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A disaster and the politics of ‘democracy’

Is the military-ruled Myanmar a multi-role-capable state? Or, is it just a surviving anachronism?

These posers have been magnified by the politics of the differing responses to the May 3 “Cyclone Nargis” from the junta — the self-styled State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) — on one side, and from several external players, on the other. While the poignancy of the sufferings of the victims and also the urgency of relief supplies to them make for a major humanitarian saga, the cynicism of the politics behind their varied responses calls for a detailed scrutiny as well.

The cyclone struck during a particularly sensitive run-up to the SPDC’s efforts to reassert its writ across the country through a referendum on the military-scripted draft of a new constitution. Significantly in that context, Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), the junta’s chief political adversary, had already called upon the people to vote “no” in the referendum. And, the SPDC, for its part, was engaged in a high-pitch campaign of its own for a “yes” vote. In all, when the cyclone devastated the Irrawaddy delta and adjacent areas, Myanmar was passing through a rare battle, even if not a fair and free contest, for the hearts and minds of the people.

The NLD’s dim view of the draft statute was outlined by the party’s spokesman U Nyan Win in several telephonic conversations with this correspondent. Speaking over difficult-to-reach telephones in Yangon, Mr. Nyan Win emphasised that the draft, shorn of its unsubtle niceties, would only institutionalise a praetorian or military-dominant system of governance through the guise of a popular vote. A junta-subservient panel reserved 25 per cent of the seats in future parliaments to the military establishment, and the armed forces would have the prerogatives, under this draft, to appoint key ministers and impose martial law at will. And, as Mr. Nyan Win had pointed out, the referendum, now held on May 10 as per schedule and as a key aspect of the junta’s responses to the cyclone, was never discussed by the military rulers with Ms. Suu Kyi, under prolonged house arrest to this day. And, before the announcement of this referendum, the junta’s designated liaison officer held four rounds of United Nations-brokered talks with her, in the wake of last year’s uprising by Buddhist monks and pro-democracy activists. Yet, even in those circumstances of the junta’s scant regard for the celebrated democracy campaigner, the NLD decided against boycotting the referendum.

Aware of this, and in a bid to ‘legitimise’ the referendum on the basis of the NLD’s willingness to vote, the SPDC lost no time, soon after the cyclone, to declare that the May 10 timeline would be adhered to. This prompted the NLD to call for a postponement of the referendum, which could turn into a travesty in a cyclone-distracted state with presumably limited means to cope with the major humanitarian crisis. From an alternative standpoint, though, the holding of a referendum at the height of such a crisis could help the SPDC project Myanmar as a multi-role-capable state under the military’s wings.

In the event, as the junta held the referendum across Myanmar, except in the declared disaster areas including the NLD’s bastion of Yangon, on May 10, the opposition estimated about a 50 per cent voter turnout. Also in focus were the allegations of pressure tactics by the SPDC’s minions and of unfair practices such as the absence of a system of agents on behalf of the “no-campaigners” at the time of balloting as also counting. The entire process, in contrast, is manned by the junta’s ‘mandarins.’ With the voting now scheduled for May 24 in the cyclone-ravaged areas, the ‘result’ is expected only thereafter. Ms. Suu Kyi has been declared eligible to vote in the referendum in its second phase, although she is barred from any elective office, under the draft statute, on the ground that her deceased husband was a foreigner. And, depending on the referendum ‘result,’ a general election has been promised for 2010.

The NLD, in its unsuccessful bid for a postponement of the referendum, did receive moral support from outside Myanmar as well. However, the party deserves credit for having participated, by arguing that “if we stay away, generation after generation will suffer under [military] dictatorship.”

If the two-phase referendum has been decided upon by the SPDC to ‘demonstrate’ Myanmar’s ‘capabilities’ as a multi-role state in the face of a huge natural disaster and in the context of widespread international scepticism on this score, what is the nature of the politics of the relief effort itself?

India is believed to be the first donor to have succeeded in offloading relief supplies by sea at the Yangon port. And, the Myanmar junta did not say ‘no.’ Indeed, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Nyan Win (not to be confused for the NLD Spokesman by the same name) was present at the Yangon airport to welcome the arrival of two of India’s AN-32 aircraft laden with relief supplies such medicines as also shelter-related and roofing materials. India airlifted more supplies thereafter too. China is also understood to have had no difficulty in sending in relief supplies to Myanmar at this time. And, all this happened, when Western aid agencies were reporting a stand-off with the SPDC over permissions to send in supplies by air and, no less importantly, “expert” foreign aid workers.

If, as is clear, the SPDC has adopted double standards in treating India and China well and in being tough with the Western-led organisers of “international” aid supplies and relief work, the reason is not far to seek. The junta is wary of Western-led aid effort, even under the U.N. auspices, suspecting the possibility of a hidden ‘political agenda’ behind such humanitarian work. The bottom line, certainly, is that the SPDC will not be able to do without the Western-led aid effort as well. Yet, the junta is trying to drag its feet as long as considered ‘possible.’

Significantly, unlike at the time of the 2004 tsunami, when India had joined a “core group,” the other members being the United States and Australia as also Japan, in rushing to the aid of Indonesia, New Delhi has on this occasion chosen to play an “exclusive role.” Obviously, India is keen to avoid getting caught in any stand-off between the West and Myanmar.

For the SPDC, the political ‘concern’ is not really that the Western-led aid workers would be able to ‘engineer,’ in a short time, a ‘no-vote’ in the ongoing referendum process.

As Soe Aung, Myanmar’s pro-democracy dissident leader in exile, points out, the junta does not want to “look not capable” of managing the cyclone crisis without help from foreign aid-workers. The political agenda of the Myanmar junta is to turn its own relief effort into a charm offensive for the hearts of the people at home.

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