When Mumbai airport escaped disaster
GURCHARAN BHATURA
On February 9, 2009, the Mumbai airport luckily escaped from a deadly accident happening on its runway. Any one will shudder at the mere thought of an aircraft of the size of A321 (weighing 83 tonnes) rolling at a speed of 200 km an hour hitting a helicopter. The providential escape saved the Mumbai airport and the Indian aviation from the worst possible safety rating.
There are experts blaming the exponential growth in aircraft movements to be the cause of such incidents. Others talk of the shortage of Air Traffic Controllers (ATC) and their fatigue. Some think that it could be due to pilot error.
The Mumbai airport is the busiest airport in the country, handling on an average 635 aircraft movements (landings and takeoffs put together) every day. The declared capacity of Runway 27 (that was in use on the day of the incident) is 30 aircraft movements an hour. There are reported cases when the ATC has also handled 34-35 aircraft movements. That means the approved ATC system in place at the airport allows aircraft operations with less than two minutes separation, demanding strict discipline and accurate estimates from pilots.
Many years ago, during VVIP movement, there was a practice of closing the airport for other aircraft movement. To cope with the growing traffic, some years ago, this practice was stopped. It was then consciously decided that VVIP aircraft can be safely handled as a normal traffic and, wherever necessary, it could be given priority in landing or departure over other aircraft. This practice is followed in many countries and has worked well in India as well.
Busy airports like Mumbai normally handle flights operating under the Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) demanding positive control on aircraft.
Exceptional instances
Some flights are cleared under the special Visual Flight Rules (VFR) when the pilot takes over some of the responsibility to look out for traffic. These helicopters were also flying under special VFR. In both cases, no aircraft can enter the airport air space or even change its position on the ground without the specific permission of the ATC (Control Tower).
For landing and takeoff, pilots seek the permission of the ATC unit called tower. All the aircraft on ground or in its neighbouring air space work on tower frequency. Thereby, they also get to know the airport traffic around them.
As per practice, Pratap 1 (Leader of the helicopter formation of the President) was in contact with the Mumbai Approach Control (another unit of ATC) and had estimated to arrive at the airport at 0920 IST. The other helicopters of the formation were expected to follow the leader and maintain the same time of arrival.
In case of any change in time, like early arrival, the pilots were expected to inform the change to the ATC, so that it can restructure the sequence of other departing and arriving aircraft.
At 09:17:02, Mumbai tower granted take-off clearance to Air India flight IC 866. Pratap 2, that was neither in contact with approach control nor with Mumbai tower, landed in front of the rolling aircraft. At 09:17:38, seeing Pratap 2 on the runway, Mumbai tower told IC 866 to reject takeoff.
The visibility on that day was around 3 km. This is less than the normal clear visibility conditions and pilots are expected to be more vigilant to keep track of aircraft movement on the ground and in the vicinity of the airport.
Ideally, the pilots flying under these circumstances are expected to be in contact with the tower, and it is the appropriate ATC unit to grant landing and takeoff clearances as it controls the runways. Even if they were in contact with Approach Control, they are expected to monitor the tower frequency as well to know the local traffic.
IC-866 was lined up on the runway. Had they been in contact with the tower or at least were monitoring the said frequency, they would have known that it had cleared an aircraft for departure. The pilots carrying the President of the country are expected to be all the more vigilant and careful.
In this case, it appears that they were neither watchful of the runway local traffic nor had maintained contact with the tower.
The incident has come under public domain and everyone is keen on knowing who has pushed our President into potential grave danger. Therefore the need for a fair enquiry by an independent authority becomes all the more necessary. We, in the industry, and the public in general, are looking for a fair and unbiased report.
(The author is a former airport director, Mumbai. He is also Director-General, Foundation for Aviation & Sustainable Tourism (FAST). These are his personal views.)
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