The Hindu : Front Page : Little progress in U.S.-India liaison on Headley case

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Tuesday, Dec 22, 2009
ePaper | Mobile/PDA Version

Front Page

Front Page

Little progress in U.S.-India liaison on Headley case

Praveen Swami

New Delhi believes United States is reluctant to expose Lashkar-e-Taiba’s links with Pakistan’s ISI

U.S. officials had denied that Headley had ever been an intelligence mole
New Delhi fears that full disclosure may never come

NEW DELHI: More than two months after Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley was held in Chicago, India’s intelligence services are divided on whether they were told the whole truth about the Lashkar-e-Taiba clandestine agent’s operations.

Many in the intelligence services even suspect that the United States is less than committed to letting the whole truth be known.

Public debate has focussed on claims that Headley—who served as a Drug Enforcement Administration informant after being arrested with two kg of heroin in 1988—may have planted by the U.S. covert services inside the Lashkar after his release in 2002.

Little evidence exists to support these claims. But there is mounting concern in New Delhi that the U.S. may prove reluctant to fully explore Headley’s links in the Lashkar—links, which they believe could implicate Pakistan’s military and its ISI Directorate.

FBI meeting

In meetings with Indian authorities earlier this month, officials from the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigations flatly denied that Headley had ever been an intelligence mole.

Headley, the officials said, was first subjected to surveillance in July this year, after failing to provide coherent answers to an airport inspector, who asked about his repeated journeys to Europe. Later, FBI investigators discovered a mass of evidence linking him to plots to attack the National Defence College here and the offices of Danish newspaper Jyllands Posten.

The officials said at the meeting that they only learned of Headley’s role in carrying out reconnaissance for the Lashkar in Mumbai during his interrogation. For that reason, India was told, the Mumbai-related charges against Headley were filed eight weeks after criminal proceedings first began. FBI investigators, the officials said, were still working to gather more evidence.

Little information was offered to address India’s concerns. Indian intelligence officials say the FBI was less-than-forthcoming with details of Headley’s recruitment, his training in Pakistan and his relationship with key Lashkar commanders. They were also dismayed by the lack of information provided on top Lashkar operative Sajid Mir, who controlled his operations.

India was told, one official present at the meeting told The Hindu, that Headley was legally entitled to reject interrogation by foreign agencies. Pressure from India for this outcome, the U.S. officials said, would likely compromise the FBI’s efforts to reach a deal with Headley – a deal offering him a reduced sentence in return for full disclosure of his role in Mumbai attacks.

For reasons the long predate the Headley case, New Delhi fears that full disclosure may never come. India’s intelligence services have long suspected that the counterparts in the U.S. know more than they have let on about the Mumbai plot.

On September 24, 2008, the Intelligence Bureau issued an alert noting that the Lashkar was demonstrating an interest in targeting the Taj Mahal Hotel. The warning, government sources have told The Hindu, was based on information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Research and Analysis Wing.

In his testimony to the Mumbai Police, Lashkar assault team member Mohammad Ajmal Amir Kasab said the group was ordered to initiate the attack on September 27, 2009—days after the CIA warned India about the imminent attack. “However”, he said, “the operation was called off for some reason.” For almost eight weeks, the assault team stood by in a safe house in Karachi.

That “some reason,” many in India’s intelligence community believe, was pressure from the U.S. on the ISI.

In August 2008, Pakistan’s military ruler General Pervez Musharraf was forced out of office. His Islamist opponents in Pakistan’s troubled north-west celebrated. Jamiat Ullema-e-Islam spokesperson Abdul Jalik Jan demanded that the government now end its anti-terrorism campaign in the region.

The Pakistan army, increasingly weary of the war against its one-time jihadist allies, wanted the same outcome. But, under intense pressure from the U.S., it was forced to escalate the fighting. Pakistan’s new military chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, is suspected—so far without evidence—of having authorised the Lashkar’s Mumbai plans, in the hope of precipitating a crisis with India that would allow him to call off the unpopular war in the north-west.

For reasons that are unclear, the Lashkar finally chose to proceed ahead with its Mumbai plans in November –monitored the September 24 warning shows by the U.S.

Indian investigators think questioning Headley may help them understand why the plot was revived, but seem unlikely to ever get the opportunity.

Printer friendly page
Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Front Page