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Sochi summit: a disappointing finale

The Russian-American summit in Sochi over the weekend rounded off seven years of bilateral relations under the leadership of Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush as both prepare to step down. Mr. Putin will hand over the reins to President-elect Dmitry Medvedev early next month and Mr. Bush will leave office after the November presidential elections.

The farewell meeting generated a lot of hope as both leaders were expected to leave behind a legacy of achievement by thrashing out some of the most divisive issues — the U.S. plans to build a missile shield in Central Europe, continuing NATO expansion and crumbling arms control. However, the Sochi summit produced no breakthrough.

It was a disappointing finale to a relationship that began so promisingly when the two leaders first met in Ljubljana, Slovenia, in 2001. Mr. Bush famously looked into Mr. Putin’s eyes and “was able to get a sense of his soul.” He praised Mr. Putin as a “very straightforward and trustworthy” leader.

Seven years and 27 Putin-Bush meetings later, Russia-U.S. relations are increasingly being described as a new cold war.

There is just a glimmer of hope. Mr. Putin and Mr. Bush issued a “strategic framework declaration” in Sochi — a “road map” for their successors. The two leaders “expressed their interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners.” This could suggest a still vague alternative to the U.S. missile defence plans for Europe, which Russia has been fiercely objecting to. The U.S. agreed to the long-standing Russian proposal to develop “a legally binding” successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which expires next year. The declaration also said the two countries had agreed to “work together to address serious differences.” These include “NATO expansion,” a solution to “restore the viability of the CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] regime,” and “certain military activities in space.”

There is no guarantee, however, that the “strategic framework declaration” will not be torn up by the next U.S. administration in the same way as the 2000 Russian-U.S. Joint Statement on the Principles of Strategic Stability was. Signed by Mr. Putin and outgoing U.S. President Bill Clinton, the statement praised “the essential contribution” of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty “to reductions in offensive forces” and pledged the two countries’ “commitment to that treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability.” Two years later, the Bush administration scrapped the treaty.

The Sochi declaration calls for the two countries “working together and with other nations to address the global challenges of the 21st century, [and] moving the U.S.-Russia relationship from one of strategic competition to strategic partnership.” It is exactly the same goal Mr. Putin and Mr. Bush proclaimed seven years ago in a joint statement issued after their meeting at Mr. Bush’s ranch in Texas. “Our countries are embarked on a new relationship for the 21st century…” the statement said. “The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat. …We are determined to work together … to promote security, economic well-being, and a peaceful, prosperous, free world.”

Acting in the spirit of the newly declared partnership, Mr. Putin closed the Lourdes radio-electronic station in Cuba, Russia’s largest Soviet-era spy centre on the U.S. doorstep, and pulled out from the Cam Rahn naval base in Vietnam. Russia provided arms and crucial intelligence to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and did not object to the U.S. opening military bases in Central Asia.

What did he get in return? The Bush administration pushed ahead with the Clinton policy of encircling Russia, setting up new military bases in Eastern Europe — in Romania and Bulgaria — and planning the deployment of missile interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic as a third positioning site of a global missile defence system. This would give the U.S. the nuclear superiority it could not achieve during the Soviet era — the technical capacity to launch a nuclear first strike without fear of retaliation.

The Bush administration has been the main driving force behind the NATO expansion in the former Soviet Union. The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became NATO members in 2004, and next on the agenda is membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Unlike the Baltic states, Ukraine lies in the heart of the former Soviet Union and much of it has always been part of the Russian nation. Half of Ukrainians speak Russian and two-thirds are opposed to their state joining NATO. Yet Mr. Bush, on a visit to Ukraine last week, assured its pro-Western leaders of America’s strong support in their NATO bid.

Russia has warned that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia will trigger a severe crisis in relations with the West and undermine European security. Mr. Putin has already suspended Russia’s compliance with the CFE Treaty and threatened to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which banned nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km. He said Russia could deploy attack missiles on its western borders and train them on U.S. military facilities in Europe.

Respected U.S. scholar Stephen F. Cohen, Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at New York University, defines the U.S. policy towards Russia as an “undeclared cold war Washington has waged, under both parties [Republican and Democratic], against post-Communist Russia during the past 15 years.”

This cold war is likely to continue under the next U.S. administration. Republican presidential candidate John McCain, whose election chances grow by the day, has accused Russia of “nuclear blackmail” and called for throwing it out of the Group of Eight. Both Democratic candidates, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, also favour a tougher line on Russia.

Given this prospect, Mr. Putin appeared surprisingly unperturbed and even relaxed during his two-day meeting with Mr. Bush at the Black Sea resort city last week. Even as he admitted that the sides failed to resolve the nagging problems in Russian-American relations, Mr. Putin did not sound unduly pessimistic at a joint press conference, and ruled out a return to the cold war era. The situation is indeed different from what it was seven years ago when the two leaders met for the first time.

Russia has since grown immeasurably stronger in terms of economic, political and military power. By contrast, the U.S. is bogged down in the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, is grappling with economic recession and faces growing dissent in the NATO ranks. In Bucharest, the U.S., for the first time, failed to push through a strategically important decision. France, Germany and other NATO members blocked the immediate granting of Membership Action Plans to Ukraine and Georgia. France bluntly said that inducting the two former Soviet republics “is not a good answer to the balance of power within Europe and between Europe and Russia.” Even though the Bucharest Summit Declaration asserted that Ukraine and Georgia eventually “will become members of NATO,” a split in the alliance gives Russian diplomacy a chance. “Old Europe” does not want to poison relations with a resurgent Russia and is reluctant to admit into NATO new members who will toe the U.S. line.

Russia’s strong opposition to the deployment of U.S. missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic has generated more cleavages in Europe. A recent poll conducted by Harris Interactive for the International Herald Tribune and France 24 in five European countries and the U.S. found that the Europeans overwhelmingly oppose the U.S. anti-missile plans, while in the U.S. support dropped from 70 per cent nine months ago to below 50 per cent. At the same time, the majority in all countries thinks that NATO should build a joint missile defence with Russia.

Russia has another strong card in its relations with Europe, which Mr. Putin played at the NATO summit in Bucharest. His decision to attend the summit — the first time he did so — had much to do with the fact that Afghanistan dominated the agenda. Russia has offered NATO a hand in its faltering efforts to defeat the Taliban, by signing an agreement in Bucharest for the transit of non-military NATO goods for Afghanistan across the Russian territory. Moscow made it clear this could be the first step to a much wider cooperation on Afghanistan. Mr. Putin bluntly stated the West “has little chance” to fight terrorism without Russia, given its “potential in Afghanistan.” He pointedly recalled that Russia had supplied weapons worth “hundreds of million dollars” to the Northern Alliance, which played a key role in ousting the Taliban. However, he said, Russia would cooperate with NATO as long as “NATO respects Russia’s interests and is willing to compromise on issues shaping the strategic environment in Europe and the world.”

Mr. Putin’s trip to Bucharest ahead of his goodbye meeting with Mr. Bush points to a further shift in Moscow’s foreign policy priorities from the U.S. to Europe. Russia’s entire post-Soviet history shows that it has far more opportunities in dealing with Europe than with the U.S.

The focus on Europe is likely to strengthen under Mr. Medvedev, who believes in the “European identity” of Russians and has given his first interview as President-elect to a European daily.

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