Inside the world of militancy
KESAVA MENON
|
Presentation of the author’s first-hand knowledge of Al Qaeda and its leaders, the result of years of observation
|
THE SECRET HISTORY OF AL-QAIDA: Abdel Bari Atwan; Abacus, an imprint of Little, Brown Book Group, Brettenham House, Lancaster Place, London WC2E 7EN. £ 8.99
This book is certainly an important contribution to the growing body of literature on the Al Qaeda. It provides some details that were not recorded earlier and it offers an Arab perspective of Al Qaeda’s founder Osama bin Laden. Where the book disappoints is in its failure to stir the internal Muslim discussion on the phenomenon of fundamentalist terror that could in the long term damage the ‘ummah’ as much as any other community.
Almost everyone who has followed the subject even cursorily knows about Osama’s claim that he embarked on his ‘jihad’ because the West was, in his view, inflicting incalculable harm on Muslims all over the world. The Al Qaeda leader claims that his rage was triggered by the televised images of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The United States became willy-nilly the target of his hatred since it backed the Zionist state. Further down the line, Osama was to add to his litany of grievances and tack on the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia during and after the 1991 Gulf War; the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq that caused the death of hundreds of thousands; the oppression of the Palestinians; and, the military occupation of Iraq.
Asymmetry
From an objective point of view, there can be no dispute that all these are issues on which the West has dealt unjustly with the ‘ummah’. That there is an asymmetry between the powerful West and a weak Arab world cannot be refuted either. But neither Osama nor anyone else has been able to explain how the ‘Salafi jihad’ against innocent civilians all across the globe can be the solution to this existential problem.
Terrorist attacks can cause many deaths, horrify even those who live thousands of miles away from the site of the strike and disrupt the local economy for at least a short period of time. But, as the example of Sri Lanka proves, terrorism cannot shake even the relatively small states and societies from their purposes.
The U.S. has no doubt trashed its own interests by carrying out the senseless invasion and occupation of Iraq. But is it conceivable that the superpower would give up the effort to exercise hegemony over West Asia and North Africa or control the oil wealth of these regions because of a few terrorist strikes. As history since 9/11, 2001 shows, the Salafists are not in a position to mount the kind of tsunami-force wave of terrorist attacks that might conceivably push the juggernaut off course.
In seeking to explain the popularity of Osama and his ilk in the Arab world, the author says that they are seen as symbols of resistance. With the despotic governments of West Asia and North Africa putting up little resistance as western powers exploit the region, the masses feel hopeless. With their minds still gripped by the lore of the Islamic civilisation’s 800-900 year-long period of glory, the masses also feel humiliated in the current circumstances. Osama and his fellow ‘jihadists’ have hence come to be viewed as the only people who are striking a blow for the collective cause.
Motivating factors
Atwan makes clear at the beginning of the book that he is not trying to justify the ‘jihadist’ project but merely setting out all its aspects, including the motivating factors at play, so that the phenomenon can be properly understood. But in this book at least he fails to dig deeper into the thesis by which the ‘jihadists’ try to justify themselves. He does not raise the question, which must be raised as often as possible, whether the ‘jihad’ can ever by itself raise the ‘ummah’ to a status of equality with other civilisations. After all, the Japanese have matched the West in terms of modernisation and, China and India are getting there without terrorism having ever been used as a means. Too many Arab commentators too often fail to point out that the ‘jihad’ is a recipe for disaster not salvation.
Ambivalence
Atwan’s initial disclaimer notwithstanding, there seems to be ambivalence in his attitude towards Osama and the ‘jihadists’. The author visited the Al Qaeda leader in the Tora Bora caves in 1996 and found him to be polite, austere, dedicated and even amiable. The man might well possess these qualities but he also propagates killing on a large scale and has neither put himself or any of his numerous sons in the forefront of “martyrdom” operations. In failing to put Osama in perspective, the author only succeeds in showing the terror mastermind in a softer light than he deserves to be in.
Printer friendly
page
Send this article to Friends by
E-Mail
Book Review
