ABM by other means

By Pran Chopra

IN DEALING with the U.S. plans for a missile defence system (NMD), the Russian President, Mr. Vladimir Putin, has shown, together, various qualities which he has shown, one by one, in dealing with other tricky situations. He has shown realism and pragmatism on the one hand and resoluteness on the other, with the ability to move steadily towards a foreseen goal even when he appears to be taking one ad hoc step after another without a chosen direction.

He has taken the very realistic view that Russia cannot prevent the U.S. President, Mr. George W. Bush, from going ahead with NMD by violating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 (ABM), but in the meantime he is also calculating what Russia might gain from that and how to maximise the gains. Some of all that might have implications for India.

It is a part of this game that each time America says ``Here are some goodies. Now forget about ABM'', Moscow replies with a resounding ``No''. But at the same time Moscow also indicates its willingness to be invited to a joint Russian-American review of global nuclear security to see whether ABM should be modified or discarded, and if the latter then what should replace it; and in either case how the concerns of other nuclear weapon powers should be accommodated. This of course implies three things. First, admission by America that there are still two superpowers, not one. Second, ``negotiations'' between the two, to which Mr. Bush remains most averse. And three, Russian respect, greater than America's, for the interests of the other nuclear weapon powers.

The more this diplomatic duel persists, the more credit Mr. Putin can claim for sweet reasonableness and the more blame Mr. Bush may get for arrogant unilateralism. As it is, the present American readiness to bypass international agreements, such as the Kyoto accords about the environment, irritates many world capitals, from Tokyo to Paris. Mr. Tony Blair's London may be an exception to that, but there also public opinion is not the same as the Government's policies in this respect. Early in August, a survey in the E.U. had shown high levels of public disapproval of disregard of treaties by Mr. Bush.

The latest thrusts in this duel are illustrative, and it was fascinating to watch them played out in Moscow up to mid-August. A couple of weeks earlier, Ms. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor to Mr. Bush, visited Moscow, where she played a card with which India has had reason to be familiar. She gave smiling hints that her talks at the Kremlin had brought Mr. Putin closer to Mr. Bush on NMD. But her Russian counterpart was much quicker off the mark in pricking that bubble than anyone was in New Delhi. He made it plain that the talks were pleasant but did not add up to much more than that. Plainer language followed a few days later.

The American Defence Secretary, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld, visited Moscow for what his hosts thought would be a trip for exploring possibilities through negotiations but which Washington saw differently, according to New York Times. The paper said on August 11 that Mr. Rumsfeld ``is about to travel 10,000 miles to Moscow and back for one day of talks on missile defence and nuclear reductions at which no agreements are expected - because many officials believe the outcome is preordained and the American position has prevailed''.

The paper summed up this `position' as follows: ``... the treaty that limits American missile systems (ABM) is obsolete'' and Mr. Bush would not ``slow testing and deployment''. For good measure, the paper also quoted a ``senior Defence Department official'' as saying that while America would try to build a new relationship with Russia ``it is a relationship that will require us to be moving beyond some of the institutions of the Cold War such as the ABM''.

This and other reports of the same kind had preceded Mr. Rumsfeld to Moscow, and the chill that resulted surprised no one. The talks lasted one day, not the scheduled two. ``Not because there were differences'', Mr. Rumsfeld explained, but ``because of efficiency''. But the fact that there were differences tumbled out on August 13. Talking to American reporters about the NMD proposal by Mr. Bush, Mr. Putin emphasised ``For us, it is unconditionally linked with both START-I and START-II. I would like (you) to understand that''. He wanted to convey it very clearly that if America freed itself from ABM, Russia would consider itself freed from the restraints imposed these two agreements.

About NMD itself, Mr. Putin said ``We would like to get military and technical parameters'' of the proposal, which he said had been `formulated' by Mr. Rumsfeld's department. But giving and discussing them would amount to `negotiations', and the Russian Defence Minister, Mr. Sergei Ivanov, underlined that at a press conference he jointly addressed with Mr. Rumsfeld after their talks. He said ``an understanding'' would have to be reached about ``the thresholds and limits, both on offensive and defensive systems'' before ``a new set of negotiations'' could begin. He said he remained unconvinced that ABM could now be done away with, and that in the meantime ``We feel no compunction to leave one or another treaty or accord which we currently have signed''.

One found general agreement among official and non-official `think-tanks' in Moscow over what Russia stands to gain from this flexible and yet resolute posture on NMD. The gains are seen to be only incremental as yet but capable of becoming more significant as they accumulate. First, improved stature in European eyes, as mentioned earlier, because greater acceptance by Europe is desired by most Russians and no less by Mr. Putin himself. Second, increased respect in Chinese eyes because, as is believed around the world, NMD is not sought by Mr. Bush for better defence against some mythical ``rogue state'' but against some possible Chinese ambitions. Third, closer Sino-Russian proximity at the strategic level.

In fact, the Russian position on NMD ties in obviously well with Article 12 of the Treaty of ``strategic collaboration '' signed by Russia and China in the midst of the preoccupation of both with the future of ABM. Article 12 says ``The Contracting Sides shall take joint efforts to maintain global strategic balance and stability and shall energetically promote compliance with the fundamental agreements that ensure the maintenance of strategic stability''. The danger of instability in this domain is the principal argument Russia advances against violation of ABM.

There is also the more material possibility that if Russia and China have to erect military defences in a world which would be without the restraints of ABM and of START I and II, then Russia's defence research and manufacturing establishments, at present languishing for lack of custom, will have to get busy again, obviously more with the help of Chinese orders than with the present or forseeable Indian orders. The financial burdens will indeed be great but do not intimidate those who believe that with all that Russia already has in its laboratories and on the drawing board, it will need to add only an affordable further effort to show that America will still be vulnerable despite NMD, and that will further fuel the second thoughts which are being expressed in America already. They will become an ABM by other means.

There are two footnotes to this. One is the opinion expressed by some Russian scholars of strategic affairs. They believe that a tussle has been going on between those in the Moscow establishment who favour greater proximity to China and those who favour Europe more, and the needs of the defence industry establishment will tilt the balance in favour of China. The second is that as financial implications come to the fore it will become clearer to the world that the real concern of the NMD lobby in America is not the defence of America but the financial health of its famed military-industrial complex for which the NMD budget that is talked about would be an elixir.

Send this article to Friends by E-Mail

Section  : Opinion
Previous : Tehelka: what next?
Next     : Keep out 'sponsors'