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Back to the old style of governance? statecraft

In a failed or faltering state, the rulers are given to clinging to the presidential thrones and, if possible, buying an insurance policy against adversity by way of a bank account in Geneva; in a successfully working state, the designated functionaries are consciously mindful of their obligation to govern — not just rule or survive in office but to govern effectively. Since India is neither a failed nor a faltering state, the entirely reasonable expectation always is that New Delhi will have a functioning, coherent and purposeful ruling arrangement. Robustness of such an arrangement may vary from time to time but its effectiveness should never come into doubt. That is the obvious lesson of the 1990s’ instabilities, which were sorted out only when a right-wing government got voted into office.

The question, now, uppermost in everyone’s mind — at home and abroad, including perhaps in the Prime Minister’s own mind — is whether the Manmohan Singh regime has got reduced to a lame-duck arrangement or whether it is still possible to recoup the prime ministerial authority and prestige, as necessary pre-requisites to a functioning Indian state.

The question has acquired a sharper edge in recent weeks, as the world has watched bewilderedly the disarray on display at the very heart of decision-making in New Delhi. Those who advocate passionately the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal have tried to goad Dr. Singh to take on the Left, whatever the consequences; others, especially from the BJP camp, have taunted him to prove his prime ministerial authority by resigning. Some of his own aides are guilty of having manipulated things in a manner so as to make him appear confrontationist and uncompromising, without the necessary readiness for the battle. For better or for worse, the United Progressive Alliance government appears to have lost its most important asset: respect that Dr. Singh commanded, both on account of the office he holds and his personal reputation for efficiency and integrity.

Worse, the open spat between the government and the Left over the nuclear deal has undermined the political raison d’etre of the UPA arrangement. The UPA-Left cooperative equation was premised on an assumption of a convergence of the political (and electoral) interests among the partners, beyond the anti-BJP instincts. Rather than build on the common primary need to keep the saffron brigade away from the front portals of the Indian state, the Congress and the Left seem to be engaged in a totally needless game of destructive political name-calling. The Congress strategists and apologists have openly talked of how a snap poll would reduce the Left’s Lok Sabha tally — and also put paid to the Left’s meddlesomeness. The Left, on its part, has chosen to accentuate its political and policy differences with the Congress, rather than enlarge the common areas of understanding. It can be no consolation to anybody that the leaders in the two political formations have perhaps unwittingly allowed themselves to be provoked into this standoff by a media given to controversy-mongering.

The nuclear deal has been allowed to become an albatross. Even if the Prime Minister confesses that he is prepared to live with the disappointment of not having the deal, the forces, ideas, thinking, individuals and interests which have pushed the deal so far are not going to give up so easily. In any case, having personalised the deal, the Prime Minister cannot just pretend to have developed the detachment of a Zen master.

The stalemate can perhaps be resolved in only one of the three ways: the Left changes or is persuaded to change its mind (most unlikely); the government abandons unambiguously the deal, a solution inconsistent with India’s long-term reputation as an international interlocutor; and, the government goes ahead — after the Gujarat elections — and tries to conclude the deal, daring the Left to vote with the BJP (or vice-versa) to oust the government.

The much larger issue is whether the coalition polity will permit the Indian state and its administrators the freedom to undertake qualitative changes in pursuit of new policies, which may involve a significant realignment with global forces. The current standoff offers three key lessons for the present and future crops of policymakers.

First, it is important to enlist the ruling party behind any major political initiative. In normal course, this should be a normal consideration in a reasonably functional party system. However, the Congress as also the rest of the party system has ceased to function in a systemic manner. As it is, the Congress remains unexcited about the deal partly because it remains at best sullenly reconciled to a division of authority and power (between the Prime Minister and the Congress president). More than that, there has been no sustained effort whatsoever to educate the Congress rank and file in the plus and minuses of the deal. However, this is the new style of functioning in most parties; the lack of education of the Congressmen on the nuclear deal is no exception. Given the exclusive and total reliance that has now come to be placed on the wisdom and sagacity of the leader, the Congress leaders no longer feel the need to explain and seek the endorsement of the partymen for policies. In the good old days when the leadership was not so unsure of itself, an AICC session would have been summoned, where the delegates would have had a chance to voice their reservations and doubts, which in turn would have been addressed by the Prime Minister and others. The idea of a party forum is one of a two-way communication — the opposition and dissent get expressed, apprehensions allayed, and the government’s compulsions explained.

The second lesson is that if the Prime Minister in a coalition government wants to embark on a major initiative like the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement, he or she will have to make serious and sincere efforts to engage the allies. As partners in the ruling arrangement at the national level, allies, especially those from the regional parties, need to be tutored in responsibilities and obligations of international agreements. It also means a two-way understanding of the rules of coalition: a share in spoils of power comes with a share in responsibility.

Thirdly, an attempt should have been made to make the case for the nuclear deal before the people of India. Though there have been many discussions in the two houses of Parliament, as Prime Minister Dr. Singh (and his party) had an obligation to take into account the massive distrust of the United States, both at the elite and popular levels. The scientific community has its own reasons to be extremely sceptical of any American commitment. And because of the Bush Administration’s Islamophobia, one more layer has been grafted on this long-term distrust. Neither the government nor the Congress made any attempt to mobilise the crowds in support of this nuclear initiative. On the one hand, there was the distrust of the masses to understand a “complex” issue; nor were matters helped by Washington’s cultivated presumptuousness.

It was a combination of these three democratic-deficiencies — non-involvement of the party cadres, non-dialogue with the allies, and distrust of the masses — that have constricted the coalition government and given the critics on the Left a chance to explore the limits of opposition. It is still possible to overcome opposition to the nuclear deal by attending to these three democratic deficiencies. Mercifully, there is a recognition that it would be democratically unethical to do a significant and momentous deal behind Parliament’s back.

Will the collapse of the India-U.S. nuclear agreement suggest that India is back to the old style of governance when New Delhi could not be relied upon to take a stand — at home or abroad? Such inference can only bring unmitigated unhappiness to all classes and sections of society, as the outside world will be tempted to either ignore us or take undue advantage of us at a time when India is poised to engage with the external forces. Nor have the forces inimical to our national security and collective welfare been totally tamed. And there is no reason to replicate the turmoil and trauma of the 1990s. The crux of the matter goes way beyond the future of the Manmohan Singh regime. If we are not able to calibrate our political differences in a reasonable manner and are not able to put in place a coherent, forward-looking government in New Delhi, we will unwittingly end up unleashing unhelpful and unhealthy forces. Bloody chaos and institutional confusion in our neighbourhood should be a sobering enough sight for all of us.

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