Opinion - Op-Ed   

The civil-military crisis in Nepal

— PHOTO: AFP

RISKY ALLEY: The Maoists have shown themselves to be immature in operating the levers of democratic power.

Nepal’s peace process has been transiting from one crisis to another. The latest one has been precipitated by the Maoists who are heading the popularly elected coalition government, by sacking the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Katwal. The cabinet decision was a minority decision, taken with all the major coalition partners, including the Communist Party- United Marxist Leninist (UML) disagreeing. The main opposition party, the Nepali Congress (NC) and other smaller groups have been consistently opposing the Maoists decision. President Dr. Ram Baran Yadav has asked the Prime Minister to review the decision.

Gen. Katwal has been sacked for his “defiance” on three issues; namely fresh recruitments in Nepal Army (NA), extension of service to eight Brigadier Generals and withdrawal of NA from National Games in reaction to participation by the Maoist’s Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA). On all these issues, the NA’s position is not quite sustainable. New recruitments are a violation of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of November 2006, (Art. 5.1.2). The U.N. Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) which is managing both the PLA and the NA under the peace process had categorically said so. There was no urgency for NA to proceed with the recruitment of about 3000 soldiers during October-December 2008 against the direction of the Defence Ministry. On extension of officers’ services, the NA is insisting on the norms that pre-date the new Army Act 2007. This Act clearly empowers the ‘Council of Ministers’ to “control, mobilise and manage the Nepali Army.” The retiring officers obtained a temporary stay on the government’s decision of denying them the extension, but NA must have consulted the Defence Ministry in allocating them their duties afresh. The boycott of National Games on the entry of PLA teams by the army was a direct and avoidable affront to the Prime Minister who had recommended the PLA’s participation. General Katawal in his clarification justified his actions on all the three counts and that too in a tone of defiance. In the meanwhile, media has also exposed NA’s plan to carry out a coup against the Maoists. Earlier in February 2009, when Prime Minister’s secretary was shot at by miscreants the rumour mill in Kathmandu pointed fingers toward the NA for firing a warning signal to the Prime Minister.

The stated issues involved in the Government-NA conflict are indeed trivial. They cannot be advanced as legitimate excuses either for NA’s repeated defiance or for the Maoists’ extreme decision. Legally, the Maoists were within their Constitutional powers to seek COAS’s explanation. They could assert ‘civilian supremacy’ at most by warning or reprimanding him. By taking the extreme action, the Maoists have isolated themselves politically and precipitated a crisis which threatens to push Nepal into chaos and conflict of pre-Jan Andolan - II phase. There are more important and urgent priorities of constitution writing and consolidation of democratic gains that needed careful and wholesome attention. But the Maoists have shown themselves to be immature in operating the levers of democratic power. The required political resilience to carry the contentious forces along in the challenging exercise of democratic state building comes hard to them. The Maoist rank and file is still not completely free from the legacy of gun culture and politics of force. This lends them easily to the charges of irrationality and dominance.

Taking advantage of their immature and impatient political handling, the main opposition and coalition partners have blamed Maoists of breaking the political consensus. Even President has asked for the review of the decision to sack the COAS because it is not backed by consensus. But for the break down of political consensus, that drove the Jan Andolan-II (peoples movement of April 2006), Maoists alone are not responsible. The consensus broke down after the Constituent Assembly elections of April 2008, because the two major parties, the NC and the UML were shocked to see the rise of the Maoists and were not readily willing to accept them as the dominant partners in power sharing. The Nepali Congress delayed transfer of power to the Maoists by three months and refused to join the Maoist led government, largely because the NC leader Girija Prasad Koirala was not accepted by the Maoists for the post of President. The Maoists tried to build a consensus on the COAS issue but other political parties would not let them have it since a strong under current of “trust deficit” prevails between them. Perhaps, this breakdown of consensus and “trust deficit” were inherent in the lack of commitment and sincerity on the part of all the three major players on the issues involved in Nepal’s peace process and the building of a new Nepal.

The present crisis in Nepal, in a very significant way, is a reflection of the unresolved conflict in Nepal; between the discarded feudal order and the inclusive, democratic, new Nepal. Gen. Katawal, a protégé of the late King Mahendra who remained loyal to King Gyanendra in fighting the Jan Andolan-II (peoples’ movement) is in some ways an icon of the old order. Both the Maoists (particularly their PLA) and the NA carry the baggage of mutual hostility nursed by the 10-year-long insurgency. They suffer from a sense of inferiority vis-À-vis each other because neither the army could defeat the Maoists insurgency nor the Maoists could capture power through their “peoples’ war.” However, under the peace process, both the PLA and the NA have been treated generally equally under the provisions of CPA, Interim Constitution and UNMIN guidelines. This has emboldened the PLA but left the army resentful, more so because under the peace process, NA has not only to integrate the PLA (at least a section of it) but also has itself to be “restructured” and “democratised.” Gen. Katawal indirectly admits of this resentment when he says in his clarifications to the government that “In the process of obliterating remnants of past conflict…the feeling of some uneasiness is natural”.

The conflict between NA and the PLA remained dormant during the interim government led by G.P. Koirala as there was no attempt then to pursue the question of PLA’s integration. But this issue along with the restructuring of NA has come to the forefront of political agenda of the Maoists-dominated government. The Maoists have consistently pleaded for the integration of PLA. The NC and the UML endorsed this as evident in all the agreements and understandings between the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) since November 2005. Even the international community and the UNMIN accepted the need for integration.

NA’s “defiance” of the Maoists government is a part of its resistance to the processes of PLA’s integration and NA’s restructuring. NA’s insistence on recruitment of new soldiers and extension to the services of Brigadier Generals on old norms clearly reflects this resistance. NA’s resistance to integration of PLA has been argued on the grounds of the lack of PLA cadres’ education and professional competence, but strong ideological orientation. This argument is untenable in substance in the evolving political context of new Nepal. The issues of PLA’s integration and NA’s restructuring are the essential components of Nepal’s post-2006 radical transition and lasting conflict resolution and cannot be treated routinely. It is always possible to create new mechanisms to upgrade educational and professional levels of the integrated cadres. There are a host of security sector reforms that the army itself has to undergo with patience and perseverance.

The NA’s position on PLA integration smacks of devious politics. Smooth execution of the integration issue will make the Maoists stronger and more coherent. By denying and/or delaying the same the NA is breeding discontent among the PLA cadres, provoking them against the Maoists leadership and weakening their party organisation. This objective of weakening the Maoists being even dearer to the other political parties, also get their ready support. Therefore, there is a convergence between the NA and the political parties against the Maoists. The old royalist network of political vested interests operating beyond and across the party loyalties and institutional affiliations has been activated to provoke and pressure the Maoists.

The international community, including India, also hardly cherished the rise of the Maoists in Nepal. The leading members of this community have therefore found it easy to side with the NA on the civil-military tangle. However, both India and international community also need to keep in mind the overall context of civil-military relations in South Asia. The political dominance of military over civil authorities in Pakistan and Bangladesh has left dangerous scars on democratic institutions in these countries. The potential of Sri Lankan army dictating political terms on the ethnic issue and even seeking a share in the power structure following its “impressive” victory over the LTTE has been created. Nepal should be saved from drifting on this risky alley. The international community must devote its efforts to rebuilding the shattered political consensus in Nepal and address the present crisis in the interest of the peace process and democratic foundations of Nepal.

(S.D. Muni is senior visiting fellow at ISAS, Singapore. E-mail: sdmuni@gmail.com )

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