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The idea of a U.S.-free Korean peninsula

The de-nuclearisation of the long-divided Korean peninsula is not a one-way exercise in diplomacy. If proof of this simple but profound reality is needed, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), as the northern part of the peninsula is known, has brought this aspect into sharp focus on New Year’s Day.

First, the Republic of Korea (RoK), or the southern part, regretted that the DPRK authorities missed the end-of-2007 deadline to declare their nuclear-arms programme, and stockpiles of fissile materials and related weapons. Pyongyang had committed itself to making a full declaration about these definitive aspects under an agreement that six relevant parties reached in Beijing on October 3 last year. The six parties are the DPRK, the RoK, the United States, China as the proactive Chair for the Korean de-nuclearisation talks, Japan, and Russia.

The U.S., a long-time military ally of both the RoK and Japan, had predicted that the DPRK might miss the deadline. However, as the prophecy became a fact, Washington sounded a pragmatic note against any knee-jerk reaction of discontinuing the six-party talks that have been in progress since 2003.

It was in this context that the DPRK, in a New Year comment channelled through the ruling party organs, reaffirmed its demand that the U.S. end its long-entrenched military presence across the RoK. In renewing this call, also indirectly linked to the American nuclear umbrella for the RoK, the DPRK remained silent about missing its deadline for a promised nuclear arms-related declaration. There was a political message behind the act of shining the spotlight on Washington’s role in regard to the RoK when the issue in prime focus was actually the DPRK’s promised declaration.

In simple terms, the DPRK’s message was that the Korean peninsula de-nuclearisation would require military-related actions by the U.S. as well.

For long, the DPRK has insisted that the U.S. should not deploy any of its nuclear weapons or the related delivery systems on the territories, including maritime zones, under the RoK’s sovereign jurisdiction. Equally consistently in recent years, Washington, for its part, has maintained that the RoK is free of American nuclear weapons and the collateral delivery systems. However, the DPRK tends to view the current strategic dynamics on the Korean peninsula in U.S.-centred terms. While continuing to deploy its slightly-depleted military forces on the RoK territory, the U.S., in Pyongyang’s perspective, remains committed to providing Seoul with a nuclear umbrella for the foreseeable future.

Not so far addressed seriously is the question whether the U.S., even if it withdraws its military forces and machinery from the RoK, will continue to protect it under the existing system of an “extended nuclear deterrence.” Under this formulation, the U.S. is said to have unfurled its nuclear umbrella over the RoK without actually using its territory, for a number of years now, for deploying atomic arms and the related delivery systems.

Evident from the latest comment by the DPRK are its serious worries about being asked to de-nuclearise itself, without so much as the U.S. indicating any willingness to withdraw from the RoK at any time. This aspect, more than the DPRK’s perceived reluctance to “come clean,” should account for the current stalemate over the declaration issue. The U.S. and its allies, however, point out that the DPRK does not want to disclose its suspected uranium enrichment programme.

Under the six-party deal, now being implemented, the DPRK had agreed to take steps towards nuclear disarmament and secure, as compensation, energy aid and humanitarian supplies from the other five countries. In doing so, Pyongyang did not insist that its own total de-nuclearisation would be conditional upon the disbanding of the RoK-based U.S. military forces.

The strategic options open to DPRK leader Kim Jong-il cannot be missed, though, in the U.S.-led euphoria over his cooperation in shutting down the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and “disabling” them in a process now on. A total disclosure of all of Mr. Kim’s nuclear programmes is integral to the existing deal. However, the eventual “dismantlement” of the DPRK’s nuclear-weapons capabilities, in terms of fissile materials, technical infrastructure as also arms stockpiles and methods of production, is yet to be negotiated.

This has offered Mr. Kim a window of opportunity to press, from now onwards, for a U.S.-free Korean peninsula as the final price for an eventual nuclear-weapons-free domain.

Two new political realities define this emerging situation. U.S. President George W. Bush wrote a rare personal letter to Mr. Kim about a month ago, urging him to recognise the importance of making a correct declaration. The real significance of that letter, though, was the sign that Mr. Bush was finally willing to abandon his ill-advised theory of an “axis of evil” that portrayed the Kim “regime” as a coordinate that needed to be removed or reformed.

Mr. Kim also has to reckon with the victory of Lee Myung-bak, an acknowledged “hawk” on matters relating to the DPRK, in the RoK presidential poll on December 19 last year. Mr. Lee will assume office on February 25, but the DPRK has already begun to look at its sums afresh in the strategic domain.

In 2001, Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, experts on the DPRK nuclear issue, assessed the issue of “guessing right and guessing wrong about engagement” with Mr. Kim. The U.S. and its allies now find that he is keeping them guessing at a crucial stage in the actual engagement itself.

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