SAARC: inside & outside

By Anil Nauriya

CHINA IS reported to have expressed a desire to join the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). It appears that Bangladesh has supported the move. Pakistan and Sri Lanka will no doubt extend support. In spite of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, it is doubtful if the Himalayan kingdom will be able to resist the idea. Apart from obvious strategic objectives, China would like greater access to the markets of India and such other countries as can be reached more conveniently by land than by the sea route via Singapore.

The suggestion needs to be discussed in all its aspects. It is only with India's consent that China can hope to enter the consensual SAARC. Should India consent? There are interesting and perhaps unexpected answers to this question which present both opportunities and challenges. So far as non-Defence commerce is concerned, India may already be China's largest trade partner in South Asia. If the two countries could expand their economic ties it would be a factor for peace in all of Asia. There are, of course, great possibilities for cooperation with China in the generation of hydro-electric power in the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra but such possibilities are not necessarily SAARC- related.

While scope for expansion of trade and other economic cooperation may be large, it should also be borne in mind that the Indian and Chinese economies are mutually competitive rather than complementary. The gains, if any, for India from China joining SAARC would be indirect rather than direct. The India-related reluctance of some countries within SAARC to move ahead with mutual cooperation arrangements could to some extent be reduced if SAARC transforms itself in certain fundamental ways.

At a time when the West was inclined to shun Beijing, India had taken the lead in welcoming China to international forums such as the Afro- Asian meet at Bandung in 1955. In its turn, however, China has not been an enthusiastic supporter of India's involvement with ASEAN or of Indian participation in the so- called Asia-Pacific conclaves which have become fashionable in recent years. Indeed, Beijing was instrumental in keeping India out of them. Be that as it may, the Chinese desire to join SAARC provides India with an opportunity to appraise the future of the organisation. As at present constituted, the SAARC is not poised to go far. Mutual suspicions, Pakistan's reluctance to give trade concessions to India, and sectarian conflicts have halted further movement within SAARC. The South Asian Free Trade Area and even the South Asian Preferential Trade Area are still far from being realised.

It was in implicit recognition of the fact that SAARC as a whole had reached a cul de sac that sub-regional initiatives were launched within it. One of these centred around Nepal, Bangladesh and India while the other revolved around India and Sri Lanka, with Maldives and Bangladesh as possible inclusions. But there was little forward movement as the initiatives were seen by Pakistan as efforts to isolate it. Curious though it may seem, the countries concerned could potentially achieve more outside the framework of SAARC than within it. And there lies the rub. With SAARC unable to move forward even with its limited focus on trade-related issues, the South Asian countries have been neglecting the far greater need for cooperation on matters such as flood control and water management.

Another reflection of the inadequacy of SAARC was the relentless Indian search for other regional mechanisms or cooperative arrangements outside the SAARC framework. These included first, the Indian Ocean regional initiative (IOR), second, BIMSTEC, (consisting of Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand) and third, the Mekong-Ganga initiative (comprising Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and India). These incipient groups have substantial long-term economic potential. The last in particular could bring together in fruitful cooperation one of the largest combinations of human and natural resources on the planet. The Indian Ocean group is much too disparate and scattered to make a mark in the near future. South Africa has its own African commitments while Australia is still searching for a new definition for itself in the region, and the search will take some time. BIMSTEC and the Mekong-Ganga initiative are the areas in which progress is likely.

SAARC makes geographical sense and its members share strong historical and deep cultural and linguistic ties. But it is not, at present, a viable geo-political group. It lacks a sense of shared purpose. Its members march to the beat of different drums. That is also why it is not likely, as at present constituted, to take off economically in the near or medium term.

Into this scenario China wishes to enter. Its induction would change SAARC in one essential respect. China is, for all its territorial expanse, really an East Asian country, which is where the bulk of its population lives. SAARC would then be transformed, in substance if not in name, into a body for East Asian and South Asian cooperation. A forum for cooperation between East Asia and South Asia would be an idea worth examining. Should SAARC transform itself formally into such a forum, its membership ought to be opened also to other East Asian countries such as Japan, Mongolia and the two Koreas. This could indeed break SAARC out of its present logjam and breathe new life into it. It would broaden the outlook of the South Asian regional body and make it aware of its larger Asian identity. In the positive atmosphere thus created, even economic cooperation within the South Asian community could start looking up.

This positive result can, however, be envisaged only in the event of the East Asian region, consisting of Japan, China, Mongolia, and both or one of the Koreas, being treated collectively for the purpose of cooperation with the South Asian community. If China alone were to come into SAARC, this could reinforce the very mutual suspicions and geo- political differences which have affected the organisation so far. By contrast, if the effort is in the direction of greater cooperation with East Asia as a whole, the focus could shift decisively towards mutually- beneficial partnerships. It would also be more meaningful for India which would benefit from great interaction with the economies of North-East Asia, some of which are more complementary to it than that of China.

The Chinese desire to join SAARC may, however, signal also some other changes in stance. It is doubtful if China can consistently seek membership of SAARC and continue simultaneously to oppose Indian participation in Asia-Pacific and ASEAN-related bodies. More importantly, China must know that it cannot expect entry into SAARC or any meaningful participation in it without concomitant settlement of the Sino-Indian territorial dispute in an amicable spirit. The India-Pakistan example shows how difficult it is to function together within a regional body where such disputes are prone, willy-nilly, to get reflected indirectly even if they are not directly within its ambit. It is possible therefore that China may have decided that the time to bury the hatchet has come.

New opportunities may be opening up and it is right to be alert to all the possibilities. Yet, in the search for new areas of economic cooperation, whether outside SAARC or within SAARC or by transforming SAARC, there is one thing that must not be forgotten: India is a large enough economic cooperation area by itself. What it needs is a resolve and a sense of direction. For example, even so essential a matter as the late Dr. K. L. Rao's scheme for a Ganga-Cauvery link which would transfer waters from water surplus areas to deficit ones has yet to be taken up. But as the annual Assam floods and the recent Orissa and Bihar floods clearly show, the misery of the people has been prolonged enough. Solutions can hardly wait until all neighbouring countries join in the effort. Though the need for them to join remains very important, India must be ready to do what it can on its own.

Political parties and the Central and State Governments must come together to remove all constitutional and financial constraints upon this major priority. Once India starts making full use of its own vast economic cooperation area, other such areas will not be far to seek - and the more that come in, the merrier.

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