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Opinion
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Elections and Kashmir
By Balraj Puri
TO THE Prime Minister's assurance of free and fair elections in
Jammu and Kashmir, the Home Minister significantly added that
polls in the State, barring that of 1977, were never fair and
free. This is the first official realisation of the fact that a
major cause of the alienation of the Kashmiris is non-extension
of Indian democracy to the State. Curtailment of the democratic
rights of the people, including the right to freely choose their
Government, used to be justified in terms of the unresolved
problem of Kashmir.
This vicious cycle began with the State's accession to India.
When Sheikh Abdullah came to power in October 1947, his party and
Government celebrated the event as the end of 400 years of
Kashmir's slavery under non-Kashmiri rulers - Mughals, Afghans,
Sikhs and Dogras. The Sheikh was perceived by the people more or
less as a Kashmiri substitute for non-Kashmiri princes instead of
as a democratic alternative to autocracy.
He would not tolerate any dissent in the State or in the party.
In 1947, the most important leader next to him was G.M. Karra. He
tried to cut to size his potential rival by denying
representation to him in the party and the Government. I asked
Nehru, why Karra's loyalty to India should be routed through the
Sheikh? I pleaded for Karra's survival as a political entity
notwithstanding his differences with the Sheikh. Nehru replied
``India's entire Kashmir policy revolved around the personality
of the Sheikh, how could we afford to weaken him?''
Jayaprakash Narayan, as the then tallest Opposition leader, too,
refused to be helpful till Kashmir issue was settled. After five
years of persecution, and in sheer desperation, Karra was the
first known Kashmiri Muslim leader to give a call for the State's
accession to Pakistan, in June 1953. It was one of the reasons
that disturbed the equilibrium of the Sheikh, who, to steal the
thunder of his rival, started making anti-Centre noises and
equivocating on the issue of accession, which was one of the
factors that led to the August 1953 crisis.
Interestingly Karra, along with other secessionist groups,
rejoined mainstream politics when the first viable alternative to
the Sheikh emerged in the State in the form of the Janata Party
in 1977. The end of one-party system also marked the end of the
secessionist movement in Kashmir. My proposal in a National
Conference meeting that no Government officer should be office-
bearer of the party was outrightly rejected by the Sheikh. I
showed Nehru a copy of an order issued by the Deputy Commissioner
of Doda, who was also president of the NC district committee, to
dismiss the party's tehsil committee in Kishtwar and appoint a
new one. I asked the Prime Minister ``how long can such an
undemocratic State remain a part of a democratic India?''. He was
visibly upset. But pleaded helplessness.
If the most popular leader Kashmir ever produced, who had the
support of the entire Indian nation and presided over a
regimented setup, needed to ensure the unopposed return of his
men in 73 constituencies with a nominal contest in two seats in
the first election to the Constituent Assembly of the State in
1951, it was difficult to break the tradition. In 1954, I told
Nehru that I wanted to set up a unit of the Praja Socialist Party
in Kashmir so that it could provide an Indian outlet to anti-
Government sentiments. He argued that the national interest was
more important than ideals of democracy. He said, ``we have
played a gamble on Kashmir, should we lose it for idealistic
considerations? Whatever be the weaknesses of Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammed (who had replaced the Sheikh) our Kashmir policy depends
on him''.
I submitted that the national interest would be best served if
anti-Government and anti-India sentiments were not mixed up. I
also reminded him that till a year ago he used to assert that
India's Kashmir policy depended on Sheikh Abdullah. In reply
Nehru said, ``Kashmir politics would always revolve around
personalities. Where is the material for democracy there?'' Most
of us, led by the PSP president, Asoka Mehta, were beaten in the
streets of Srinagar when we reached there to set up the party
unit. The first experiment in forming a secular, democratic
Opposition in the Kashmir Valley was crushed.
In 1958, another experiment in Opposition politics was made when
G.M. Sadiq led his leftist group out of the NC to form the
Democratic National Conference. A number of foreign journalists
observed that the Bakshi-Sadiq polarisation had made a
considerable dent in the following of the Plebiscite Front led by
the Sheikh. But the national leaders and the press were alarmed
over ``the disunity in the ranks of the nationalist forces''. The
two parties were pressured to reunite and the event was hailed as
the triumph of the national interest.
In 1967, Bakshi revived the NC and posed a formidable challenge
to the Congress in power. Nomination papers of his partymen in
more than half the constituencies in the Valley were rejected. I
collected a bundle of duplicate ballot papers that the ruling
party was using to defeat Bakshi's candidates and showed them to
the Chief Election Commissioner, K. Sundaram. He said, ``Bakshi
also used to do like that''.
The tradition of unopposed elections, rejection of Opposition
candidates and bogus voting was broken by Morarji Desai, who, in
defiance of the advice of his Cabinet colleagues and the
entreaties of State Janata leaders, including Karra and Mr. Abdul
Ghani Lone, boldly asserted, ``I will prefer taking poison and
die to any manipulation in election''. The Janata won only two of
the 42 seats in the Valley. But its defeat was the greatest
triumph of Indian democracy and national interest. The
polarisation of State politics between the Janata and the NC made
secessionist and communal forces redundant.
A similar polarisation between the Congress and the NC in 1983,
which returned the latter led by Dr. Farooq Abdullah to power had
provided anti-State Government and anti-Centre sentiments secular
outlets. But Dr. Farooq Abdullah was removed for ``hobnobbing
with the opposition parties of India'' by Indira Gandhi. After
two years, he returned to power when he agreed to share power
with the Congress. Thus space for a secular Opposition was again
vacated. The Muslim United Front came into existence to fill the
vacuum and became the only channel of expression of anti-Centre
and anti-State Government sentiments.
If the Rajiv-Farooq accord blocked a secular outlet of
discontent, the manipulated election in 1987 blocked a democratic
outlet also. Some of the candidates, along with their election
and polling agents, whose defeat was engineered, formed the
nucleus of the first militant group that went across the LoC to
get arms and training.
What would have been politics of these militants if they had not
been deprived of a democratic way of expressing their discontent
may be debatable. But it is surely better for the parties
concerned to confront each other in the Assembly and through
democratic debates than through the violence of the gun. Indian
democracy, if extended to the State, should have accepted the
challenge of a dissent of 10 to 15 members who could possibly be
elected if the poll was perfectly free and fair, in a House of
87.
In the 1996 election, none of the national parties, in particular
the Congress and the Janata Dal, which had a presence in the
Valley, campaigned against the NC on the plea that Dr. Farooq
Abdulllah was their best bet. Thus the entire Opposition space
was left to non-secular or secessionist parties.
In the 1999 Lok Sabha election when, again, the contest was
between pro-India parties, the election, according to press
reports quoting the Election Commission, ``was neither free nor
fair''. The electorate, it added, ``was coerced by the security
forces to vote''. Apart from weighty theoretical arguments, there
is thus ample empirical evidence that whenever there were free
elections and a democratic and effective Opposition in Kashmir,
the degree of alienation of the people visibly declined.
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