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Time for action on the civilian nuclear deal

Abdul Kalam, former President of India, spoke recently at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in Mumbai. For the first time, he openly endorsed India entering into civil nuclear energy cooperation with the United States of America and other advanced countries. In his earlier statements, he had emphasised the importance of developing thorium as a source of energy production in view of its relative abundance in India. From the time of Homi Bhabha, the long-term importance of t horium has been well recognised. But what some of the nuclear experts who have suggested that we should shun the uranium option and work solely on the thorium option have overlooked is this basic fact. An adequate programme of first generation nuclear reactors using natural or enriched uranium is an inescapable technological necessity if we are to produce plutonium in adequate quantities to launch a substantial programme of thorium utilisation.

The presently known resources of uranium can support only a programme of 10,000 mw of first generation reactors (of the heavy water type, that is, PHWR). In the projections made in the 1980s, India was expected to have installed by 2000 all of this 10,000 mw. The reality however is that we have around 4000 mw in operation. This results in a slow build-up of a plutonium inventory to achieve a significant fast reactor capacity.

We should also bear in mind that the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) will only enter into service in 2012 or thereabouts. Our first thorium-uranium-233 system is likely to go into service not earlier than 2015.

Under these circumstances, it is misleading to chart out a ‘uranium import-free’ scenario for nuclear power growth. Even more importantly, the present estimates for nuclear power are vastly more than anyone could have predicted in the 1980-1990 period. The reasons are the forbidding price of oil heading towards $135 per barrel, with no indication of any downturn. All projections fear continuance of this rising trend. Secondly, the Indian economy is growing at an annual 8+ per cent, thus demanding much more energy as an input than when it was in a growth trajectory of 3 to 4 per cent per year. Thirdly, coal, which supplies about 65 per cent of electricity production, cannot be expected to keep up that share of a rapidly growing electricity generation capacity. Even if the developed world is responsible for the historical rise in carbon emissions in the past century, the newly developing economies, including India, China, and Brazil, will have to join in the global endeavour to cut down carbon emissions.

In my interactions with enlightened people in public life, this question is often posed: why is the nuclear scientific community so sharply divided on the Indo-U.S. civilian nuclear deal? Such people find it difficult to come to a conclusion on whether the deal is good or bad for India. I was a member of a group of eight nuclear scientists who, at the end of December 2006, warned parliamentarians and the government about the language of the Hyde Act (which had received approval of the U.S Congress). The Act was clearly India-unfriendly and greatly damaged the well-balanced U.S.-India agreement of July 2005. The Prime Minister patiently heard the group and assured us that the genuine fears we expressed would be taken care of while negotiating the U.S.-India bilateral agreement (the 123 agreement).

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh gave a solemn assurance to Parliament in August 2007 that India’s interests would be fully protected in the 123 agreement. After many tortuous rounds of negotiations, an agreed draft 123 emerged in the early part of 2008. It is true that the 123 draft has largely met India’s concerns but there are provisions that reflect the intent of the Hyde Act and the mother act – the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Our group of nuclear scientists included three former chairmen of India’s Atomic Energy Commission, Homi Sethna, myself, and P.K.Iyengar. We have all been involved in high-level policy formulation over many years. Dr. Sethna has remained neutral while Dr. Iyenger has maintained his opposition on the ground that India’s nuclear autonomy would be compromised by the U.S.–India nuclear deal.

The reality is that the 123 specifically recognises the continuing existence of India’s nuclear strategic programme. There is confusion with regard to India’s freedom to carry out tests in future. It is useful to recall that R. Chidambaram, Chairman AEC during 1998, when the Pokhran II nuclear explosions were carried out, claimed in public that India had acquired the ability to design a whole range of nuclear weapons, based on the 1998 test results and the computer modelling competence generated in the DAE. It is strange that the Bharatiya Janata Party, the leader of the NDA coalition in power then, does not seem to be impressed by Dr Chidambaran’s claims, in spite of his having been the principal architect of Pokhran II.

Of course, under the 123 agreement read with the Hyde Act and the U.S. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, there is a real possibility of a future administration suspending cooperation following an Indian test. No doubt the language of the 123 provides some comfort to India but nothing takes away India’s right to conduct a test if it considers it absolutely necessary, even facing the consequences of a U.S. cut-off.

India has to go ahead with the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and seek an exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group. These two steps are absolutely essential if the country wishes to proceed with civil nuclear cooperation with Russia and France. The relevant draft agreements are ready but both Russia and France are waiting for conclusion of these two key steps. The practice of the NSG is that each country retains its right to follow its own legislation. Russia and France do not have a requirement of suspension of cooperation pursuant to a nuclear explosive test. We may recall that Pokhran II did not adversely affect the Indo-Russian collaboration for Koodankulam. Only when we approach the NSG will we know if the exemption to India will be clean and free from any unacceptable conditions.

Recently the High Commissioner of Atomic Energy in France met me, at his request. He summed up the situation on energy by noting that it was very difficult indeed with oil prices ruling about $120 a barrel, with no evidence of any rollback. India needed to support an 8 to 10 per cent growth rate to improve the living conditions of over a billion Indians. He urged me to help in an early conclusion of the IAEA and NSG processes. Nuclear power plant suppliers in France, Russia, and Japan have serious limitations in securing supplies of equipment and special materials due to the bunching of orders.

Let us note that we can have civil nuclear cooperation with the U.S., Russia, and France and also our nuclear weapons programme if we go ahead with the IAEA safeguards agreement, NSG exemption, and bilateral agreements with these countries. If we allow the present opportunity to slip, we shall have a small nuclear power programme and our nuclear weapons. Getting civil nuclear cooperation from advanced countries in future may require our having to give up our nuclear weapons. China accesses all available nuclear power capacity worldwide. The choice is clear but the question is whether the Indian political establishment can unite on this issue for the country’s good.

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