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Managing Pakistan-U.S. relations

A few weeks ago, Pakistan was awash with rumours that President Pervez Musharraf’s departure was imminent. As the tide of opposition from several quarters, especially from the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and civil society, mounted, President George W. Bush considered it expedient to express his support for President Musharraf by making a phone call.

The United States President’s rationale for supporting President Musharraf is manifold. From the U.S. perspective, the centre of global Islamic radicalism has shifted to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), although many in Pakistan would disagree and consider it a tactic to shift responsibility for the U.S.’s own failures. With American elections less than a few months away, the failure of the Bush administration’s Pakistan policy that centred round President Musharraf would have an adverse fallout on the electoral fortunes of the Republican Party. With not much to show either in Iraq or Afghanistan, a failure in Pakistan would be politically ruinous and a failed legacy for Mr. Bush.

Washington would also like President Musharraf to stay in office to play a role in the formulation and implementation of the peace agreements so that the interests of the U.S. and NATO are not marginalised. As is common knowledge, the Bush administration has reservations about the restoration of judges because that would immediately reopen the case of missing persons and President Musharraf’s presence could delay their return. In addition, it is part of President Bush’s character to demonstrate loyalty to his friends and political allies when they are in trouble. The U.S. is also deeply sceptical of the stability and effectiveness of the coalition government. For these reasons, every effort is being made by the U.S. to keep President Musharraf’s lifeline afloat until November 2008, although the cost of this unflinching support is high and risky.

Analysing from a Pakistani perspective, the timing and statement of support from the White House appear most inappropriate and a categorical rebuff to the people of Pakistan as they had clearly voted for the parties that were opposed to President Musharraf and his political allies. What is most unfortunate is that by inextricably linking U.S. destiny with President Musharraf, Washington is overlooking Pakistan’s fundamental interests.

Over the years, owing to major distortions brought about by military and civilian rulers in the constitution, the power structure of our state has been deformed. Despite a parliamentary system, power revolves round an indirectly elected President; and in the case of President Musharraf even his legitimacy is questionable.

The efforts of civil society to correct these constitutional and political anomalies are thwarted by President Musharraf and his allies and it is regrettable that instead of standing with the progressive forces, Washington is putting its full weight behind the forces of the status quo under the mistaken belief that this way, its security and strategic interests will be well guarded. There are many in the U.S. who do not share this view. Recently Senator Biden said the U.S. should follow a Pakistan-oriented instead of a Musharraf-centric policy.

Supporting military rulers and simultaneously passing legislation that requires the U.S. President to certify that Pakistan is making progress in its democratic evolution exemplify Washington’s mixed and contradictory policies. Nonetheless, owing to a Democrat-dominated Congress and the likelihood of a Democratic President at the White House, there could be greater support for democracy in Pakistan.

In trying to impose its will against the wishes of Pakistani people, the Bush administration further heightens anti-American sentiment; discredits the war on terror; and makes it more difficult for the new civilian government to stabilise. Air strikes by U.S. forces in the tribal belt, threats of more to follow, and Washington’s fierce opposition to peace agreements also lead to widespread resentment and instability.

There is also a prevailing perception that apart from, or in the veil of, combating terrorism, U.S. and NATO policy for this region is motivated by lucrative economic and strategic interests. The belligerent unilateralism and discriminatory attitude of the Bush administration toward Muslim causes have also driven people toward taking an anti-U.S. stance. A lack of shared values and misperceptions about the clash of civilisations have not been helpful in bringing the two countries closer.

While the military-to-military relationship has always been close, recent incidents, especially the latest in which 12 Frontier Corp personnel and a major of the army were killed, have brought a strong response from the military and relations have been strained. There are also misgivings among intelligence and law-enforcement agencies on other issues related to the war on terror.

In giving oneself the right to attack perceived potential threats, the U.S. may be invoking its doctrine of pre-emption under the justification of self-defence and protecting self-interest. But a similar or more expansive interpretation of this was used for attacking Iraq, and Israel may now be using it for attacking Iran. We only have to remind ourselves that the bombing of Afghanistan and Iraq was a spectacular demonstration of American military power but did it really solve the problem? Are Afghanistan and Pakistan any better with that military invasion and are the U.S. and the world any more secure?

Moreover, if resort to pre-emptive attacks is the pathway to ensuring security, would this not lead to a state of permanent war? It portends a dark future and an era of perpetual war in which aggressive policies generate a cycle of unending violence.

Mr. Bush’s presidency has been characterised by a harder, militaristic, and highly aggressive foreign and defence policy. Pakistan, through astute handling, will have to deal with this phenomenon until November 2008. Not that U.S. pressure will end after that but surely when a new President takes over, a review of policy is expected, even if it is merely a nuanced change.

Washington cannot overlook the reality that Islamabad has extended unprecedented cooperation. The unfortunate part is that the U.S. praises Pakistan for its cooperation but is highly critical of it for being a major centre of Islamic radicalism. Washington and the West conveniently forget that in many ways, their past and present actions have contributed to the spread of militancy. This blame game and pressure tactics only weaken the relationship and strengthen militants. What the world, and especially the U.S., has to appreciate is that there is more at stake for Pakistan in the successful outcome of combating terrorism than for any other country. And the new democratic government is relatively better suited to counter terrorism, provided it gets appropriate support from the international community, especially the U.S.

Clearly, Pakistan is the front line state in the war on terror and one of its worst victims. Afghanistan’s instability and U.S. and NATO military engagements in the region are essentially the contributory factors, although it is also a fact that over the last few years, powerful local Taliban groups have emerged. Pakistan is bearing the maximum brunt of this war. More than 1200 of its servicemen have died and thousands of civilians have fallen victim to explosions and collateral damage.

When Pakistan tries to find indigenous solutions based on tribal traditions and historical experience and makes a deal with militants, the U.S. and its western allies seriously oppose this. No doubt in the past the militants took advantage of the truce and expanded their influence. But this time, a carefully crafted military operation in South Waziristan and Swat preceded the peace deals and Pakistan is not talking to the militants from a position of weakness. Yet the U.S. is not comfortable. Washington should also realise that a strategic pause would allow the government to re-establish its contacts with the tribal elders and explore opportunities of developing community projects to win over the people. In essence, this war can best be fought if the government can create and sustain a local power structure that has the support of the people and is able to eventually isolate the militants.

There is another major area of difference with the U.S. Pakistan feels that American and NATO forces are not addressing the real problems in Afghanistan that have given the Taliban strength to dominate several provinces in the south and are the root cause of militancy. There has been an exponential increase in poppy cultivation, making Afghanistan the world’s largest opium producer (97 per cent) and a major source of financing for the militants and warlords. Moreover, no effort has gone into strengthening state structures in south, southeast, and southwest Afghanistan. The international community has given scant attention to the repatriation and rehabilitation of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. This remains a source of potential militancy and instability. It passes the blame on to Pakistan for all the problems.

Besides, by relying heavily on airpower and less on ground forces, the U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel push the militants on to the Pakistani side and expect that we will fight their war with all its attendant fallout, including collateral damage.

Pakistan’s new civilian government will have to be highly sensitive to the security concerns of the U.S. and other European powers that during the truce, its territory should not be used for attacks in Afghanistan or elsewhere in the world. Close cooperation on intelligence and operational matters can be helpful in removing U.S. doubts and interference.

(The writer, a retired lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army, is a well-known political and defence analyst and commentator. His email id is talat@comsats.net.pk)

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