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The conviction of Arundhati Roy

THERE IS SOMETHING terribly amiss about a law and a legal environment which imposes unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and punishes people for nothing more than speaking their mind. The conviction of Arundhati Roy by the Supreme Court for criminal contempt is an unfortunate and disturbing development and should worry all those who believe that the law of criminal contempt, an extraordinary legal provision which vests extraordinary powers with the courts, should be used only in the most sparing and fastidious manner. The principal objective of The Contempt of Court Act, 1971, is to protect the authority and dignity of the court. The provisions of the Act are not intended to suppress criticism (even if expressed trenchantly) of court judgments, discourage frank and free expression about the state of the judicial system or, as in the case here, to bring `errant' writers to book.

The Supreme Court appears to believe that its (ostensibly nominal) sentencing of the Booker Prize winning author — to a one-day "symbolic imprisonment" and a fine of Rs. 2,000 — is a pointer to its magnanimity. But, in a larger sense, it is only another disturbing instance of the increasing tendency within the Judiciary to interpret the law of criminal contempt in an extremely rigid and inflexible manner. In criticising the Supreme Court's judgment on the Narmada dam issue and in defending herself in an affidavit (filed in reply to a contempt petition against her and others for raising slogans during a demonstration in December 2000), Ms. Roy has admittedly been unsparing in her criticism of the apex court. However, in matters of criminal contempt, it is extremely important that judicial sensitivities do not get the better of judicial restraint. Moreover, at the end of the day, the litmus test for declaring someone guilty of criminal contempt is whether a conviction actually serves to preserve the dignity and authority of the Judiciary. In holding an otherwise law- abiding citizen such as Ms. Roy guilty, whose `offensive' words and actions stemmed from a clear commitment to a social and environmental cause, there is a real risk that public confidence in the Judiciary is likely to be eroded rather than enhanced.

It is pertinent to note that the original contempt petition filed against Ms. Roy was declared grossly defective and duly dismissed. Her conviction stemmed from a second and suo motu contempt proceeding after the Court found a few paragraphs in her affidavit (filed in reply to the original contempt petition) "scandalising" and "lowering of its dignity". It may be true that matters would not have come to such a pass if Ms. Roy, in the course of her long and passionate reply, had refrained from making a couple of questionable references or had chosen to retract them when given an opportunity to do so. But the overall progression of the contempt case, which began with a defective petition and ended with an unfortunate conviction, raises issues which go beyond the three `offending' paragraphs in her affidavit. They concern the worrying ease with which Indian courts invoke criminal contempt even as the courts in some other democratic countries have virtually given up this power. For instance, in Britain, the law is virtually a dead letter and in the United States, it is invoked only in the extraordinary circumstance that there is a clear and present danger to justice. The lack of settled criteria to assess what "scandalises" the court, the provision that even truth is not a defence against criminal contempt and the fact that the judge and the prosecutor are the very same in such proceedings have complex ramifications. Together, they demand that the Judiciary observe a tremendous amount of restraint when invoking criminal contempt. It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court has failed to do this in the case of Arundhati Roy.

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