The Hindu : U.S. seeks friends in Baghdad

Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Monday, Mar 24, 2003

Opinion

Opinion - News Analysis

U.S. seeks friends in Baghdad

By C. Raja Mohan

The acme of skill, according to Chinese sage Sun Tzu, lies in winning the war without fighting. This ancient lesson in warfare is central to the American strategy in `Operation Iraqi Freedom'. Washington wants to win the battle for Baghdad without much bloodshed. But like all wise lessons, it is easier said than done.

The television images of war in the last few days have riveted and angered world opinion. But they tell us less about the outcome of the war than the behind-the-scene contact between the U.S. and the Iraqi military leaders. These talks hold the key to the fate of `Operation Iraqi Freedom'.

Anglo-American forces have met surprisingly stiff resistance in southern Iraq, even as large contingents are racing towards Baghdad. Skirting major cities and refusing to take charge of urban centres on the way, the U.S. military forces are closing in on Baghdad. The arrival of the American troops at the gates of Baghdad will unveil a critical moment for both Washington and its Iraqi interlocutors.

The Bush Administration has denied that there are any direct talks between Washington and the leadership in Baghdad. But it has announced contacts at many levels between the U.S. forces and various military commanders in Iraq to avoid bloodshed in achieving regime change in Iraq.

The U.S. forces would prefer to drive in to Baghdad rather than fight for it street by street. Avoiding civilian casualties is also an important political consideration in the American strategy for changing the regime in Iraq.

All indications are that the U.S. agencies have been in contact with Iraqi leaders for months in the run up to the war. But these negotiations acquire a real salience only now, when Washington must make early decisions on how to conclude the war.

The negotiations had no real basis until the U.S. demonstrated its political will to take Baghdad by force if necessary. The "shock and awe" of this campaign has not come from the massive bombing of Baghdad. Raining of bombs on them is something the people of the city have long become accustomed to.

The shock of this war lies in the American willingness to risk large casualties in an aggressive land campaign to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi military has long been fed on the myth that the U.S. has no desire for a bloody conflict on the ground and prefers only attacks from the air.

Having demonstrated the political will to engage in a high risk land war and getting its forces rush towards Baghdad, Washington believes it has done enough to argue with its Iraqi interlocutors that the end is near and that it might be beneficial for them to stay on the winning side rather than perish with Saddam Hussein.

The problem for Washington, however, lies in the fact that its past efforts to probe the fissures in the Iraqi establishment had not been successful. American attempts to engineer a military coup inside Baghdad have failed in the face of the enormously tight control that Saddam Hussein has exercised over his power structure.

It is certainly not easy to believe the claim in Baghdad that "Iraq is Saddam Hussein and Saddam Hussein is Iraq". Divisions are natural in any power structure. But defections in Iraq carry the premium of instant retribution in the form of a death sentence from Saddam Hussein.

Further, it must be noted that while the regime of Saddam Hussein is narrowly based it has a fiercely loyal cadre of the ruling Bath Party that enjoys all the benefits from the current political order. It should be assumed that this cadre, including the Republican Guard, would fight to protect its own interests.

Giving political incentives to important elements in the present power structure in Baghdad is the key to breaking it. But offering substantive assurances to elements that have been associated with Saddam Hussein runs against the hopes of the Iraqi exiles abroad and minorities within for a comprehensive "de-Bathification" of Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein.

Given the high priority America attaches to a quick and decisive end to the conflict, there is no doubt the U.S. would want to accommodate remnants of the Saddam Hussein regime in some form, rather than prolong this war that has become so controversial.

While the U.S. President, George W. Bush, has tried to prepare his people for an extended conflict, the hopes for an early end to the conflict have been raised too high. And Mr. Bush is not unaware of the many problems that could arise from a conflict that drags on.

The challenge for Mr. Bush is to get these potential defectors to act quickly. He cannot wait indefinitely outside the gates of Baghdad.

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