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The urgency of concluding the nuclear deal

M. R. Srinivasan


It was a mistake for India to have parked the nuclear agreement in an Indo-U.S strategic relationship. But continued exclusion from international civil nuclear commerce will deprive India of a voice in managing emerging nuclear problems.


Discussions are in progress between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency on an India-specific safeguards agreement. When this negotiation is completed, a draft agreement will be available, which after due scrutiny at the higher levels in the Government of India, will be placed before the UPA-Left Committee for its consideration. Leaders of the left have been reiterating their objection to the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement and unless there is a serious rethink on their part, further progress on concluding the agreement appears unlikely.

The Left and the NDA do not attach any urgency to India concluding a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States or for that matter with Russia or France. Some of them have noted that it took the U.S. and China some 13 years to conclude their 123 agreement. By contrast, India and the U.S. have been engaged on this matter for only two-and-a-half years.

The on the ground reality is that the India built Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) are now operating at only 50 to 55 per cent capability compared to 80 to 90 per cent capability some two to three years ago. This is because mining of uranium has proceeded much slower than the fuel needs of the operating reactors. It is expected that it will take about five years for the demands to be met from internal production. It must be noted that our PHWR capacity in total is, in fact, modest.

Leaving aside this limited near term question, there are strong indications of a resurgence of nuclear power in many parts of the world. The U.S. in likely to build some 10 to 15 reactors in the next 15 years, to be followed by a much larger number thereafter. South Africa, Egypt, Argentina, and Brazil have announced plans to take up new nuclear plant construction. During the recent visit of French President Nicolas Sarkozy to China, a programme of building a number of French origin reactors in that country was announced.

More than 80 per cent of the total of some 450 reactors operating in the world are Light Water Reactors (LWR) using low enriched uranium. Potential suppliers of the LWR are Russia and France. The U.S. was once a world leader of LWRs but it has not built a new reactor for almost 20 years. However the U.S. reactor builders (General Electric and Westinghouse, now owned by Toshiba of Japan) have continued technology development with their associates in Japan. The preferred size of LWRs, now more or less industry standard, is 1000 MW or 1500 MW. If India wishes to increase its nuclear power generating capacity in a significant manner, in the next 15 to 20 years, it has to go in for LWRs. There is simply no other way.

Because of the setback the nuclear industry suffered globally after the Three Mile Island accident in the U.S. in 1979 and the Chernobyl accident in Ukraine in 1986, the capacity for building reactors is rather limited and even if demand for nuclear power builds up, there will be delays due to limited industrial infrastructure. China, in a large measure, and South Korea, to a lesser extent, have soaked up the presently available industrial capacity. The Chairperson of AREVA, the French nuclear consortium, is reported to have advised the Indian nuclear establishment that unless India took early decisions, other countries may jump ahead in placing orders and take up available capacity.

There is another long-term concern. The total amount of uranium available globally, including proven, reasonably assured and speculative reserves, is about seven million to eight million tonnes. With a resurgence of nuclear power, the annual global consumption may go up to about 100,000 tonnes. So we can see a depletion period of some eighty years only, which is not a really long period. As the saying goes, the early bird catches the worms; those who enter into long-term contracts or acquire uranium mines early will corner the available supplies.

India’s expectation is to use thorium as an energy source in the long run. If the first phase of our programme is limited to 10,000 MW of PHWRs, the rate at which Fast Breeder Reactors can be built will be quite low. On the other hand, if the first phase programme can be augmented with LWRs of 20,000 to 30,000 MW by 2030, we shall have a strong base of Fast Breeder Reactors to be able to launch thorium utilisation in a significant way in the decades thereafter.

There is a perception that if the nuclear agreement were to get implemented, India will become a dumping ground for LWRs from outside. This is unlikely to happen. Indian industry has been a supplier of high-quality nuclear equipment at highly competitive prices to the Indian programme. If we were to take up LWR projects, our industry will certainly play an important role. The leaders of the LWR technology are looking at new manufacturing platforms. India would be an important location, apart from China and South Korea, if India itself were to build LWRs. This development would push the growth and consolidation of the Indian nuclear industry to enable it to pursue in future large-scale growth of Fast Breeder Reactors, Accelerator Driven Systems (for thorium utilization), and Thermo Nuclear Reactors. If the Indian nuclear industry does not grow in a robust manner in the next two decades, it will be very difficult for it to catch up later.

Real concerns

Now let us look at the real concerns that have surfaced from the long drawn out debate. First, the question of a future test, articulated by the BJP. There is a revival of the idea of working towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World. In a January 2007 joint article, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn and others suggested that the time had come for the world to consider elimination of nuclear weapons. A conference held at Stanford in October 2007 was attended by a large number of former U.S. cabinet members who lent support to this proposition. The Norwegian government is organising an international meet at Oslo later this month to discuss the question of nuclear disarmament. Some of the steps that can lead to this are a comprehensive test ban treaty, a fissile material cut-off treaty, and balanced reduction of nuclear weapons by those states possessing them. The new U.S. administration, to take office in 2009, very likely to be headed by a Democrat President, will almost certainly revive the CTBT. If the U.S., China, and Pakistan join the CTBT, India is bound to do the same. Those who argue for a full freedom on future tests are chasing a ghost.

A second issue raised by the BJP is an unfettered size of India’s nuclear arsenal. In a world that may, hopefully, move towards reduced arsenals and even elimination of nuclear weapons, this is a retrograde proposition. Our objective should be a credible minimum deterrent and no more. Let us also remember that one of the main reasons for the collapse of the mighty Soviet Union was the arms race with the U.S., which bled the country and pushed it towards implosion.

The final point is that of India becoming a junior partner of the U.S. in the latter’s quest for global dominance, sharply articulated by the Left. It was a mistake for India to have parked the nuclear agreement in an Indo-U.S strategic relationship. It should have been seen as, and justified as, a ‘Normalisation of Indo-U.S. nuclear relations.’ India has held the view it was unfairly excluded from international civil nuclear commerce, as a result of U.S. policies.

With India resuming such relations with other advanced nuclear countries, it is only getting back its legitimate space. The Left and the BJP must realise that continued exclusion will deprive India of a voice in managing emerging nuclear problems, such as the security of Pakistan nuclear assets if there were to be further internal instabilities in that country.

India has not compromised, and will not compromise, its independence in foreign policy field, as demonstrated in its stand at the WTO or climate change discussions. Denial of increased use of nuclear energy, as an option to solve India’s energy problems, is too high a price to be paid for an imaginary fear of being road-rollered by the U.S. in other foreign policy matters.

(Dr. M.R. Srinivasan is a former chairman of India’s Atomic Energy Commission.)

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