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In his anxiety to secure nuclear power for quick economic development, our Prime Minister seems to have overlooked the risks involved in forging an all-round partnership with the U.S. — a superpower prowling in a unilateral world, finding itself in some trouble over the implementation of its neo-conservative delusions.

If it is nuclear deal alone, India cannot dream of anything better: India’s military nuclear facilities — eight of the 22 reactors — are left untouched, along with its fast-breeder programme, its reprocessing and enrichment facilities, which will not be interfered with either by the IAEA or the U.S.

This bestowing of a virtual nuclear-weapon state status is an extraordinary favour on a country which has secretly made nuclear bombs and refused to sign the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But the nuclear deal is part of a package which includes Defence Framework Agreement, the Agriculture Deal, the Disaster Management Agreement, and some others.

It is arguable if India can stand up to the pressures of a superpower which arm-twisted the U.N. and other European powers into acquiescing in its acts of aggression. In a supposed Indo-U.S. partnership, could India ever influence its partner to moderate its policies towards Iraq, Iran, Israel, Cuba, et al? But in no time, it could calibrate India’s vote in IAEA in relation to Iran.

This is to say that unequal partnership is a one way street, and India might end up being subservient to the U.S in such a partnership. If that happens, India could lose its leading role in the Third World, and might have to reckon with its growling neighbours — rising Russia, growing China, and defiant Iran.

With whatever motives, the Bush administration had come up with an agreement to “end the nuclear isolation of India.” But a number of Indians and Americans have expressed reservations about the agreement: Americans that they are opening floodgates to nuclear proliferation for accommodating India in nuclear edifice, and Indians that their country, proud of Nehruvian legacy, is going under American influence.

The embarrassment on both sides will disappear if India were to renounce nuclear weaponisation and nuclear testing by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. By doing this, India will be formalising the prevailing situation: it has already announced it would not conduct nuclear tests, and it is not adding weapons to its stockpile.

If it goes a little beyond and forswears conducting of nuclear tests and making of nuclear weapons, the signing of agreements with the NSG and the U.S. would be a smooth sailing, and hitches, if any, of formal nature could be overcome. India could then go on importing light water reactors, uranium, etc. For achieving breakthroughs on economic front, bold decisions on shedding projects of prestige and posturing are signs of wisdom and not of surrender.

With the legacy of Gandhi and Nehru still hanging by a thread, India volunteered with policies of “building a credible minimum deterrent”, “no-first-use”, and “permanent voluntary moratorium on tests.” Giving up altogether nuclear tests and nuclear weapons would be a fitting finale to the somewhat troubled conscience of India’s policy makers.

India’s high level technology and general revulsion against nuclear attacks should be enough guarantees against possible attempts by Pakistan or China. At the end of the day, a slight risk need be taken for a high moral stance and for a higher gain of ‘energy security.’

Meanwhile our energy needs will be fully met; we will not be pointed out for being made an exception and unravelling the global nuclear regime; we will not be signing into a partnership of all kinds with the U.S; and India will be in the forefront of an international movement for nuclear disarmament.

yvr_niru@yahoo.com

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