Repeal of the Armed Forces Act
A.T. THIRUVENGADAM
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Circumstances that necessitated the deployment of the Army on anti-insurgency duties still exist
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THE SPECIAL panel on the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act has done what is called running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. While recommending the repeal of the Act it has also suggested retention of the Army in anti-insurgency duties. It has not indicated under what legislation the Army could be deployed on these duties, part of which are essentially police duties. `Aid to civil authorities' under which the armed forces are utilised by the civil administration will not be applicable to prolonged operations.
The circumstances that necessitated the deployment of the Army on these duties still exist. They are: a) inadequately trained and insufficient armed police forces of the State; b) politically unstable, inefficient and unpopular administrations; c) rampant corruption and large scale unemployment; d) organisations in the name of social work and human rights covertly work for increasing the divide between the people of the hills and the valley: one for integration of the Naga areas and the other for the territorial integrity of the State; and e) finally the absence of an enlightened political leadership acceptable to the people and acting as a bridge between the people and the government.
Besides, the increasing nexus between various insurgent groups of the region, availability of sanctuaries, resources and advice from neighbouring countries and a complex and variegated population mix are adding to the problems of peace and harmony in the area. This has necessitated the presence of the armed forces in the region for anti-insurgency duties.
Allegations against armed forces excesses came to the fore in the eighties when the valley was riddled with terrorist activities and the armed forces were inducted. The people of the valley resented the search and seizure operations undertaken by the Army.
Swift response and timely remedial measures undertaken by the force commanders and the administration on a few allegations against the Army and other paramilitary forces kept the people somewhat satisfied. A few measures were also initiated at that time. They were: a) co-opting a police officer by the security forces columns when undertaking search and seizure operations; b) carrying out interrogations jointly with the police while the accused/suspect is in police custody; and c) following and observing all legal requirements of the case.
Some of the cases were handed over to the local police for enquiry and investigation and guilty persons were to be tried by civil courts and not courts-martial. There was ample protection for the security force officers and men under the CrPC when they were on duties declared operational.
The panel has reiterated the advice given by the then Governor of Manipur, Gen. Krishna Rao, in a conference of police chiefs of the Northeast held in Imphal some time in the eighties. He advised them in the interest of their own force and in the interest of the nation and the armed forces that the State police should become a key player. The armed forces should be used effectively for a shorter duration so that they are not diverted from their main duty of soldiering and do not get disoriented by a long exposure to duties on the civilian side and also prevented from getting trained for the task of protecting the nation.
Unfortunately, this advice could not be given a fair trial owing to the circumstances and politics in the area. The panel would have done justice to its task if it had come up with a measure to ensure the presence of the Army under some enabling legislation without contradicting the democratic norms of the country.
(The article is based on the writer's experience in the Northeast in the State police as well as in the Intelligence Bureau)
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