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North Korea optimistic, U.S. cagey over security dialogue

The United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) are members of the Association of South East Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), a security-dialogue entity. The current ASEAN Chair and a regional “thought-leader,” Singapore, has facilitated, without actually participating in them, the latest round of parleys between the U.S. and the DPRK on denuclearising the divided Korean peninsula.

At the end of these exchanges on April 8, Kim Kye-gwan, the chief delegate of the DPRK or North Korea, exuded optimism that the two sides had “narrowed” their differences considerably. In contrast, Christopher Hill, the usually upbeat U.S. delegate, was more circumspect, and declined to characterise the bilateral exercise as a breakthrough.

A day later, the DPRK Foreign Ministry announced that a “consensus” had in fact been struck on a key issue. Making a rather rare reference to a “declaration,” which the North Koreans were still expected to make with regard to the history and present status of their nuclear weapons programmes, the DPRK chose to go public. It was disclosed that the “consensus” covered “political compensation” that the DPRK would receive in exchange for such a “declaration,” as and when it is made.

For the DPRK leaders, who value their bilateral engagement with the U.S. as a testimony to their autonomy outside the relevant six-party process, a “consensus” on “political compensation” in this sensitive sphere enhances their status.

The six parties to the ongoing process are the U.S., the two Koreas, China as the proactive host, Japan, and Russia. Their stated objective is to transform the peninsula into a nuclear weapons-free zone. For now their focus is on denuclearising the DPRK, which tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006.

This issue is, nonetheless, inextricably linked to Pyongyang’s insistence that the Republic of Korea (RoK), as the southern part of the divided peninsula is known, should also be free of any nuclear weapons that the Americans might still have in place there. The demand is that the U.S., despite being the guarantor of a nuclear umbrella for the RoK, should denuclearise that country as well. Although Washington has repeatedly said in recent years that its nuclear umbrella does not entail the positioning of any atomic arsenal on RoK territory, the DPRK is expected to raise this issue in some form before the unspecified completion of the six-party process.

The beginning of this process pre-dates the 2006 nuclear test by the DPRK, an event that could have completely negated this diplomatic exercise in denuclearisation. Yet, China’s renewed efforts to save and sustain the process in that context, besides the DPRK’s new-found self-confidence as a nuclear-armed state with a “deterrent” against the U.S., breathed new life into the six-party talks. As a result, the DPRK has already shut down all the facilities at its Yongbyon nuclear complex, to the satisfaction of the other five parties. And, in the ongoing second phase, considerable progress has been made towards the longer-term disablement of the shut-down facilities.

It is in this ambience of some dramatic progress, least expected in the immediate wake of the 2006 nuclear test, that the current tussle over the “declaration” comes across as a make-or-break event for the prospects of the DPRK’s eventual denuclearisation. At stake are such issues as the size of the current plutonium-derived stockpile of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons; the suspicions that it has not so far publicly disclosed all its programmes, including uranium-enrichment; and the totality of the picture with regard to fissile material in the DPRK.

After the Singapore talks, responding to a question from this correspondent Mr. Hill maintained that “it is not just for the U.S.” to certify the completeness and correctness of any “declaration” that the DPRK might eventually make in this full-spectrum context. The “declaration” would be “a six-party matter.” He further indicated that any certification role for the International Atomic Energy Agency would be decided accordingly.

There is more to this simple-sounding stuff than meets the eye. From the DPRK’s perspective, the RoK, despite being an ethnic-kin country, has begun to distance itself from the mutually agreed measures towards rapprochement and eventual reunification. The recently inaugurated RoK President, Lee Myung-bak, has frequently linked such rapprochement and his country’s DPRK-bound economic aid to progress with respect to Pyongyang’s total denuclearisation.

Mr. Lee, who makes no secret of his faith in the perceived ‘benevolence’ of the U.S.-RoK military alliance for the peninsula, is being increasingly seen by the DPRK as a man willing to see the sun set on the inter-Korean “sunshine policies” of his predecessors in Seoul. DPRK leader Kim Jong-il, and the previous RoK President, Roh Moo-hyun, had even agreed to initiate thoughts and actions towards a new “peace regime” on the Korean peninsula.

In a sense, the “political compensation” that Pyongyang now expects in exchange for the “declaration” covers such aspects as progress towards security guarantees for the DPRK and the reliability of the flow of external economic assistance to the North Korean people. An implicit external assurance about the stability of the Kim Jong-il “regime” in Pyongyang is also high on its agenda.

For a long-term settlement of the Korean nuclear issue, the DPRK has already indicated its desire to have a say over the establishment of the future security architecture across Greater East Asia. Relevant to this end-game, which is still far from being initiated, are the interests and dispositions of not only the U.S. but also China and Japan. India, once an internationally recognised benign player on the Korean scene, is now very much on the margins.

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