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The Gaza earthquake and its aftershocks

The war in Gaza between the Palestinian group Hamas and Israel has generated powerful forces, seismic in their intensity. These are shaking the foundations of the power hierarchy in West Asia.

In order to gauge the degree of change this has brought about, the Gaza conflict needs to be seen in conjunction with the Lebanon war of July-August 2006 and its larger regional fallout.

Israel failed to impose its military will on the Lebanese group Hizbollah by means of the Lebanon war. After successfully defending south Lebanon, Hizbollah further consolidated its position domestically. It has now emerged as the fulcrum of Lebanese politics, successfully translating its military gains into tangible political results. Regionally, Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has arguably stirred the Arab street as no other regional leader has done since the days of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Hizbollah’s conduct during the 33-day Lebanon war has become worthy of emulation, as was seen during the 22-day conflict between Hamas and Israel. Tactically, Hamas fighters, like those of Hizbollah, emerged from the mainstream of Palestinian society, and were inseparable from the ordinary citizenry of Gaza. Bound by a common legacy of dispossession and close family and religious bonds woven into a deep-rooted culture of resistance, Gazan society was resilient enough to withstand collective punishment of unprecedented intensity that the Israeli war machine inflicted on it during the war. Despite the indiscriminate use of phosphorus bombs, which harmed Gazan civilians and led to credible accusations of Israeli war crimes, Israel failed to generate a popular revolt against Hamas based on its tactics of terror.

There have been credible reports that Hamas has directly benefited from Hizbollah’s military expertise. Lebanese media have reported that top Hizbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh, who was assassinated in Damascus in February 2008, personally imparted some of his military knowledge to Hamas. He had apparently pressed Hamas fighters to recognise the pivotal importance of secure communications between military command centres and fighting units during the course of a guerrilla campaign.

Hamas units and allies, including the Islamic Jihad, the leftist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Resistance Committees in Palestine (PRCP), also appear to have made extensive use of tunnels to carry out hit-and-run raids on Israeli combat forces during the war. Asked in an interview for Qatari-owned daily Al Arab about it, PRCP spokesperson Abu Mujahid said: “This is a combative method that played a clear role in the battle. Through this technique, our combatants were able to reach unexpected locations, strike the enemy and retreat peacefully...” He added that in previous wars the guerrilla fighters were visible to the adversary. “This time the combatants were not apparent and the enemy could not detect their locations. It could only feel their painful strikes.”

In the political domain, Hizbollah played an enormous role in shaping Arab popular opinion against the Arab “moderate camp.” It focussed especially on Egypt as a target of derision.

Within days of the start of the Israeli assault on December 27, Mr. Nasrallah urged Egyptians to arise and force Cairo to open the border gates with Gaza at the Rafah crossing. “If the people took to the streets by the millions, could the police kill millions of Egyptians? People of Egypt, you must open this crossing by the force of your chests,” he said.

A month later at a press conference, the Hizbollah leader persisted in criticising the Egyptian position on the Rafah crossing: “My stance against the Egyptians was correct, and I still denounce their ongoing closure of the Rafah border crossing with Gaza. The opening of the Rafah crossing is crucial to the Palestinian people, the resistance and the living conditions there… its closure is one of the biggest crimes in history.”

In tandem with the Hizbollah experience, the Palestinian Hamas benefited from the rear-base support provided by Syria, which has given sanctuary to the Hamas leadership-in-exile. It has been the group’s key defender at Arab forums. Syria played a critical role in ensuring that top leaders of Hamas and its allies were represented at a regional conference on Gaza that Qatar hosted during the conflict.

Aware of the crucial importance of the media in influencing a situation involving asymmetrical warfare, Syria has played a vital role in guaranteeing that the voice of resistance could be heard loud and clear during the course of the war. Television channels such as Hizbollah’s Al Manar and Iran’s Press TV, which have supported the resistance, have widened their reach with Syrian help. Qatari channel Al Jazeera also continued to amplify and reinforce the pro-Palestinian mood in the Arab street.

Iran has played a major role in firming up the resistance, both in Lebanon and in Gaza. However, its role in Gaza has been relatively modest, mainly on account of the geography of the coastal strip which the Israelis have successfully cut off by land, sea and air from the rest of the world.

The Gaza conflict has generated fresh momentum to forces opposing the status quo that had emerged following the Lebanon war. Significantly, it has also caused the emergence of powerful new players in the region, who appear uncompromising in their intent to bring about meaningful change.

The foremost among them are Turkey and Qatar. Prior to the Gaza war, both Turkey and Qatar had shown their inclination to emerge as lead agents for conflict resolution in the region. By espousing this role, they challenged and brought enormous pressure on countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia which have been the traditional mediators. Qatar gained considerable diplomatic ground after it successfully mediated to end internal conflict in Lebanon which had been festering in the aftermath of the 2006 war. Turkey was the honest broker in talks to end the dispute between Syria and Israel over the Golan Heights.

Soon after the war began on December 27, the Turks and the Qataris made energetic efforts to ensure that their positions on the Gaza conflict were clearly heard and understood. Qatar’s leaders were unequivocal in their condemnation of Israel and forthright in their support for Gazans. In a televised address on January 4, Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, said: “The Israeli aggression against our people in the Gaza Strip is a war crime.”

Turkey, which had so far shared a close relationship with Israel, planted itself firmly in the Arab discourse by fearlessly lashing out against the humanitarian catastrophe that Israel had perpetrated by attacking Gaza’s civilians. By resorting to uninhibited criticism of Israel, Turkey could work the Arab street which was deeply disappointed over its earlier posture of silence. Meanwhile, the “moderate” Arab countries continued to adopt such a posture of silence despite the Gaza carnage.

Turkey continues to endear itself to the Arab masses as its feud with Israel over Gaza deepens. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan sparred with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum. His protest walkout in Davos, and his unflattering description of Israeli actions in Gaza, captured live by the world media, drew instant support in the region – a region that is hungry for assertive leaders who can stand up to Israel and its powerful friends.

Gaza also provided Turkey and Syria the leeway to wriggle out of a tightening Western embrace by walking out of the negotiations with Israel on the Golan Heights. Any significant progress on this would have put pressure on Syria to normalise ties with Israel. Conversely, Damascus would have found it difficult to continue its special relationship with Iran and the Lebanese Hizbollah.

Besides, maintaining Hamas’ presence in Damascus would, in all likelihood, have become untenable. Not surprisingly, Syria announced in the wake of the Gaza events that diplomacy on the Golan Heights needed deferment, while Turkey stated it was suspending its mediation between Syria and Israel.

Despite opposition from Egypt and Saudi Arabia and the consequent split in Arab ranks, Qatar, supported by Syria, went ahead with a regional conference on Gaza in Doha. In the Qatari capital, leaders of Hamas and its allies made their appearance and actively participated in the conference. The Syrian leader called upon participants to sever all ties with Israel. Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was an invitee.

Against the backdrop of the Gaza war, Syria, Turkey, Iran, Qatar and Lebanon, backed by Hizbollah, are emerging as the backbone of the region which is undergoing a rapid realignment. Responding to the whirlwind of change, Egypt is sinking enormous political capital to ensure the success of talks being held in Cairo to cement a durable ceasefire in Gaza. Saudi Arabia is keeping its lines of communication with Syria active.

The emergence of a new political order in West Asia is still a work-in-progress, and the unscripted drama is only beginning to unfold. However, it is evident that the Gaza war has generated a tectonic shift in the politics of the region, which is set to experience a fundamental transformation.

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