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LTTE attack in military context

Pushed into the Vanni jungles and denied vital supplies as a result of a relentless year-long campaign by the Sri Lankan military, a desperate LTTE has scored a hit of modest military significance. The October 22 pre-dawn ground-and-air attack on the Anuradhapura air base in the North Central Province, leaving four military helicopters destroyed and 14 soldiers dead, was in reality a suicide operation by an organisation on the run. The modus operandi is typical of the LTTE. A 21-member suicide squad, in two formations, was let loose on the air base, wrecking everything in sight. Two light aircraft of the nascent ‘Tiger Air Force,’ which surfaced 70 minutes after the suicide offensive, appear to be of mere symbolic significance. It was the fifth aerial foray since the Tigers made their debut in the skies in March 2007 targeting the air base near the only international airport of the country at Katunayaka; and the first after the Sri Lanka government put in place a revamped air defence system. By demonstrating its ‘air power,’ in the melee of the suicide attack at Anuradhapura, the LTTE hopes to bolster the sagging morale of its cadres.

Militarily and politically, the LTTE has been in dire need of an Anuradhapura-type attack — as in the last several months it has taken a severe beating from the Sri Lankan armed forces. Since its ouster from the east in August, the terrorist organisation has failed to conduct any military operation of significance notwithstanding the fissures within the Karuna group and general unrest in the east. Contrary to predictions from several quarters, Colombo has been safe. According to the Sri Lankan Navy, the LTTE has lost all of its ten ships, ferrying supplies from various clandestine sources, in one-sided sea battles. Eight of these losses were in 2007 and the other two ships were sunk in Indonesian waters. According to informed estimates, which are not contested by the LTTE, 200 of its cadres were killed in the past one month. For the first time in years, the Sri Lankan army made territorial gains in the north by capturing a Tiger base in Mannar. However, the armed forces face a few troubling questions. The new radar detected the intruding aircraft, yet they were able to operate in the air space for at least 30 minutes and return to their base. And what explains the failure of the armed forces to detect the infiltration of a large suicide squad right into the compound of a vital air base? The LTTE operation shows up continuing weaknesses in Sri Lanka’s intelligence machinery and in the capability of the armed forces to secure the air space even against sub-military threats.

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