The talks with Pakistan

By Amrik Singh

THERE IS no end to speculation on what could emerge from the Indo-Pakistan talks. It would be rash to say anything by way of a prediction. But an analysis of the forces and pressures at work would be in order. In my judgment, the outcome of the talks would depend more upon Pakistan than India. Having taken a somewhat inflexible position in regard to Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would find it difficult to be flexible now. Flexibility is required on both sides. From that point of view, India is better placed than Pakistan. The very fact of having invited Pakistan suggests a considerable degree of flexibility on India's part. Pakistan has readily accepted the invitation. But any flexibility beyond that would be difficult.

This is not to suggest that India would not have difficulties in being flexible. But India has one advantage. More than the Congress(I), it is the BJP which could have created difficulties. But the BJP is in power and has given evidence of some degree of flexibility. In any case, objections by the Congress(I) would not count beyond a point. It is another matter that Mr. Mulayam Singh too might choose to be difficult for the same reasons or for some other reasons. He counts for a great deal in Uttar Pradesh and therefore his importance cannot be underrated. The various regional outfits, important though some of them are, are not likely to adopt an independent posture of their own. All said and done, the BJP-led Government would not find it difficult to be flexible.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf's position is much more unenviable. For one thing, it was he who masterminded the Kargil operation. That he did not succeed in the ultimate outcome is a comment on the constraints within which he has to operate. Since then, his having been in the seat of power seems to have given him a somewhat more realistic perception of things. His attitude today is not what it was a couple of years ago. His real problem comes from the mass mobilisation in favour of Kashmir which so far has proceeded without any stop or challenge. With that cast of mind, it will be difficult for him to be flexible when he sits down for talks. And yet, without being flexible no progress will be possible.

Does flexibility mean that he will have to give up his position? To some extent perhaps. But not to the extent that he would be expected to concede. The right of India to administer Jammu and Kashmir has been a fact of life for over half a century by now. The only meeting ground between the two countries therefore can be that, henceforward, Kashmir is neither a part of India nor of Pakistan. Instead, Jammu and Kashmir becomes independent with guarantees, perhaps underwritten by the U.N., from both countries not to undermine or violate her autonomy. Today, this looks like a pipe dream. But, in the changed circumstances, such a thing can happen. There are certain pre-conditions for it however. It is those that need to be spelt out.

The obvious pre-condition is that Pakistan abandons what is called the `jehad' approach. It is based on what an ex-President of Pakistan described as the ``unfinished business of the Partition''. That phrase has one implication. The partition of India into two countries in 1947 was a rational step to settle a confrontation between the two communities. But was it?

Experience since 1947 has shown that the problem has not disappeared. With Pakistan having become a sovereign state like India, it was free to go to war if that is what it preferred. Apart from the 1947 attack on Jammu and Kashmir there have been wars in 1965, 1971, and 1999. None of these has gone in favour of Pakistan. The current phase of `jehad' is partly owing to the growing Islamisation of the Pakistan polity and partly because Pakistan has not yet accepted the fact that going to war is not going to achieve what is sought to be achieved.

Pakistan is not in a position now to go to war again in the near future. For one thing, the international correlation of forces would not permit that; the anti-nuclear lobby for instance. For another, and that is even more important, Pakistan's economic situation has continued to deteriorate. This is the most unnerving thing for Pakistan. Furthermore, Gen. Musharraf seems to have discovered since he captured power that, in dealing with the IMF, Pakistan had no choice except to sign on the dotted line. While Afghanistan is not prepared to do that, Pakistan (despite its reluctance to do so) found that not to do so would push it downwards even further.

And herein lies Pakistan's dilemma. Politically and ethnically, it is Punjab which calls the shots. Economically speaking, however, it is Sind or, more precisely, Karachi which calls the shots. Going the Taliban way is an option which is not so easy to take for Gen. Musharraf.

The basic problem that Gen. Musharraf, therefore, faces is how to make his line of thinking politically acceptable to the people of his country. Those who organise `jehad' etc., are not fully aware of what the current economic situation of Pakistan portends. Given the highly adverse situation. Gen. Musharraf is trying to do his best to cope with the situation. And that would depend upon how he works out a deal with India.

The real strength of India lies in the fact that its economy is performing better than Pakistan's. The size of the economy also matters. Some of the more perceptive people in Pakistan already recognise this fact. If there is no settlement between the two countries, does it follow that Pakistan will continue to bleed India in Jammu and Kashmir? Pakistan has been able to ensure this for about a decade and can continue to do so for several more years. As someone in Kashmir put it caustically, ``Pakistan will fight India to the last Kashmiri''. Currently, it appears, the Kashmiris are prepared to play this game but a stage can come when they will get tired. Some people think such a stage has been reached.

What Gen. Musharraf has to decide is whether the present policy can continue to be pursued. If so, what consequences will it have, both in the short term and the long run? If not, how can he carry the public with him on the new policy which he would like to work out with India? This would also depend upon the terms which he can get from India. One thing that Gen. Musharraf will not be able to sell to his countrymen will be a deal on the ceasefire line. If offered this option, Gen. Musharraf cannot but reject it. With the Kashmiris being more pro- Pakistani than pro- Indian, India is certainly not on a stronger wicket than it was in 1972. In the long run, however, India is bound to win. Pakistan knows it and, therefore, would like to settle today rather than tomorrow. In a sense, therefore, the battle of wits that will be waged in Delhi (and elsewhere) will be in respect of what happens today and what will happen tomorrow.

In this dicey situation, it requires no great insight to see that beginning with Agra, there will be a series of meetings. India will be unwilling to let Jammu and Kashmir go out of its hands. Anything short of that will be unacceptable to Pakistan. Therefore, a prolonged series of negotiations will be unavoidable.

The one thing that India has to ensure is that Pakistan does not go the way of Afghanistan. Pakistan too wants to avoid moving in that direction. Once Pakistan chooses its own path of development which would not be the same as that of Afghanistan, India does not have much to worry about. Afghanistan is attempting to do what in a sense, Saudi Arabia has done for itself. But Saudi Arabia could afford it, Afghanistan cannot. That the latter will come a cropper within the next few years is not difficult to anticipate. What Pakistan has to do is to detach itself from that suicidal path. Of course the price that Pakistan will have to pay will be to accept the dominant role of India in South Asia. But the other choice is much more fatal. Where will Pakistan be in five years if it follows the Taliban's path?

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