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Competitive intolerance

For all but the most fanatical, Bangladesh writer Taslima Nasreen’s announcement that she would remove from her book Dwikhandita the portions critical of Islam that were regarded as objectionable should bring to a close the controversy that sparked violent protests in Kolkata and earlier in Hyderabad. Her decision itself was a pragmatic concession to the intolerant who would seem to be beyond reason. It was preceded by some deft handling of the situation by Union External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee. His statement on the issue made in Parliament was categorical that Ms Nasreen would be unconditionally permitted to live in India and provided security. This was followed by pronouncements in the nature of advice that guests in India were expected to refrain from political activities and from making statements that would hurt the sentiments of the people. It was heartening to note the widespread support Ms Nasreen obtained when Islamic extremists represented by the All India Minority Forum in Kolkata and the MIM in Hyderabad launched their attacks on her. Not to be missed, however, was the hypocrisy of some Hindu extremist forces who rushed to her defence. These very forces were at the forefront of the campaign against the renowned artist M.F. Husain for his depiction of Hindu deities, a campaign that included vicious street demonstrations and dozens of court cases and virtually forced him to flee the country. Similar protests followed Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. Karunanidhi’s disputing the existence of an ancient bridge between India and Sri Lanka across the Palk Straits as described in the Ramayana, and earlier Deepa Mehta’s film Fire. It needs to be emphasised that freedom of expression is indivisible and if it applies to Ms Nasreen’s critical references to Islamic figures and doctrine, it should apply equally to criticism of other religions, including Hinduism, Christianity, and Sikhism.

It is to ward off the charge of double standards that religious establishments the world over, who should be placing their faith in the strength of their doctrines rather than in the sanctions of the criminal law, are united in their demand for legal protection and immunity for all religions from criticism. Yet in most democracies there is an increasing realisation that legal mechanisms are inappropriate for dealing with matters of faith. Nowhere is this more marked than in the United States where the Supreme Court has declared unequivocally: “It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine…” In the United Kingdom, the blasphemy law that affords protection only to the doctrine of the Church of England is rarely invoked and there have been only two prosecutions since 1922, the last in 1977. It needs to be noted that criticism, however strong, does not curtail the religious rights of others — for in a democratic and pluralist society what any religious group can demand is respect for its right to practise its religion, not respect for its doctrine to the extent of curtailing the freedom of expression of others. On the other hand, in the interest of maintaining harmony and public order, the state ought to curb hate speech that targets a religious group and incites discrimination and violence against it.

It is ironic that in India hate mongers who foment disaffection and violence among religious communities go unpunished, while a writer, an artist, or a film-maker making critical references to a religion, at times even unwittingly, is often harassed through criminal cases. The Indian Penal Code contains extensive provisions that penalise offences against religion and religious groups. Some — such as the one barring the promotion of “disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will” between religious groups [Section 153A (1)] and the one that deals with disrupting worship and ceremonies in a place of worship [Section 153A (2)] — are intended to safeguard public order and protect the religious rights of others. On the other hand, Section 295A, which is perhaps the most extensive blasphemy law applicable to all religions, provides for three years’ imprisonment to anyone who, with the “deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings” of any class of citizens, “insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class.”

It is this omnibus section that has turned into an instrument of harassment of writers, artists, and film-makers. In justification, it is argued that given the intense, and often violent, reaction that any attack on religious beliefs provokes, it is necessary to bar speech that offends religious sentiments. However, as the European Court of Human Rights pointed out, freedom of expression extends not merely to ideas that are received favourably or are inoffensive but also to those that “offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population” — a position that has been endorsed by the Supreme Court of India. As for the hostile audience problem, the Supreme Court declared categorically in the case of the film Ore Oru Gramathile (S. Rangarajan v P. Jagjivan Ram) that if speech cannot be constitutionally restricted on any of the grounds specified in Article 19(2), “freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or threats of violence.” Since what is insulting or offensive is judged on a religion’s own terms, orthodox and fundamentalist groups within every religion are allowed to arrogate to themselves the right to set the parameters of public discourse. The increasing use of Section 295A in the recent period has underlined the dangers of competitive intolerance curtailing the space available for freedom of expression. The section is clearly not in consonance with democratic and constitutional values and it is time it was removed from the statute book.

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