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Wednesday, Jun 25, 2008
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“Do not rush safeguards accord without debate”

Sandeep Dikshit

Extreme secrecy, media hype, parochial interests have put the country on dangerous path: nuclear scientists

“Additional power generated with imported reactors will be more expensive”
123 pact does not guarantee uninterrupted fuel supplies for reactors under safeguards

NEW DELHI: Three senior nuclear scientists have urged the government not to rush the safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) till it is fully debated, at least by the United Progressive Alliance (UPA)-Left committee and independent nuclear experts.

“A combination of extreme secrecy, media hype, parochial interests of organisations and ignorance of the issues among the general public have put the country on a dangerous path,” said the former Atomic Energy Regulatory Board chairman, A. Gopalakrishnan; the former Atomic Energy Commission chief, P.K. Iyengar; and the former Bhabha Atomic Research Centre director, A.N. Prasad, in a joint note released on Tuesday.

They are part of a group of senior nuclear scientists, who had in the past expressed concern over India entering into a nuclear co-operation agreement with the U.S. under the aegis of the Hyde Act 2006.

They pointed out that there was a great deal of disquiet in the scientific community over the government’s intention to approach the IAEA without giving details about the proposed safeguards agreement to even the UPA-Left committee that was created specifically for a joint evaluation of the deal.

The basic argument of energy security was a “myth,” they said. Not only would the additional power generated through imported nuclear reactors be more expensive, the nuclear deal would ensure that the country’s commercial nuclear interaction with other countries were “firmly controlled” by Washington by the Hyde Act.

Stipulations

The government’s argument that the deal would be governed only by the 123 Agreement was “untenable” because this pact was anchored in the U.S. domestic laws, including the Hyde Act. The Act contained several stipulations extraneous to the issue of bilateral nuclear cooperation, including foreign policy behaviour, which India should adhere to if the deal had to be kept alive, they argued.

“The real issue facing India, therefore, is whether or not we want this mythical extra ‘energy security’ through this deal, paying almost thrice the unit capital cost of conventional power plants, with the additional burden of subjugating the freedom to pursue a foreign policy and indigenous nuclear R&D programme of our own,” the scientists said.

They feared other serious repercussions, including a potential weakening of India’s nuclear deterrence and inability to protect and promote indigenous R&D efforts in nuclear technology.

Besides, the Hyde Act and the 123 Agreement do not guarantee uninterrupted fuel supplies for reactors, which India would place under safeguards. Though the government had assured that this defect would be corrected in the safeguards agreement, the IAEA was not a fuel-supply guarantor. Therefore, there was serious doubt whether the Indian negotiators had obtained any assurance in this regard, they said.

The scientists wanted to know the nature of corrective measures assured by the government in the 123 Agreement if foreign fuel supplies were disrupted.

Also, India being merely allowed to withdraw indigenous reactors from safeguards after stripping them of fuel and components of foreign origin was not a corrective step. This does not ensure uninterrupted operation of the reactors if foreign fuel supplies were disrupted. Besides, this relaxation would not apply to the imported reactors, which would use up bulk of the country’s investments in nuclear power.

The scientists wanted the government to simultaneously negotiate the Additional Protocol along with the main safeguards agreement.

“Pursuit clause”

Not agreeing with the government’s strategy of hammering out the Additional Protocol at a later date, they pointed out that intrusive actions were usually taken on the basis of this protocol. These include the “pursuit clause” that permitted interference in non-civilian programmes on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion.

They said that though reprocessing was at the core of long-term energy security, the 123 Agreement gave an “empty theoretical right” in this regard. The actual permission to reprocess would come after several years when a modern reprocessing plant is built. This would mean negotiating more safeguards and the Additional Protocol, which the government had not done.

None of the issues could be adequately addressed unless the entire safeguards agreement and its associated papers were made available to the UPA-Left Committee and independent national experts for evaluation, the scientists said.

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