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Iran elections and their aftermath

The conservative movement in Iran has always been a powerhouse of influence, which acquired high visibility during the 1979 Islamic revolution. It picked up fresh momentum during the election campaign that led to the emergence of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as President in 2005. On the other hand, the influence of the reformists, which peaked under the former President Mohammad Khatami, has continued its precipitous decline. Unlike the conservatives, the reformists have advocated major changes in the political system. The Iranian establishment — a complex web of political institutions geared to defend the revolution — has perceived them as a potential threat.

The marginalisation of the reformists can be partly attributed to the electoral vetting process, steered by the Guardian Council (GC). The GC is aligned with Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It is headed by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati Massah, a powerful cleric and founding member of a highly influential Islamic school of thought based in Qom — Iran’s religious capital. The GC has over the years barred many reformists from contesting elections, citing their incompatibility with revolutionary principles.

The poor show of the reformists has also to do with the resurgence of the neo-conservative movement, led by individuals such as Mr. Ahmadinejad. Backed by influential clerics such as Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, the neo-conservatives have made deep inroads into the masses, especially those residing in urban slums or deeper in the countryside.

In the recent parliamentary elections which the conservatives won comfortably, two influential trends emerged. One, the neo-conservatives did extremely well. Individuals such as Ruhollah Hosseinian and Mohammad Reza Bahonar represent this trend. Mr. Hosseinian is Mr. Ahmadinejad’s close confidant. In April 2007, he became the President’s security adviser. He is also member of the 15-member think-tank, the Council for Spreading Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Thoughts. The aim of this council is “to define and guard over the thought and works of the President.” Mr. Bahonar is the brother of Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Iran’s second Prime Minister who was assassinated in a bomb blast. He was a leading figure in the Islamic Cultural Revolution, which aggressively overhauled the education system to be in tune with the goals of the revolution.

Many of those elected to Parliament have been influenced by the Haqqani religious school of thought, based in Qom. Headed by Ayatollah Yazdi, the school is highly influential, especially among the clergy and the security establishment and in higher political echelons. The school imparts training to clerics based on traditional and modern curriculum. The subjects covered include science, medicine, politics and western philosophy. However, what differentiates the Haqqani school from many others is the messianic belief in the imminent arrival of the Mahdi — a messiah. Members of this school believe that conditions must be created for speeding up his coming.

It is widely believed that Ayatollah Yazdi is Mr. Ahmadinejad’s spiritual and ideological mentor. He publicly supported Mr. Ahmadinejad’s candidature for presidency ahead of the 2005 elections. Many luminaries of Iran’s intelligence services and the elite Revolutionary Guards owe allegiance to the Haqqani school.

The second group of “soft” conservatives who were also successful in the polls are represented by Ali Larijani, Mohammad Baqer-Qalibaf and Ahmad Tavakoli. Like the neo-conservatives, the soft conservatives do not challenge the basic architecture of the political system. However, they are more inclined to follow a pragmatic course on issues of foreign policy and economy. The soft conservatives are also well grounded in Iran’s religious establishment. For instance, Mr. Larijani has been influenced by Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari, his late father-in-law. Motahhari was a co-founder of the revolution with Ayatollah Khomeini. He taught philosophy at Tehran University and authored several books on history, Iran and Islam.

Mr. Qalibaf acknowledges that he has been influenced by the teachings of Ayatollah Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti. Part of Khomeini’s inner circle, Ayatollah Beheshti was a scholar who studied in both the University of Tehran and the Sorbonne University. In the 1960s, he headed the Islamic centre in Hamburg, which was meant to provide spiritual guidance to Iranian youth stationed in Germany and western Europe. Ayatollah Beheshti was assassinated on June 28, 1981 in a blast which killed 70 others also.

The pragmatic trend among the conservatives can be traced to the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), which was formed in 1979 under Khomeini’s instructions to advance the revolution. Its founding members included Mohammad Javad Bahonar, Beheshti, the former President, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the present supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. Mr. Rafsanjani and Beheshti, supported by Motahhari, represented the pragmatic current within the IRP. These individuals became part of the Combatants Clergy Association, which carried forward the pragmatic tradition within the conservative mainstream. The IRP was also the nucleus for the emergence of the reformists. Unlike the pragmatists, a section within the IRP believed in the necessity of exporting the revolution. It also believed in establishing a state monopoly over the economy. This group established the Association of Combatant Clerics, which evolved under Mr. Khatami into a pro-reform formation.

As the two conservative streams compete for influence, the role of the Supreme Leader once again acquires prominence. Known as a consensus builder, Ayatollah Khamenei has stood out for his ability to reconcile the competing trends within the Iranian establishment. It is likely that the two conservative trends will be allowed to compete with each other, as competition could allow the emergence of additional options for the 2009 presidential elections. As of now, Mr. Qalibaf could emerge as a challenger to Mr. Ahmadinejad in the next elections, leading to a head-on clash between the two currents.

While the outcome of the recent elections could have domestic repercussions, as they are likely to bring the poor health of the economy into focus, they are unlikely to generate big changes in foreign policy. There is a broad consensus in the establishment that Tehran’s growing influence in the neighbourhood, especially, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, needs to be protected. The Iranians have also been shoring up their ties with the developing world, the six neighbouring Gulf countries and Venezuela. In the east, they have gone public, seeking membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). China and Russia are the main players in the SCO along with the Central Asian republics.

Iran’s relations with Pakistan have acquired greater importance after the formation of the new government there. The two countries are set to establish a cross-border bus service soon. Iran’s relations with India are on hold, and major decisions are unlikely to be taken until India makes up its mind on finalising the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline deal.

The new Parliament is expected to back Iran’s efforts to break the shackles that are being put on it by the United States and its western allies on account of the country’s nuclear programme. In trying to end their isolation, the Iranians have an energy card to play, especially with the Europeans. Aware that the Europeans are desperate to seek alternatives to the Russian source for their natural gas supplies, the Iranians have been positioning themselves well to play that role. Significant success was achieved on March 17, when the National Iranian Gas Company and the Swiss firm EGL signed a deal, estimated anywhere between $28 billion and $42 billion. Iran will supply Switzerland 5.5 billion tonnes of gas a year for 25 years, starting 2011. It will be sent through the proposed Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. Once completed, this pipeline will connect Greece and Italy as it heads deeper into Europe. The pipeline is part of a strategic project that aims to draw gas from West Asia and the Caspian Sea fields and transport it to Europe. The Iranians clinched this deal, thanks to the National Intelligence Estimates of the U.S., which declared that Iran is no longer engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

Not surprisingly, the Swiss authorities have brushed aside U.S. and Israeli criticism of the deal. Wearing an Islamic headscarf, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey, who was present at the signing ceremony in Tehran, said her country needed to lower its dependence on Russia to fulfil its energy needs. She asserted that Switzerland did not need the U.S. permission to promote its strategic interests.

Iran is aware that Switzerland would not have gone ahead with the deal without the European Union’s go-ahead. It now hopes that the doors will also be opened for other ventures such as the proposed multi-billion gas deal with Austria.

As Iran consolidates itself, it is well aware of combating a new round of hostility from the U.S. From an Iranian perspective, the summer months ahead are crucial. The prospect of facing an American military strike would become remote once electioneering for the U.S. presidency gets into top gear and the Bush administration begins packing its bags.

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