailand, Latha Reddy, describes as a “very solid and dynamic” bilateral engagement at this time.

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