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Opinion - Interviews Printer Friendly Page   Send this Article to a Friend

‘For Southeast Asia, to have India as a partner is a tremendous plus’

P. S. Suryanarayana

Singapore Prime Minister and East Asia Summit ChairmanLee Hsien Loongmakes a resonant plea for an “effort” by India to help “crystallise” a regional architecture of cooperation. In an exclusive interview in Singapore, he speaks on a range of issues including the City-State’s multi-dimensional ties with India. Excerpts:

— PHOTO: AFP

Lee Hsien Loong: “The old links are reviving and revitalising... the links between India and Asia Pacific are growing.”

The [Singapore-India] Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) has been under implementation for nearly two years. Do you think that the accord has come up to expectations?

It has been a very positive factor in our economic relations. Our [bilateral] trade has grown; our investments in India [are] very considerable. In fact, we like them to be more. And, many Indian companies have set up [base] in Singapore: 3,000 or so, some of whom are using Singapore [as] their headquarters for [the Asia Pacific] region, including India.

We have reviewed the CECA. Agreed on a set of enhancements. But there has been some delay. Our banks are finding themselves without a free hand which was committed under the CECA. These are matters we are sorting out.

If we regard the CECA phase as the First Wave of enhanced cooperation, do you consider the possibility of a Second Wave? Our enhanced defence cooperation seems to be the Second Wave.

We have joint training. The [Singapore] Air Force has signed an understanding for joint training. The Army has completed an agreement but not signed it yet. But it is on the way. It is beneficial to both. We get experience [by] training with a different partner [including in the naval domain]. You also get some opportunity to link up with a friend in this part of the world, where you have increasing interest. Yes, it is a new dimension.

Where does this figure in Singapore’s strategic doctrine?

You are liberalising your economy, linking up with the world. It is natural, therefore, that your security interests will also be interpreted to encompass these [East Asian] areas. And, from Southeast Asia’s point of view, to have India engaged as a partner is a tremendous plus. We have good links with China, with Japan. And, now, we will have growing links with India. This means a broader, more balanced, and more comprehensive network of cooperation.

How confident are you that this defence aspect is understood in the right perspective by the neighbours?

I don’t think Singapore’s neighbours are concerned about India, and I don’t think India’s neighbours are worried about Singapore. [Laughs heartily] .

Your [defence] cooperation with India seems to be far more intensive than your cooperation with China or Japan?

Yes [Emphatic, to be italicised]. With China and Japan, there is cooperation, but the political context is different. We cannot imagine having Singapore Armed Forces’ units conduct training in the People’s Republic of China. The world would have changed, if that were to be possible. And, we have exchanges with Japan, but there is the history of the Second World War.

So, outside of the U.S. and some of the Western allies of the U.S, does India rank particularly as a defence cooperation partner for Singapore?

We have cooperation for military training with many countries, because we are so short of space in Singapore.

Is the link-up with India wholly logistics-driven or is it strategic in content?

[Laughs heartily] The substance is military training cooperation, the context is: India sees us as a friend and we see India as a friendly country, whose engagement with Singapore and Southeast Asia is positive for the region.

Would you like the analogy of defence cooperation being the Second Wave?

I am not sure. I would call it a Second Wave, if we had a dramatically more ambitious CECA, for example. This [defence link] is a new direction [in] our relationship, which is multi-dimensional.

You seem to be putting India through its paces down the ancient Nalanda Trail [a new project of shining the spotlight on old Buddhist links between India and East Asia] ...

The old links are reviving and revitalising. And, the links between India and the Asia Pacific are growing [now]; and this is a natural focus point to do a very nice project.

On the Asean-India relations, why is the proposed Free Trade Agreement taking so long?

There are some issues which are politically sensitive on one side and maybe commercially important on the other.

Now that Singapore has taken over Asean chairmanship, do you think this will be clinched?

I hope so. But the Chairman is not the commander [Laughs very heartily]. It is quite complicated negotiating a deal with 10 [Asean] partners on one side. [However] it is a disappointment [still]. Because, the Asean-China FTA is already substantially in operation: we have got goods [and] services in operation, we are about to sign the investment chapter, With the Japanese [also], we have made a lot of progress, although it has taken a long time. And, with India, it has been even harder. I am not saying either side is at fault. A lot is at stake - the significance of India having a link with Asean, which is at the centre of the regional cooperation architecture of the Asia Pacific.

Will the special economic zones of India interest Asean as a whole or just Singapore?

In the first instance, that’s a Singapore initiative, but I would imagine that there will be companies in other Asean countries which will be interested in doing similar things.

Moving on to the East Asia Summit, to be held in Singapore on November 21), do you think the recent domestic “difficulties” over the United States-India civilian nuclear energy cooperation deal, is causing

an image problem or a credibility problem for New Delhi?

I don’t think it’s an issue, because we don’t have nuclear cooperation with India amongst the EAS countries, certainty not in an EAS framework. But more broadly, for India internationally, any country observing these difficulties getting this nuclear deal ‘ratified’ in both chambers — in the U.S. Congress as well as the Lok Sabha — must conclude that there are powerful political forces which cannot be neglected when talking to the Indian Government. In terms of what the East Asia Summit wants to talk about — climate change, environmental sustainability, energy security, as well as Myanmar — we will look forward to what Prime Minister Manmohan has to say.

On energy security, which came up at the Cebu EAS [last year], there was a component called nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Whether to have nuclear energy or not: that is for each country to decide for itself. But, where the East Asia Summit countries have a common interest is to make sure that there are high safety standards and safeguards, so that there is no mishap, and no accident, which has cross-border implications. If your home people are affected, that is bad enough. If the winds blow the dust across the border, which is inevitable, that is big trouble all round the region. So, there is an interest in helping to have high standards of maintenance, surveillance, safety, reliability; and these are things where the countries have a vested interest in working together.

Will this be the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards or will there be additional EAS safeguards?

The IAEA [norm] is a bare minimum. But, as immediate neighbours, we would like to know what is happening and like [to have] good reassurances that things would go right. America has had accidents, big and small. Japan has had a series of accidents. Proliferation and so on are [the] IAEA concerns, but as neighbours, safety of the operation of the nuclear plants is paramount.

China, India, Japan probably high on the list of EAS ...

Japan has many nuclear plants. So has China. India ... you have quite a few. Southeast Asia is an area of new concern, because many of the countries are looking at this. Because, if you are talking about sustainable development, nuclear [energy] is one obvious way. And, yes, Southeast Asia has unique challenges, because we are on the Rim of Fire.

Will this be discussed at this summit?

The details would be discussed at experts’ and officials’ level. But the idea that we want to be concerned about this jointly through the EAS, that is something which the leaders have already expressed.

On climate change, what will be the forward movement at the Singapore summit?

The Asean meetings ought to have a good statement on climate change, and so too the East Asia Summit to tee up towards the [imminent] Bali meeting. I don’t see that we will be doing serious negotiation in the Asean or the EAS framework. It will be in the United Nations framework that finally a deal will have to be struck. I don’t think we are specifically targeting for a numerical goal to be expressed [at the Singapore EAS, on greenhouse gas emission standards].

As for the political dimension of EAS — with the continued absence of the U.S. and the proposal by Japan that the U.S., India, Japan, and Australia should form a quadrilateral forum of Asia Pacific democracies — are there any difficulties for the EAS in functioning together?

The EAS co-exists with the other regional forums, some bigger, some smaller, some overlapping. The Americans have often reminded us that it is something to worry about to have a grouping in which America is not in.

[However] by the way the EAS has been structured, it has got America’s friends in it: Japan, Australia, New Zealand. India is a friend of America; India itself has its independent foreign policy. The [EAS] membership is frozen for now, I think.

As for the proposed four-countries cooperation project which you talked about ... you could form a grouping [which, however, has not taken off]. I don’t think that will take away the need for the EAS to exist. From India’s point of view, the EAS is relevant, because through the EAS, you are at the table: with the East Asia economies including China, Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian economies.

The EAS exists in an environment where the regional architectural framework has not yet been crystallised. It is forming, EAS is one of the ingredients.

In a figure of speech, EAS seems to be just having something like an experimental space-walk in an uncharted universe of pan-Asia cooperation.

A space-walk makes it sound very hazardous. This is not so dangerous. [Laughs]

Do you think that the EAS will have momentum of its own, without having to depend on the collateral forums [with an Asean nucleus]?

It will depend on what the countries put into it, and we hope very much that India will put an effort in, because this is the [Emphatic, to be italicised] forum through which India is able to engage important partners and be at the table.

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