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India and U.S. allies in East Asia

The key military allies of the United States in Greater East Asia are reassessing India at this stage in the international community’s efforts to fashion a post-Cold War political structure. This subtle reality is evident from the manner in which Japan under Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, South Korea under the influence of President-elect Lee Myung-bak, and Australia under the charismatic leadership of Kevin Rudd are treating India.

Greater East Asia is the area covered by the 16 countries of the East Asia Summit (EAS), including India; and these three U.S. allies are also members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This aspect lends a touch of high drama to their unrelated perceptions of India at this stage.

In a fundamental sense, their new sightings of New Delhi in a different light, when compared to the reality that existed during the EAS in Singapore last November, have nothing to do with the latest signs of a high comfort level in India’s ties with China. Both Mr. Rudd and Mr. Fukuda are well disposed towards Beijing. And, China has long ceased to figure in the calculus of the U.S. and its major military allies in Greater East Asia as a country to be wary of in a manner reminiscent of the first two decades of the Cold War. Moreover, Mr. Lee, on his part, is known to be a hawk on matters relating to North Korea but not China. Viewed in this perspective, the new currents in the equations between India, on the one side, and Japan as also Australia and South Korea, on the other, should be seen in the light of the independent world views of Mr. Fukuda, Mr. Rudd, and Mr. Lee.

Before the EAS last November, India’s political stock rose and fell in Greater East Asia, largely in line with the perceptions of these U.S. allies about the state of play in the evolution of New Delhi’s deal with Washington in the civil nuclear energy domain. China was and remains a central player in the EAS forum. Yet unlike these U.S. allies, China does not tend to view India either solely or mainly through the changing prisms of its ties with the U.S. over their civil nuclear energy deal.

On balance, it is no idle pastime for several EAS countries, including major U.S. allies, to compare and contrast India with China on a regular basis, especially in regard to their independent engagement with the U.S. For now, China’s status will be largely determined by how well its leaders meet any provocative actions by the U.S. and the West ahead of the Beijing Olympics. In contrast, India, certainly not in China’s league in Greater East Asia, is now being judged by U.S. allies in more absolutist terms than at the time of the last EAS.

During that summit, India made common cause with China on climate change issues. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s articulation of India’s aspirations on the global stage impressed the Association of South East Asian Nations, but Japan was not amused that his interventions virtually undermined its energy security initiative for East Asia. Dr. Singh’s subtle message was that India might be more mindful of the environmental concerns of the developed countries, if only its security in the civil nuclear energy domain were to be ensured through meaningful gestures from them.

Unsurprisingly, Japan’s response is now reflected in a curious fashion. Mr. Fukuda, who met Dr. Singh during the recent Singapore summit, when the sun shone brightly on India, has not referred to New Delhi at all in his latest policy speech to Diet (Japan’s Parliament). The reasons are not far to seek. Mr. Fukuda has still not reconciled himself to India’s unhelpful attitude, as seen from his standpoint, towards his environmental initiative. Secondly, according to ranking Japanese sources close to Mr. Fukuda, he is not inclined to endorse, at least in the public domain, the initiative of his predecessor Shinzo Abe for a four-power grouping of Asia-Pacific democracies — the U.S., India, Australia, and Japan itself. In any case, the China-wary U.S. was a reluctant supporter of Mr. Abe’s proposal, and Beijing-friendly Australia was lukewarm even under John Howard — Mr. Rudd’s predecessor.

The conventional wisdom in the region is that Mr. Fukuda, on balance, cannot ignore the likely U.S. disposition towards India, if and when its case goes to the NSG. The reasoning is that the U.S. remains at the centre of the universe in his world view.

Mr. Rudd’s Australia has now cordially but also categorically conveyed its disinclination to export uranium to India. The reason is that India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the governing Australian Labour Party values highly in its world view. Beyond the fact of a reversal of Mr. Howard’s policy lies the message that India cannot simply hope to ride on the shoulders of the U.S. in the sensitive nuclear domain and expect the world to applaud. Of much interest, though, to Official India now is the observation by Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith in New York on January 25 that he would regard the U.S.-India civil nuclear energy cooperation agreement as “a separate matter ... if that comes to fruition.”

South Korea, under the present Roh Moo-hyun administration, had in recent months veered to the view of supporting India’s case in the NSG under U.S. auspices. However, Mr. Lee, as President-elect who would assume office on February 25, has not yet hinted at any firm line on India even while sporting his non-proliferation heart on his sleeve with regard to the non-comparable case of North Korea.

In these circumstances, China’s willingness to cooperate with India in the civilian nuclear energy domain is a new factor in the wider politics of Greater East Asia.

Su Hao, Director, Centre of Asia-Pacific Studies, China Foreign Affairs University, told this correspondent in Singapore a few days ago that he would expect Beijing to display “a positive attitude” towards India “individually” for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council. This was an issue earlier “complicated” by India’s campaign as a member of “a four-party coalition” that included Japan from this region. In all, India finds itself in a new political ambience in Greater East Asia now.

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